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among dental practices to 1) remove any omitted factors influencing both practice intensity and patient load
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only a partial solution. To conclude, I discuss the policy levers available for addressing the misalignment of
clinical efficacy and provider reimbursement, using the theory of optimal insurance and optimal coverage of
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ABSTRACT
THE EFFECT OF MARKET EXPANSIONS ON PROVIDER BEHAVIOR IN
DENTISTRY
Shulamite S. Chiu
Daniel Polsky
How do market expansions that increase patient loads among o ces a↵ect provider treat-
ment behavior? This question is immediately relevant to recent insurance expansions, where
increases in insurance coverage may increase market demand for care. Because this may
result in positive income shocks for providers, providers may alter how they treat patients
across the entire practice to reallocate existing resources. Hence, a market expansion may
not only impact treatment of new patients but also treatment of existing patients.
A simple extension of the McGuire and Pauly (1991) model predicts that an insurance
expansion may be an e↵ective policy lever not only to increase dental or medical utiliza-
tion among populations prone to underutilization, but may also decrease provider-initiated
overutilization among existing patients. I then substantiate what decreases in provider-
initiated overutilization looks like using the clinical dental literature and reimbursement
rates across procedures. The hypotheses generated by this model are then tested empirically
using a novel source of dental claims data from Delta Dental of Michigan from 2008-2013. I
leverage an exogenous increase in demand for provider services from a dependent coverage
insurance expansion in the overall dental market. I use an instrumental variables strategy
to isolate increases in patient load that come solely from dependent expansion, and isolate
attention to continuously insured patients among dental practices to 1) remove any omitted
factors influencing both practice intensity and patient load and 2) detect changes in treat-
ment behavior initiated by providers, holding fixed demand-side factors. I find o ces face
up to a 8.64% increase in o ce loads from the dependent expansion, which leads to substi-
vii
tution away from intensive cavity procedures towards routine procedures. These empirical
results are consistent with the predictions of models of demand inducement and provider
behavior. I then follow with a more detailed discussion of why demand inducement is an
issue in the dental market and why an insurance expansion is only a partial solution. To
conclude, I discuss the policy levers available for addressing the misalignment of clinical
e cacy and provider reimbursement, using the theory of optimal insurance and optimal
coverage of preventive care.
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CHAPTER 1 : Introduction
How provider behavior responds to changes in financial incentives remains a central issue
in health economics (McGuire, 2000; Arrow, 1963). In particular, if providers respond to
changes in their financial incentives, whether they respond by decreasing their provision of
low-value care when there is asymmetric information about the patient’s true health con-
dition is still an outstanding question. The empirical literature in economics has generated
mixed results, part of which is due to 1) lack of adequate claims or practice data that traces
provider behavior across patients and insurers (Sintonen and Linnosmaa, 2000) and 2) the
di culty involved in finding an exogenous shock large enough to induce a change in provider
decision-making (De Jaegher and Jegers, 2000).
The small but growing literature on the supply-side e↵ects of insurance expansions has
demonstrated that insurance expansions may provide a useful source of variation to examine
how providers can alter supply-side behavior within their practices in response to sudden
changes in their financial incentives, and has identified potential e↵ects not only upon the
population targeted by the insurance expansion, but upon entire practices. In particular,
Buchmueller et al. (2016) showed that when state Medicaid programs added an adult dental
benefit, dentists were able to increase participation in Medicaid and see more Medicaid
patients without decreasing provision of visits to privately insured patients, with only a
modest increase in the time spent working and modest increases in wait times. This was
because dentists were able to use dental hygienists to provide routine procedures and could
increase the use of dental hygienists. Along similar lines, Garthwaite (2012) found that
o ce visits became shorter after implementation of the State Children’s Health Insurance
(SCHIP) Program even as physicians increased their participation in the SCHIP program.
These two studies examining the e↵ect of public insurance expansions on provider behavior
suggest overall that there may have been a change in the content of visits over all patients
within practices (due to modest increases in wait times in Buchmueller et al. (2016) and
shorter o ce visits in Garthwaite (2012) in response to each paper’s respective expansion
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of interest).
However, because the literature on the supply-side e↵ects of insurance expansions has pri-
marily examined survey data on providers and o ces to look at how provider behavior and
hiring decisions change in light of an insurance expansion, little is known about whether and
how providers change the content of visits in order to respond to an insurance expansion.
More concretely, it is unclear how changes in demand on the extensive margin may a↵ect
practice patterns on the intensive margin across patients within a practice.
The McGuire and Pauly (1991) model of provider behavior provides a theoretical founda-
tion for thinking about how large demand shocks will a↵ect provider treatment behavior.
The original McGuire and Pauly (1991) model suggests that an exogenous decrease in pa-
tients within a practice provides a negative income shock to providers, who may exploit
the informational asymmetry between providers and patients by increasing provision of
high-intensity care that patients would not otherwise value with full information (demand
inducement). This has been used most notably in Gruber and Owings (1996), where they
tested an exogenous decline in demand stemming from declines in fertility over 1970-1982.
They found that the negative income shock resulting from the decline in fertility was corre-
lated with increases in cesarean utilization. The McGuire and Pauly (1991) model then also
implies the opposite - if insurance expansions serve as a source of a positive income shock
to o ces, expansions may then lead to decreases in supplier-induced demand, if indeed
supplier-induced demand is occurring.
I provide a few extensions to the McGuire and Pauly (1991) model in Section 2.1 to show
how an exogenous increase in demand that comes from an insurance expansion may a↵ect
the incentive to induce demand for providers. Because the exogenous increase in demand
comes from an insurance expansion, I di↵erentiate continuously insured patients from new
patients who may be facing changes in their demand for care due to changes in the out-of-
pocket cost for treatment from the gain in insurance coverage. This predicts generally that
though the predictions for how treatment intensity will change for the newly insured are
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ambiguous, due to moral hazard e↵ects operating in contrast to income e↵ects, an insurance
expansion will lead to a decline in treatment intensity for continuously insured patients
who are fixed in any factors that influence demand for services. I also include a capacity
constraint for practices to model how the incentive to induce demand will decline further if
practices become capacity constrained, conditional on capacity-intensive treatments being
exactly the high-intensity services that providers have financial incentive to induce for.
This paper is, to my knowledge, the first test of whether insurance expansions have an
e↵ect on supplier-induced demand. Previously, there were two primary di culties in using
insurance expansions as positive demand shocks: 1) insurance expansions may not translate
directly to increases in access to care, and thus may not translate to demand shocks at the
o ce-level; and 2) examining how provider behavior changes within visits requires claims-
level data. In particular, Decker and Lipton (2015) hints at (1), suggesting that the e↵ects
of increases in coverage may have a larger e↵ect on the use of dental care, and thereby
the size of the demand shock to o ces, if reimbursements to providers are higher in the
case of Medicaid expansions. To ameliorate both issues of whether increases in coverage
result in increased access and utilization and the existence of claims data to trace provider
treatment behavior, I focus upon the dental care market, which faces the similar issues of
physician agency as in the medical care market. Section 2.3 describes where the incentives
to induce demand are in dentistry, and Chapter 3 discusses why insurance expansions in
the dental market are likely to lead to large demand shocks at the o ce-level, and describes
the claims-level data obtained from Delta Dental of Michigan, the main dental insurer in its
geographic market. However, I give a brief preview in the following paragraphs to outline
why the dental market is of interest in examining both the supply-side e↵ects of insurance
expansions and whether demand inducement occurs and to what extent.
Because dental care providers, like medical care providers, observe more information about
the patient than the patient himself or the insurer, there is room for dental providers to
induce demand without detection by both patients and insurers. An example of this is
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dental procedures for cavities. A simple example of this arises in dentistry comes from one
of the most common procedures - cavity fillings. Though a common and relatively simple
procedure, reimbursements vary with the size of the filling, and X-rays typically do not
capture the full extent of the tooth damage. Rather, the extent of the damage is known
only when the dentist drills into the tooth, and due to the di↵erences in reimbursement
for simple versus more complex cavities, the dentist has an incentive to carry out the
procedure for a larger filling than necessary. This can be done without penalty from the
insurer or patient because there is no way to detect at a claim-by-claim level whether the
dentist induced demand for a higher intensity procedure than would have otherwise been
demanded by the consumer with perfect information. Inducement at an individual claim
level is therefore neither observable nor verifiable.
A necessary question that follows then is whether the patient would care about an increase
in intensity of (restorative) treatment given full information. In short, yes. One reason is
that fillings do not last forever - they crack or degrade and must be replaced periodically.
However, when fillings are replaced, the original hole does not su ce, but an increasingly
larger hole in the tooth must be made with each consecutive filling replacement. The
larger a hole is, the less the structural integrity of the tooth and the higher the risk of
further bacterial damage deeper in the tooth that will necessitate an endodontic procedure
and the higher the risk of loosing the tooth altogether due to cracking or other reasons.
Hence, though the di↵erence in out-of-pocket cost between receiving a more complex cavity
procedure and a less complex procedure may be minimal to the patient (especially given
dental insurance coverage) initially, the di↵erence in severity may impact the consumer’s
downstream costs and demand for further follow-up procedures. The potential harm to
consumers in increasing the severity of procedures is discussed at length in Section 2.3.
Though consumers may have had repeated encounters with a dentist, quality is di cult for
consumers to ascertain, especially because many dental conditions tend to be asymptomatic.
When treatment alternatives presented to the patient are similar in out-of-pocket cost, time
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cost, and cosmetic appearance, the dentist will have the ability to sway the consumer to
procedures with higher probability of downstream procedures and/or with higher total
reimbursement rates. Hence, the issues with physician agency in medicine are present also
in dentistry.
Given the recent health insurance expansions, the degree to which providers have autonomy
over the amount of low-value care being given to patients is strongly relevant to the policy
discussions on how to design payment systems and innovate delivery systems to incentivize
more e cient provision of care. Though there has been a lack of consensus in the demand
inducement literature on whether demand inducement occurs and the degree to which it
exists, the literature on how providers respond to supply-side shocks is small but growing.
This literature has primarily examined survey data on providers and o ces to look at how
provider behavior and hiring decisions change in light of an insurance expansion, but little
is known about whether and how providers change the content of visits in order to respond
to an insurance expansion.
Conditional on the availability of the claims data, the dental care market is a promising
setting to study the impact of a large shock in demand on treatment behavior. This is
because any shocks in market-level demand is likely to impact dental practices more than
medical practices for a few reasons. The first reason for this is that dental practices primarily
operate under-capacity due to lack of market demand (Vujicic et al., 2013). Because the
majority of dental practices operate under capacity and are able to use dental hygienists to
provide routine preventive procedures for new patients with minimal cost to the o ce (other
than the cost of dental hygienists’ labor) (Buchmueller et al., 2016), dentists are incentivized
to receive rather than turn away new patients. In contrast, translating an increase in
demand for medical care (such as in the case of a private insurance expansion) to access
is a struggle in medicine (Bodenheimer and Pham, 2010; Bodenheimer et al., 2009; Colwill
et al., 2008). Decker and Lipton (2015) also stresses that in the dental market, an increase
in dental coverage will translate to larger increases in dental care utilization if payment
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rates are higher, which is more likely to be the case in private dental coverage expansions
relative to public dental coverage expansions 1. A less than one-to-one conversion from the
number of patients demanding care to the number of patients desiring care – especially
given private insurance coverage with higher payment rates relative to public insurance –
is less likely in dental care.
The potential for inducement behavior suggests that dental providers may alter their treat-
ment behavior in response to large shocks in market demand, allowing changes in induce-
ment to be detected in aggregate (rather than claim-by-claim). Though the majority of
dental practices are able to treat new patients with minimal increases in material cost, due
to the use of dental hygienists for routine and preventive procedures, there is still a shadow
cost of providing care to new patients. Given a fixed o ce capacity (i.e. the number of
chairs in an o ce), the o ce may have less capacity to provide treatments, especially more
time-intensive treatments that take up chairs for longer periods of time. Because of this,
providing routine procedures and care to new patients may spillover into the care received
by existing patients. Since dentists may be more likely to take on new patients relative to
other disciplines, an exogenous increase in market demand in dentistry is more likely to lead
to a dramatic change in treatment behavior, which is as a result more likely to be detected
in the data.
To test the empirical predictions from the extension of the McGuire and Pauly (1991)
model described in Chapter 2, I use dental claims from one of the largest dental insurers
in the United States to examine how provider behavior may be a↵ected by an insurance
expansion that e↵ectively facilitates access to providers. I use 2008-2014 dental claims
from Delta Dental of Michigan, Indiana, and Ohio (DDMI) that traces providers across
claims, patients, and years. This dataset is novel to the economics literature – dental
claims historically have been di cult to acquire, and no other dental claims datasets used
in the economics literature have been known to have the wide geographic variation that is
1This is also supported by the broader literature examining the e↵ects of generosity of provider payment
on Medicaid provider participation and access to care (e.g. (Polsky et al., 2015)).
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present in the DDMI data. The DDMI data contains dental claims across all fifty states
in the United States, with an average of 5.57 million unique individuals per year and an
average of 9.22 million claims processed per year. Furthermore, DDMI holds 65% market
share in its main states of operation (Michigan, Indiana, and Ohio), and captures more
than 93% of providers in its dental network, which helps to ameliorate concerns about new
enrollees switching between insurers or a change in insurance status leading to a change in
provider choice. As a result, we can identify patients that are truly new to practices and
to dental insurance plans. I also discuss at length what changes in demand inducement
may look like empirically given the clinical and institutional details of the dental market to
suggest what the welfare impacts on patients are.
The ultimate goal of this research is to analyze how substantial changes in o ce load
(measured primarily in the number of patients per o ce) impact treatment behavior. As a
result, this research is most concerned with whether providers’ treatment decisions respond
to the size of a shock from the number of new patients added into each o ce. However,
the simple correlation between changes in the number of patients in each o ce and the
average treatment intensity and quantity across patients does not account for the fact that
omitted variables, such as quality, may be influencing this relationship. A plausible story
is that patients may perceive o ces that implement more treatments or higher intensity
treatments to be higher quality, and thus flock to these o ces, leading o ces that are higher
intensity/quantity to have more patients. Hence, a plausibly exogenous shock that increases
o ce load and is uncorrelated with the underlying quality of an o ce is needed to resolve
this endogeneity problem.
To do this, I exploit a large dental insurance expansion stemming from the A↵ordable Care
Act as a novel source of variation that leads to a significant increase in o ce load among
o ces a↵ected by the expansion. As part of the A↵ordable Care Act, health plans were
required to extend coverage to dependents between ages 18-26 by the end of 2010, with
e↵ects on enrollment appearing starting in 2011. Dental plans were not required to make
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the same changes. However, many employer-sponsored dental plans did extend coverage to
dependents up to age 26. This could a↵ect dental coverage enrollment by 1) increasing take-
up among dependents and 2) increasing take-up among families with dependents that may
have had access to dental coverage for adults, but not for the dependents. Prior research has
found evidence of the dependent coverage expansion even among survey data (Vujicic et al.,
2014; Shane and Ayyagari, 2015), suggesting that the expansion is not DDMI-specific, but
industry-wide. Curran (2016) also reports in the 2016 IBISWorld Dental Industry report
that “ [an] uptick in the number of children with dental benefits, coupled with more young
adults (i.e. individuals aged 19 to 25) having private dental benefits, has provided a boon to
the [dental care] industry”. The identifying variation that is used in this project comes from
the fact that because the dependent coverage expansion among dental plans was strictly
voluntary and stemmed from employer-level decisions, the degree to which markets were
impacted by the dependent expansion varied and was not anticipated by dental providers
in the market.
To ensure that the increases in county-level enrollment and in patient loads for dental o ces
are a result of an increase in market demand, rather than an increase in Delta Dental-specific
enrollment, I instrument for the increase in demand using the simulated size of the expansion
in each market, proxied by the ratio of the population directly eligible for the insurance
expansion of interest. I find that a one standard deviation increase from the mean in the
size of the eligible population generates a 2.59% increase in dental coverage enrollment for
individuals under age 65, with spillovers in enrollment coming from the parents of those
eligible for dependent coverage. This suggests that up to a 9.2% increase in the number
of patients in each o ce is possible given a one standard deviation increase in the ratio
of eligible individuals in the population. The o ce-specific analyses suggest a substantive
demand shock for individual dental o ces of a size in line with the county-level analysis,
with o ces one standard deviation above the mean experiencing an average 3.6% increase
in the number of patients across all years in the post-implementation period, relative to
the baseline year of 2008, with o ces facing larger expansions experiencing up to an 9.5%
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increase in the number of patients.
Using two-stage least squares, with the simulated size of the dependent expansion at the
market-level as an instrument for increases in o ce load, I find that the sudden shock
in o ce load from the dependent expansion leads to a statistically significant decrease in
the average number of intensive cavity procedures across continuously insured patients and
a statistically significant and sizable increase in the average number of diagnostic imaging
procedures per continuously insured patient, and modest increases in the average number of
cleanings per continuously insured patients. Because I include only patients who have been
continuously insured throughout the time period, the increase in intensive cavity procedures
is not from a sudden change in insurance coverage, thus removing any moral hazard e↵ect
or changes in underlying demand. The result taken together suggest that a sudden increase
in an o ce’s workload leads to substitution away from intensive cavity procedures towards
routine procedures. This is consistent with the predictions of models of demand inducement
and provider behavior.
Given that the analysis in Chapter 4 is consistent with a theory of demand inducement, I
discuss in Chapter 5 why demand inducement is an issue in the dental market and why an
insurance expansion is only a partial solution to the problem of demand inducement among
providers. Generally, catastrophic dental costs or catastrophic medical costs resulting from
insu cient utilization of clinically e↵ective preventive care do not fall upon the dental
insurer. As a result, dental insurers are not incentivized to decrease the incentives for
demand inducement nor to provide incentives for dental providers to increase utilization of
clinically e↵ective preventive care. I then discuss the policy levers available for addressing
the misalignment of clinical e cacy and provider reimbursement, using the theory of optimal
insurance and optimal coverage of preventive care. Chapter 6 then concludes.
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CHAPTER 2 : Background
In this chapter, I outline first the economic theory for why providers may choose to prescribe
services that patients would not otherwise demand given full information (demand induce-
ment) and generate testable predictions for what will occur in the event of an insurance
expansion leading to an increase in the number of patients among practices. I then review
the previous literature testing similar predictions and discuss the historical challenges, as
well as areas for improvement.
Moving to the dental market more specifically, I review the clinical literature to describe
how reimbursement rates are misaligned with e↵ectiveness of dental treatment, which accen-
tuates the incentive to prescribe procedures with potentially negative impacts on patients’
clinical outcomes because of the financial reward to the provider. Because many of these
mispriced procedures are covered generously by insurers with little to no patient out-of-
pocket costs, this implies that if patients had full information about the clinical e↵ects and
costs of treatment, they would not acquiesce to treatments with low clinical e cacy and
high financial reward for providers. As a result, there is substantial incentive to prescribe
low-value care to patients in the dental market. The data used in this dissertation then is
introduced to further assess the validity of the assumptions in the theoretical model and
more concretely discuss how reimbursement rates give rise to incentives to prescribe dental
treatments for which patients with full information would otherwise reject in the dental
market.
Given the substantive incentive to induce demand in the dental market and the disincentive
dental insurers have to increase utilization of e↵ective preventive care and decrease the plau-
sible over-utilization of restorative care, the implications of the theoretical section suggest
that increases in dental insurance coverage may be a partial solution to incentivize more
preventive care and less restorative care. As a result, rather than exacerbating the problems
of mispricing of procedures relative to their clinical e cacy and to patient net benefit, and
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the resulting incentive to overuse mispriced procedures, increases in insurance coverage may
be a short run solution to decreasing the incentive to overuse procedures without changing
the payment structure of insurance plans.
2.1. Theory
2.1.1. Profit Maximizing O ces
I discuss here briefly how o ces in a monopolistically competitive market would react to an
increase in market demand, where they face potentially binding capacity constraints. This
discussion uses the model discussed in McGuire (2000), which outlines a monopolistically
competitive model with administered prices (where prices are always above cost for covered
services), symmetric information, and quantity-setting o ces.
In this model, providers can set take-it-or-leave-it o↵ers to patients, where the o↵er of
treatment optimally extracts all of the available consumer surplus for each patient, given
a non-binding capacity constraint. A binding capacity constraint would e↵ectively cause
there to be an additional per-unit cost of production (the shadow cost). As long as the
reimbursement for services remains above the cost of production with the per-unit shadow
cost from a binding capacity constraint, then the profit per unit is strictly positive and the
provider extracts all the consumer surplus from each patient as possible by setting quantity
as high as the patient can tolerate without going to another provider. This is because
the provider has the market power and non-retradability to extract all available consumer
surplus even when prices are administered and providers set quantity.
In the monopolistically competitive model, a change in the number of patients that does not
lead to a binding capacity constraint should not change how the provider optimizes at the
patient level, but may instead change the composition of patients within the practice. This
is because some of the new consumers that have come into the market may have a higher
willingness to pay per unit of service, which allows the provider to extract more consumer
surplus from these patients. Once a patient is within a practice, the provider chooses to
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extract all the consumer surplus. However, providers may respond to a sudden influx of
patients in the market by shifting towards patients with a greater willingness to pay per
unit (so that they can extract more consumer surplus from these patients).
Suppose though that the monopolistically competitive o ce faces a binding capacity con-
straint. The o ce seeks to extract as much consumer surplus as possible from each patient,
but is constrained by the capacity within the practice. Then, the o ce will extract as much
as possible given capacity and cut down on sevices with low patient value first. However,
there should be no change among the highest-value services because providers were already
extracting all the available consumer surplus from provision of the high-value services.
Generally, the shift towards patients with higher willingness to pay in the event of a market
expansion predicts an increase in quantity of services with no capacity constraint, but this
is from a change in the patient composition in the practice. If the practice becomes capacity
constrained from the market expansion, then there is a decline in low-value services, but no
change in high-value services.
As a result, an examination of changes in treatment behavior among patients continually in a
practice in the monopolistically competitive model should yield either no change (if capacity
does not bind) or a decline in low-value services and no change or a decline in high-value
services. There should be no increases in any type of service under the monopolistically
competitive model.
2.1.2. When O ces Can Induce Demand
A useful theoretical framework for analyzing how providers respond to insurance expansions
when there is the incentive and ability to induce demand is the McGuire and Pauly (1991)
model which has been the basis of much of the empirical work aimed at detecting whether
inducement takes place among providers and to what extent. The key element of this model
is that providers receive utility from income and disutility from the e↵ort put towards
convincing patients to receive low-value care. This generally takes place in the form of
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high intensity procedures for which the patient is ill-suited for and would not receive given
perfect information. The main prediction of the model is as follows:
Prediction 1. All else fixed, an increase in the number of patients seen in
a practice will lead to a decrease in inducement carried out per patient in the
practice.
There are a few reasons for providers to 1) experience disutility from inducement e↵ort
and 2) decrease the amount of inducement when there is an increase in the number of
patients within a practice. The first, discussed by McGuire and Pauly (1991), is that there
is a “conscience” cost of inducement, in which providers feel guilty at their behavior and
therefore receive disutility from increased e↵orts at inducement. The second, suggested by
Dranove (1988), is that there are negative reputational e↵ects from increasing inducement.
Related to this is that as the number of patients increases, the probability of insurers or
other stakeholders detecting inducement behavior increases, with punishments ranging from
exessclusion from provider networks in an insurance plan or litigation for fraud in extreme
cases. A decline in inducement then could yield either 1) a decline in intensive services only
or 2) substitution between high-intensity to low-intensity services.
A third reason for providers to decrease inducement when there is an increase in patient
load is that providers may face a capacity constraint in the number of patients, the number
of patient visits, and/or the number of treatments that can be provided. In the operations
management literature, Pac¸ and Veeraraghavan (2015) suggest that when the low-value
care takes the form of treatments that are more highly reimbursed and require more time,
congestion in the practice may act as a natural cost of overtreatment by imposing longer
delays and higher waiting costs for consumers when demand exceeds supply. As a result,
providers may substitute towards less intensive treatments that take up less time and space
in the practice when there is a large influx of patients, and capacity cannot be adjusted
in the short run. Incorporating a capacity constraint into the McGuire and Pauly (1991)
model, with each service taking up varying levels of capacity in the practice (because some
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services use up more materials, manpower, and o ce space than others), generates the
following prediction.
Prediction 2. An increase in o ce size that causes the capacity constraint
to be binding at initial levels of inducement leads to decreased inducement per
service per patient, with stronger results for services that take up more capacity
in the practice.
Moral hazard among the newly insured adds an additional layer of complication to models
of provider behavior when an increase in the number of patients seen in practices is caused
by an increase in insurance coverage among the population, which is directly relevant to this
paper. Health insurance expansions may a↵ect the quality and quantity of care received
across all patients, due to increased demand through the avenues of both increased market
size and increased moral hazard. We have discussed the intuition behind the impact of
increased market size above. However, moral hazard among the newly insured may lead
to increases in demand for procedures due to the change in the out-of-pocket price faced
by consumers for medical care. This is well-documented in the literature, especially for
the impact of utilization among the newly insured (for instance, Brook et al. (1984) and
Finkelstein et al. (2012)). As a result, I separate patients into two di↵erent groups in the
practice, the continuously insured and the newly insured. Though there are up to four
potential groups of patients in the practice – 1) those who were previously and continue
to be insured and seeing the dentist, 2) those who are newly insured and were not seeing
the dentist previously, 3) those who are newly insured and were seeing the dentist out-of-
pocket previously, and 4) those who are seeing the dentist out-of-pocket – the two that can
be identified in the data are groups (1) and (2), the continuously insured and the newly
insured. Because the e↵ect of the insurance expansion used in this paper primarily increases
insurance rates among those previously not seeing the dentist out-of-pocket (discussed later
in Section V on data and measurement), I abstract away from groups (3) and (4), those
who were seeing the dentist out-of-pocket without insurance at some point in time.
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The newly insured who were not being seen in practices prior to gaining dental insurance
face a shock in their out-of-pocket price for treatment. This is because previously, the
out-of-pocket prices for this group was prohibitively high (so that they were previously not
seeing the dentist without insurance) and declines after insurance receipt. As a result, the
newly insured may both increase their consumption of dental services and be less resistant
to inducement when the out-of-pocket price of services declines (especially for cleanings and
X-rays) upon becoming insured in a dental plan. This leads to the following prediction for
the newly insured:
Prediction 3. A decrease in price for the newly insured (who were not
seeing the dentist prior to insurance receipt) leads to an increase in the quantity
of services for the newly insured.
As a result, Prediction 3 is in direct contradiction to Predictions 1 and 2, which predict a
decrease in quantity of services among both intensive and capacity-intensive services and a
potential increase in quantity of low-intensity treatments (due to a decline in inducement
for intensive services leading to substitution to low-intensity treatments). Hence, whether
quantity increases or decreases for the newly insured is theoretically ambiguous.
To avoid ambiguous predictions, I focus attention on the continually insured in the practices
who are not experiencing abrupt changes in plan design. This results in the following
testable hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1. An increase in the number of newly insured patients in the
practice will lead to a decrease in inducement for the continuously insured.
Hypothesis 2. When capacity constraints become binding, an increase
in the number of newly insured patients in the practice will lead to stronger
decreases in inducement for more capacity-intensive services among the contin-
uously insured.
However, if the capacity constraint becomes binding and the e↵ect of capacity especially
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for more time- and capacity-intensive procedures (that generally tend to be more intensive
services in dentistry) dominates the moral hazard e↵ect for the newly insured, it may be
possible to detect a stronger decline in the quantity of services provided per newly insured
patient for more intensive services relative to less intensive services (such as cleanings and
X-rays). This leads to Corollary 2.
Corollary 1. Hypothesis 2 may hold for the newly insured if the capacity
e↵ect dominates the moral hazard e↵ect for the newly insured.
Overall, the model implies that there may be a change in the general equilibrium of the
quantity and quality of services provided across all patients, and thus implies spillovers
onto continuously insured patients. In particular, a decline in inducement implies both
a decline in high intensity services that is substituted for with a possible increase in low
intensity services for continuously insured patients. This is in contrast to the case of the
profit maximizing o ce, which predicts 1) no change in treatment for continuously insured
and continuously seen patients when there exists excess capacity and 2) only a decline or no
change in the quantity of both high- and low-value services. Whether quantity and quality
of services received by patients changes in response to an insurance expansion, the size
of the spillovers to patients that were seen prior to insurance expansions, and the welfare
consequences of such changes has yet to be explored. The full details of the extension of
the McGuire and Pauly (1991)(1991) model for this paper are in the Appendix.
2.2. Prior Literature
The two strains in the literature examining variation in incentives to induce care lever-
ages either changes in provider-to-population ratios (density) or changes in reimbursement
(McGuire, 2000). Though changes in reimbursement, especially with regulated fees that
are present in many healthcare markets, more directly influence the incentives to induce
demand compared to changes in provider-to-population ratios, the subset of the literature
focusing on changes in reimbursement has faced several problems.
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First, a change in fees under the McGuire and Pauly (1991) model yields mostly ambiguous
predictions about what occurs to supplier-induced demand because the substitution and
income e↵ects from a change in fees may cancel each other out. Hence, not only must changes
in fees be large enough to cause providers to change their behavior, but income e↵ects
also must dominate any substitution e↵ects (McGuire and Pauly, 1991), making detecting
marginal changes in demand inducement di cult, which De Jaegher and Jegers (2000)
point out is the only way to determine whether demand inducement exists in practice. For
instance, Yip (1998) looked at Medicare fee cuts for previously overpriced procedures, which
threatened to be a 26% loss of surgeon income assuming constant volume. The result was
that volume increased for these procedures among both Medicare and private patients,which
was then strongly suggested to stem from a strong income e↵ect consistent with models of
demand inducement. In contrast, Gruber et al. (1999) finds an increase in C-sections after
an increase in reimbursement relative to vaginal deliveries. The di↵erences may be due
to examining small versus large changes in incentives for inducement - small changes may
imply smaller income e↵ects, whereas larger changes may imply more dramatic income
e↵ects. Second, there is di culty in untangling patient-initiated changes in utilization from
provider-initiated changes in utilization especially when a change in fees may reflect not
only a change in provider payment but also patient payment, and when the data is unable
to directly determine what is patient-initiated and what is provider-initiated. Dijk et al.
(2013) attempts to make use of both a change in reimbursement systems (a shift from a
combination of social and private health insurance towards compulsory single universal basic
health insurance), which could arguably lead to a large income e↵ect, in the Netherlands
and data that distinguishes between patient- and provider-initiated utilization. Though they
find positive evidence of supplier-induced demand, it is unclear whether their di↵erence-in-
di↵erences specification passes the parallel trends test, which is a basic condition for the
use of the di↵erence-in-di↵erences approach, due to their use of a limited time frame with
one year prior to the policy change and one year after.
The McGuire and Pauly (1991) model is not the only model of demand inducement that
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generates predictions for how changes in provider density will change treatment behavior.
Another key model is Dranove (1988), which models patients as Bayesian learners with
information about the frequency with which a provider overprescribes treatment. Hence,
based on the reputation of the provider and the diagnostic skill of the patient, the patient
will choose whether to consent to treatment or not. The result is that both the patient’s
consent strategy and a utility-maximizing provider’s strategy both use cuto↵ rules. Hence,
the provider may induce demand by lowering the cuto↵ and thereby recommending treat-
ment for less severe clinical indications, but patients respond be increasing their cuto↵s,
thus limiting the amount of demand inducement that can be carried out by providers.
Dranove (1988) notes that “as the physician/population ratio [decreases], each consumer’s
information about particular physicians will [increase]”, thereby decreasing the incentive
to induce demand. This is a prediction that is supported also by the McGuire and Pauly
(1991) model, but stressing a di↵erent mechanism - negative reputational e↵ects from in-
creasing demand inducement. De Jaegher and Jegers (2000) and Reinhardt (1985) both
point out that the positive relation between the physician/population ratio and induce-
ment is the only prediction that distinguishes hypotheses derived from demand inducement
models from those derived from the neoclassical model.
The literature thus far has been limited in the ability to empirically test the original McGuire
and Pauly (1991) hypothesis of how a change in market size a↵ects provider behavior in
a fully rigorous way. An early series of papers attempted to take advantage of the clear
empirical implications coming from changes in market size in McGuire and Pauly (1991) by
examining how variation in the provider-to-population ratio a↵ected treatment intensity.
The smaller literature on demand inducement in dentistry has primarily used this strategy
(Manning Jr and Phelps, 1979; Conrad et al., 1987; Mueller and Monheit, 1988). However,
these papers su↵ered from endogeneity concerns, particularly because provider location
choice is not exogenous from the taste for and demand for certain levels of treatment
intensity in markets, which may then a↵ect the provider density in markets. Dranove and
Wehner (1994) famously clarified and emphasized this by testing an empirical strategy often
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used among these papers by testing for inducement in childbirths, and found “evidence” of
inducement in an area where there should have been none.
This paper most closely follows the vein of the Gruber and Owings (1996) and Currie
and Gruber (2001) approaches, which use exogenous changes in market size for medical
treatment. Gruber and Owings (1996) uses the declining fertility in the United States as an
exogenous income shock to obstetrician/gynecologists during the 1970s. Because declining
fertility rates are exogenous with respect to tastes for treatment intensity and changes in
reimbursement levels, the authors could estimate the size of the income e↵ect on treatment
intensity, finding that within-state declines in fertility are correlated strongly with within-
state increases in cesarean utilization. The Currie and Gruber (2001) paper uses a similar
approach in looking at the e↵ect of exogenous market expansions on treatment intensity, but
use instead the di↵erential timing and size of Medicaid expansions, finding that treatment
intensity increased for childbirths among the previously uninsured, but decreased for those
who were likely to have had held private insurance coverage prior to the expansions, and
then to have switched to Medicaid. As in both Gruber and Owings (1996) and Currie and
Gruber (2001), there cannot be much said about the levels at which inducement is provided
at, but only the change in inducement due to the policy intervention. This implies that
the size of the policy intervention must be large enough to induce a measurable change in
inducement.
Policies impacting rates of insurance coverage, such as insurance expansions, that translate
to increases in the patient load among practices may then be a promising area to look
for policy interventions. However, part of the di culty in the literature in assessing how
providers alter their treatment behavior in response to changes in coverage rates comes
from 1) inability to trace providers across patients and insurers in many claims datasets
and 2) di culty in finding an exogenous change in insurance coverage that is large enough
to impact an o ce’s workload su ciently. The degree to which o ce workload is a↵ected
by an insurance expansion depends on whether providers are incentivized and are able to
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turn away patients. If providers are able to exert control over their o ce workload, then an
insurance expansion will not lead to an increase in access for those previously uninsured, and
supply-side decisions should not be substantially impacted by the expansion. Nonetheless,
studying what the e↵ects of insurance expansions on provider behavior is still an important
open question, and examining di↵erent sections of the healthcare market that vary in their
ability to translate insurance coverage to access to care may give a broader view of how
insurance expansions may impact provider behavior given a certain provider landscape.
As a result, this paper also relates to the literature on the supply-side e↵ects of insurance
expansions, which is a developing area of study in the economics literature. So far, the
status quo in the literature on the supply-side e↵ects of insurance expansions has been to
use self-reported provider data (Garthwaite, 2012; Buchmueller et al., 2016), which is unable
to capture changes in dental treatment choices, though variables such as hours supplied per
week by the dentist and dental hygienists that are not directly captured in dental claims
data is available.
In the literature on the e↵ect of insurance expansions, both Buchmueller et al. (2016) and
Decker and Lipton (2015) specifically examine what occurs in public dental insurance ex-
pansions by looking at increases in the generosity of Medicaid adult dental benefits over time
and across states, but are unable to examine changes in provider treatment behavior that
may be important underlying mechanisms driving their results. While Buchmueller et al.
(2016) focuses on the e↵ect on supply-side behavior finds that dental providers respond
to Medicaid expansions by increasing take-up of Medicaid patients and shifting work to
dental hygienists, they are unable to examine how the content of visits change and thereby
a↵ect patient outcomes and welfare. Using a similar source of variation, Decker and Lipton
(2015) finds that not only does increasing generosity of adult dental benefits increase utiliza-
tion of dental services, but also seems to decrease the likelihood of severe dental problems.
However, their data evaluating the clinical e↵ect is limited to only leverages cross-sectional
variation due to the limitations in the time period available for the data (one year only
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using the dental health outcomes available only in the 2008 National Health Interview Sur-
vey) and is unable to untangle where the improvements in dental health may come from.
As in Buchmueller et al. (2016), Decker and Lipton (2015) is also unable to examine what
occurs with utilization among patients who already had insurance and what the net e↵ect
on supply-side choices and treatment behavior may have been. Furthermore, it is unknown
how the impact of public expansions in dental insurance may di↵er from private expansions
- Decker and Lipton (2015) also suggests that the e↵ects of increases in coverage may have
a larger e↵ect on the use of dental care if reimbursements to dentists are higher.
In general, there is little information both on how insurance expansions a↵ect treatment
behavior among providers and in the broader literature using the exogenous variation pro-
vided through insurance expansions. This literature has previously discussed the e↵ects
on selection and crowd-out (Hackmann et al., 2015; Gruber and Simon, 2008), as well as
on access, utilization, and health outcomes (Finkelstein et al., 2012; Mueller and Monheit,
1988; Kolstad and Kowalski, 2012). However, none to date have examined the impact of
insurance expansions on provider treatment choices. This is primarily been because the
service-specific data rarely exists especially for dental markets (Sintonen and Linnosmaa,
2000), and prior insurance expansions have been relatively small in size and have not dif-
ferentially a↵ected markets in unpredictable ways, as has been the case with the recent
implementation of the ACA.
2.3. What Does Demand Inducement Look Like in Dentistry?
Prior literature on supplier-induced demand in dentistry has emphasized that historically,
the supply of dental services has exceeded demand, especially due to the reduction in dental
disease that took place in the 70s and 80s (Grytten et al., 1990) that was hypothesized
to come from increases in fluoridation and use of fluoride toothpaste. In this context,
researchers were concerned about the possibility of dentists inducing demand to make up
for the fall in income from the decline in demand for dental services. Few researchers have
defined clearly, however, where the incentives to induce demand arise in dentistry.
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Dranove (1988) writes that ”inducement models...suggest that physicians induce demand
by recommending procedures even though the available clinical information indicates that
the expected costs of the procedure (to the patient) exceed the expected benefits.” Hence,
in this section, I seek to show that there is incentive to induce demand in dentistry. To
do this, I address 1) what the clinical recommendations and summarize briefly the clinical
evidence that exists (or does not exist) for each recommendation, 2) the clinical and financial
ramifications for the patient in increasing intensity of treatment and 3) whether the payment
structure for dental procedures reimburse more strongly for higher intensity of care and to
what extent.
Dental services are broadly separated into seven basic types, which are as follows: 1) pre-
ventive care, such as cleanings and routine o ce visits encapsulating exams and X-rays; 2)
restorative care, such as fillings and crowns; 3) endodontic care, such as root canals; 4) oral
surgery; 5) orthodontics, such as retainers and braces; 5) periodontics; and 7) prosthodon-
tics, such as dentures and bridges.
There exists a robust literature with randomized clinical trials supporting the e cacy of
several low-cost, low intensity preventive procedures especially for certain populations, such
as fluoride varnish (Marinho et al., 2002) and the use of sealants among children and silver
diamine fluoride (Liu et al., 2012; Rosenblatt et al., 2009; Zhi et al., 2012). Furthermore,
there has also been some evidence that improving dental hygiene habits can not only prevent
(especially through the use of fluoride toothpaste as in Marinho et al. (2002)), but also
reverse early cavities. This is due to how cavities progress. The National Institute of Dental
and Craniofacial Research (2013) writes that ”[tooth] decay is the result of an infection with
certain types of bacteria that use sugars in food to make acids...[which over] time make a
cavity in the tooth”. Hence, when a tooth frequently becomes exposed to acid, this can cause
the protective enamel surrounding a tooth to lose minerals. Over time, enamel may become
”weakened and destroyed, forming a cavity” (National Institute of Dental and Craniofacial
Research, 2013), though before a cavity is formed, enamel can repair itself using minerals
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from saliva and from fluoride (via toothpaste or other sources). Hence, application of
fluoride or improved brushing habits can reverse a potential cavity. ”Current dental caries
management considers caries disease to be a dynamic and reversible process” (Braga et al.,
2010), because ”dental caries is a dynamic process fluctuating between demineralization
and remineralization over time” (Rochlen and Wol↵, 2011).
However, these interventions tend to either not be reimbursed highly enough to incentivize
dentists to use them or not reimbursed at all by dental plans (Niederman et al., 2017),
both public and private. Because these procedures are estimated to be e↵ective to decrease
future caries by 40% (fluoride varnish) and up to 80% (silver diamine fluoride, sealants), they
potentially pose a threat to the future income stream of dentists by diminishing the future
number of cavities that will enter the practice, especially because providers are reimbursed
on a fee-for-service basis. Thus, these procedures are under-utilized, though the clinical
literature supporting these interventions date back more than fifty years (Niederman et al.,
2017) and one of the stated Healthy People 2020 goals are to improve sealant usage among
children and adolescents up to age 15. The e↵ect of silver diamine fluoride to arrest caries
has been known for more than a century (also called ”Howe’s solution” after Howe, who
reported on its e↵ects on caries prevention in 1917), though fell out of use fifty years ago.
I discuss why dental insurers have not better reimbursed these procedures in Chapter 5.
In contrast, the majority of services that are covered by dental benefits have not been
shown to clinically reduce the prevalence of dental cavities. Currently, dental benefits
generally cover annual or twice-yearly o ce visits for an exam, cleaning, X-rays (generally
one set of bitewing X-rays a year, with four films to a set), and sealants (eligibility for
coverage for sealants is typically age-determined) (National Association of Dental Plans,
2014), with additional visits requiring patients to pay out-of-pocket for additional routine
procedures. For other non-routine or non-preventive procedures, the consumer typically
is required to pay some amount of the procedure costs. Notably however, there are no
clinical trials demonstrating that twice-yearly oral evaluations and cleanings (prophylaxis)
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reduce prevalence of dental caries (Niederman et al., 2017; Bader, 2005; Davenport et al.,
2003). Similarly, there has been little or no data demonstrating that dental surgeries that
extract tooth decay followed by fillings reduces or prevents the underlying bacterial infection
from continuing to destroy further tooth structure in the mouth (Niederman et al., 2015).
Furthermore, there are systematic reviews that find that traditional fillings that remove
tooth structure in the process of treatment lead to significant increases in the probability of
adverse events relative to sealing early cavities or using atraumatic restorations (Ricketts
et al., 2013; Schwendicke et al., 2013; Niederman et al., 2015). The dental literature has
only recently been highlighting the lack of robust evidence supporting the e cacy of the
majority of traditional dental treatment (Ricketts et al., 2013), and this has come to light
in the popular media as well recently in a series of news articles (Frakt, 2016; Carroll, 2016;
Holmes, 2016; Donn, 2016; Saint Louis).
As for X-rays, there is not a robust evidence base demonstrating that traditional imaging
techniques are e↵ective in diagnosing cavities. Meurer et al. (2015) reviewed the literature
comparing dental imaging to visual inspection in diagnosis of common dental conditions
among children and adolescents and found that the evidence is mixed, but that dental
imaging and visual inspection are comparable. Some of the mixed evidence may be due to
the variation among dentists in defining whether a tooth is carious or not (Greenfield Boyce,
2005). However, because X-rays are two-dimensional and tooth damage three-dimensional,
”the core technology of X-radiation allows detection of proximal caries lesions only when
they are at least halfway through the enamel radiographically” (Berg, 2014). Furthermore,
there is significant di↵erences in radiographic interpretation across dental providers (Balto
and Al-Madi, 2004). Hence, the American Dental Association suggests that though the
frequency of X-rays is up to the dental provider depending on the individual patient’s risk
for cavities, adults with regularly scheduled professional care and at generally low risk for
dental caries are recommended to have one set of posterior bitewings once every two to
three years. 1
1It should also be noted that there exist other detection methods available to dentists for diagnosing
24
Despite the lack of evidence on the e↵ectiveness of oral evaluations and cleanings and X-ray
imaging, annual or twice-yearly o ce visits for examinations, cleanings, and X-rays are
typically covered in full by dental insurance plans. The 2013 American Dental Association
Survey of Dental Fees suggests that a routine visit with an oral evaluation (CDT code
D0120 for established patients), four films of bitewing X-rays (D0274), topical application
of fluoride (D1204), and an adult prophylaxis (cleaning) (D1110) could allow the provider
to reap an average of $216.23 in total reimbursement and as much as $286, based o↵ of
the average and 95th percentile reported fees from general dental practitioners in the East
North Central Division of the United States.
Because the profit margin for routine procedures is arguably higher than the profit margin
for most other dental services, dentists would tend to prefer providing routine procedures
over restorative procedures. Multiple dentists have asserted this to the author in informal
discussions, but to estimate roughly the costs of routine procedures relative to restorative
procedures, I use mean Medicaid procedure fees across the ten most populous states (Cali-
fornia, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Michigan, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
and Texas). 2 The average Medicaid reimbursement for a visit that includes a periodic oral
evaluation, prophylaxis (cleaning) for an adult, topical fluoride varnish, and a set of bitew-
ing X-rays (four images) is approximately $96. The roughly estimated profit of a routine
visit comprised of these procedures is then more than $150. Furthermore, many routine
services are in the scope of practice for dental hygienists in most states, which likely drives
cavities that are typically not covered by insurance, but which may allow dentists to persuade patients
into cavity treatment for teeth with pre-carious lesions. Recent technological developments for early caries
detection tools, such as light-based imaging (Wilder-Smith et al., 2010), has allowed for early detection of
changes in the tooth instead of relying on X-rays or visual inspection by the dentist, but have been alleged
to contribute to false positives or used to prescribe restorations. Though this technology could be used to
identify weak spots in the tooth that would benefit from, for instance, fluoride application, there have been
reports of using this technology to diagnose pre-cavities as cavities (Greenfield Boyce, 2005), though there
has not been research to substantiate these claims. Furthermore, not all methods can accurately detect
early cavities and may result in both false positives and false negatives (Zandona´ and Zero, 2006). Hence,
early caries detection methods should not be used to justify premature restorative intervention (Zandona´
and Zero, 2006). Currently, insurance coverage for early detection methods is very limited, so dentists may
o↵er scans from early detection methods for free as part of a regular o ce visit or cleaning (Johannes, 2015).
2This is in lieu of better estimates of the cost for care, which the author thinks is likely to be driven
heavily by the amount of time that a dentist and his or her sta↵ spend on the examination and the cleaning.
To my knowledge, there has not been any good consensus on how long routine visits take.
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down the underlying cost incurred by the dentist for these services, since the dentist’s time
can be better spent providing other services that might generate a higher profit margin
in a shorter period of time. In contrast, one-surface amalgam fillings in the East North
Central Division of the United States (Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin)
are reimbursed an average of $118.93 but with an average Medicaid reimbursements across
the ten most populous states for one-surface resin-based composites of $52 to $53, routine
visits are estimated to be more than twice as profitable than cavity fillings. I note that
using Medicaid reimbursements to estimate costs for non-routine dental procedures is likely
an underestimate of the cost for carrying out these procedures, since the state Medicaid
programs try to disincentivize the provision of non-routine procedures. Hence, the profit
margin for a routine visit is arguably higher than that from one-surface fillings.
Given no restrictions on the number of routine visits per patient, it is likely that a profit-
maximizing dentist would seek to increase the number of routine visits per patient as much
as possible and solely run their practice on routine visits. However, because insurers place
yearly limits on the number of routine procedures per patient with full coverage (with
additional routine procedures usually being charged to the patient) and there is a significant
time cost for patients in traveling for additional routine care, this places a limit on how many
routine visits a dentist may persuade a patient into. Hence, it is unlikely that excess routine
care (where the cost to the patient outweighs the clinical benefit) is being prescribed beyond
the yearly constraints placed on utilization of routine procedures imposed by insurers. 3
Once a dental provider has maximized the number of routine procedures that can be ad-
ministered per patient, it is possible that demand inducement takes place among cavity
3There is also an argument here, given the lack of clinical evidence supporting the e cacy of routine
procedures in reducing or preventing caries, that the simple use of routine procedures is demand inducement
in and of itself. However, what also matters here is the belief of the dentist administering care and whether
they believe that they are inducing demand or not. If a dentist provides a service with no clinical value that
insurers encourage them to administer and that they believe improves patient outcomes and welfare, then
to the dentist, encouraging patients to receive the clinically ine↵ective service is not demand inducement.
Furthermore, I would like to note here that the lack of clinical robust evidence does not necessarily mean
that these services are necessarily of no clinical value, but merely indicates that there is yet no evidence to
support their clinical value. In contrast, however, there are treatments for which there is robust evidence of
e cacy that will be discussed.
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procedures. This is because there is substantial financial incentive to increase severity of
cavity treatment. For instance, national average fees for general practitioners in Illinois,
Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin suggest that a dentist could reap an average of
$131.69 additional from going from a one-surface to a three-surface resin-based composite
filling (for a posterior tooth), with the one-surface fillings costing an average of $155.83
and the four-surface fillings $287.52 (American Dental Association, 2014). Furthermore,
because X-rays are two-dimensional and typically do not show the extent of tooth damage,
X-rays are not usually required by insurers to justify cavity filling procedures. Hence, there
is generally no evidence that an insurer or a patient is able to latch onto which would justify
the size of a cavity filling.
Increases in the size of a cavity filling can have detrimental e↵ects on patient cost and
outcomes. Ricketts et al. (2013) writes that ”removal of all [tooth] decay has some disad-
vantages, including damage to the nerve of the tooth, toothache and possibly weakening of
the tooth structure”. The larger the filling, the more structure that is removed from the
tooth and the higher the likelihood of a crack in the tooth - which requires follow-up care
such as a new filling, crown, root canal, or an extraction(American Association of Endodon-
tists, 2016)4 - or for a general failure of the restoration5 (Bernardo et al., 2007). The risk
of a dental restoration failing is non-trivial - ”it has been estimated that the replacement
of failed restorations constitutes about 60 percent of all operative work” (Bernardo et al.,
2007). Furthermore, fillings typically need to be replaced every five to fifteen years depend-
ing on the type of material used and the stress that the filling is subject to, but each time a
filling is replaced, more of the tooth structure necessarily needs to be removed. As a result,
an increase in the size of a filling increases the patient’s future likelihood of needing further
intensive treatment on the same tooth and increases the future expected cost of maintaining
the condition of the tooth. Specific cost estimates of the downstream costs of maintaining
4From a clinical point of view, extractions are the worst case scenario.
5”Failure occurs when a restoration reaches a level of degradation that precludes a level of degradation
that precludes proper performance either for esthetic or functional reasons or because of inability to prevent
new disease”(Bernardo et al., 2007)
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cavity fillings of di↵erent sizes were unavailable, but a study conducted by Delta Dental
found that
...over a person’s lifetime it costs $1,788 to maintain a single filling on an
anterior tooth and $2,108 to maintain one in a premolar. On average, patients
who develop cavities in their molars between ages 7 and 12 require more than
$1,000 in services by age 40 to maintain each restoration.
These estimates do not include the risk of a restoration failing and consequent intensive
follow-up treatment. Bernardo et al. (2007) ran a randomized controlled trial comparing
survival of amalgam and resin-based composite posterior restorations and found that 10.1
percent of primary restorations failed within seven years, regardless of the type of material
used in the restoration. To give an idea of the cost involved in follow-up care for a failed
restoration that necessitates follow-up endodontic work, the average fee for endodontic
therapy on a molar in the East North Central Division of the United States is $945.51
(American Dental Association, 2014) 6. With limited insurance coverage for intensive dental
procedures, this represents a potentially large financial loss to the patient. Hence, though
a patient may not face substantial increases in immediate out-of-pocket cost due to an
increase in the size of a filling, the potential cost and risk to a patient from an increase from
a larger filling is likely to be non-negligible. Because of the decrease in consumer welfare
(both risk and expected future costs increase from an increase in the size of a cavity filling),
holding fixed the true underlying severity of the patient’s oral condition, an increase in the
severity of a cavity procedure instigated by the dentist would meet the definition of demand
inducement as defined by Dranove (1988).
Increasing the size of a cavity filling is perhaps the least detectable type of demand induce-
ment from an insurer and patient’s point of view, but there also exists another possible type
of inducement that a general dentist might be able to take up (but at higher risk of patient
6This is using the average fee for procedure code D3330, which is for endodontic therapy on the inside of
a tooth to treat infected pulp and does not include the cost of the final restoration (i.e. a crown)
28
pushback or insurer detection) - treating complex cases that would typically be served bet-
ter by referral to a dental specialist. In dentistry, general dentists are licensed and trained
to practice all areas of dentistry and only 20% of dentists have specialty training, which
requires further training in a residency or advanced graduate training program after dental
school. Dental specialists have further training in specific areas (such as root canals for en-
dodontists or cosmetic and restorative procedures for prosthodontists) that may allow them
to have a wider range of experience dealing with routine and complex cases. Though gen-
eral dentists are allowed to implement treatments that dental specialists train specifically
in, clinical decision-making di↵ers significantly between general practitioners and dental
specialists (Balto and Al-Madi, 2004; Bigras et al., 2008), and treatment by specialists has
been found to yield better quality outcomes (Abei et al., 2004; Marques et al., 2011; Alley
et al., 2004; Dugas et al., 2002) and less time on treatment 7 8 (Marques et al., 2011).
The dental literature, along with anecdotes from individual dental clinicians or faculty, has
suggested that ”[decisions] made to treat or refer may be a means for [general dentists]
to adapt to changing economic demand” (Gilbert et al., 2015). Though clinical findings
tend to support that specialty treatment administered by dental specialists yield better
outcomes for the patient, general practitioners may choose to administer specialty treat-
ments themselves or keep complex cases within their practice instead of referring to a dental
specialist especially when patient inflows are low. Furthermore, because insurers typically
do not provide extensive (or any) coverage for more intensive procedures and dental plans
are protected from financial risk through the use of annual dollar maximums, there is lit-
tle incentive for insurers to require general dentists to refer patients out to specialists for
more intensive procedures. Additionally, specialists may charge higher prices for the same
procedure, which is an added incentive for insurers to limit specialty referrals, such as in
7An exception to this is (Esfandiari et al., 2006), which was a randomized controlled clinical trial ex-
amining patient satisfaction and the number of unscheduled visits up to six months following procedures
for dental prostheses carried out by experienced specialists relative to new general dentists, and found no
statistical di↵erence in outcomes between specialists and new general dentists.
8Carman (2010) has a thorough literature review of the di↵erences in outcomes of endodontic treatment
between endodontists and general practitioners, and factors driving the decision to refer patients to an
endodontist.
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the case of some dental managed care plans (Cottrell et al., 2007) 9. Patients also gener-
ally do not refer themselves to most dental specialists (Cottrell et al., 2007) and referrals
take place primarily under the direction of the patient’s general dental practitioner. Hence,
self-referrals for specialty treatment, such as root canals and implants, may be a type of
demand inducement that general dental practitioners can engage in.
There is also potential for the majority of dentistry as currently implemented in dental
practices to be defined as demand inducement, given the lack of clinical evidence for common
dental procedures and the wide support for the e cacy of sealants, fluoride varnishes, silver
diamine fluoride, and other low-cost preventive procedures. However, I emphasize here that
the lack of clinical evidence for these procedures tends to be because of faulty study design,
and may not mean that common dental procedures have no e cacy in preventing future
cavities or in improving the oral health of patients. Furthermore, whether prescription of
a higher intensity treatment (such as a prophylaxis treatment / cleaning over a sealant)
is demand inducement depends also upon the viewpoint of the clinician. If the clinician
believes that he or she is doing the best for the patient, and is perhaps unaware of other
recourse for treatment, then we cannot define that the prescription of a higher intensity
treatment is demand inducement. But what is perhaps more concerning is if dentists are
fully aware of the e cacy of these preventive procedures but do not prescribe them because
reimbursement rates for these procedures are mispriced by dental insurers. Birch (2015)
emphasizes that even with e↵ective dissemination of the evidence on preventive dental
procedures, providers operating under fee for service arrangements ”rely on a constant flow
of patients with oral disease in need of treatment.. [and that reducing] oral disease in the
population reduces the size of the future market for treatment” (Birch, 2015). In this case,
the incentive to induce demand is exacerbated by the mispricing of procedures carried out
by dental insurers. I discuss this further in Chapter 5.
9Though the di↵erences in clinical quality and outcomes of treatment may di↵er substantially between
general dental practitioners and dental specialists, general dental practitioners may o↵er a lower price to
patients (especially if patients are in dental plans with limited networks) or increased convenience over dental
specialists. Hence, some of the loss in patient welfare from having a complex procedure done by a general
practitioner may be recouped by the gain from experiencing lower costs or increased convenience.
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The next question to ask after defining the plausible forms of demand inducement in den-
tistry is the following: is demand inducement welfare improving for patients? Labelle et al.
(1994) stresses that whether or not physicians induce demand is not as important as the
e↵ects on patient welfare and De Jaegher and Jegers (2000) emphasize through their model
of provider behavior that increases in demand inducement could be welfare-improving for
both patients and providers. Similarly, Carlsen et al. (1998) suggest that decreases in treat-
ment intensity or quantity could result from rationing, which implies a negative welfare
e↵ect upon patients who would likely benefit from utilization. However, given the clinical
background outlined in the previous subsection, these concerns are less likely to hold in this
setting. As discussed earlier, increases in the size of a filling put a patient at greater risk
for adverse events, holding fixed the severity of the patient, as do self-referrals from general
practitioners for more complex intensive procedures.
As a result, in this section we conclude that there is extensive room for dentists to induce
demand, because the structure of dental payments for treatments is highly misaligned with
the existing clinical evidence for the e cacy of dental treatments, and because there is little
ability for insurers or patients to detect whether or not increases in treatment severity are
warranted by the underlying oral condition. In particular for general dental practitioners,
there is incentive to increase the size of dental fillings and self-refer patients for more complex
dental procedures (rather than referring out to a specialist).
2.4. Conclusion
There is a general concern that while there may be societal welfare gains from increased
provision of clinically e↵ective preventive dental procedures, the current structure of dental
insurance and reimbursements to dental providers and the practice patterns of dentists
tends to incentivize restorative over preventive care.
However, the demand inducement model suggests that even when there is an incentive to
induce demand for more intensive, restorative procedures, an increase in private dental in-
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surance coverage may decrease the incentive to induce demand and lead to shifts away from
restorative procedures towards preventive procedures. Hence, rather than exacerbating the
problem of provider-initiated overutilization of restorative care and under-utilization of pre-
ventive care, a private dental insurance expansion could provide at least a short run solution
to improve provision of preventive dental care. Given the monetary and political costs of
reforming the entire dental system (dental insurance, provider payment, and provider prac-
tice patterns), increasing dental insurance coverage may be a more e cient way to alleviate
some concerns about demand inducement in dentistry.
2.5. Tables and Figures
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CHAPTER 3 : The Dental Market
In this chapter, I begin by discussing why the dental market is an intriguing setting to study
the impact of insurance expansions on provider behavior while introducing the institutional
detail of this market. The lack of data on the dental market has been the main restriction in
fully characterizing and studying this segment of the healthcare market, so I introduce then
how I resolve several issues by introducing the data source for this dissertation in Section
3.3. To give a sense of generalizability, I compare the data to known information about the
dental market discussed in the previous chapter in Section 3.4.
I then move to discussing the policy intervention in this market that serves as the main
source of variation leveraged in this dissertation (the dependent coverage expansion) in
Section 3.5 and compare the estimates from prior work on the size of the impact of this
specific expansion to estimates generated by the data in Section 3.6. I conclude then by
discussing the potential demand-side e↵ects of such an expansion for the newly insured
patients.
3.1. Dental Market Summary
The dental care market is a promising setting to study the impact of private insurance
expansions on provider behavior, because 1) the uninsurance rate in dental care is especially
pronounced relative to medical care, 2) dental o ces are more likely to take up the newly
insured population as new patients, and 3) dental providers have room to induce demand
without detection by both patients and insurers. I discuss and develop these three points
below.
First, dental insurance accounts for 9.7% of the health insurance industry (Curran, 2016),
and is striking for the rate of uninsurance compared to the medical and health insurance
industry – an estimated 33.9% of consumers in the dental market receive dental care without
insurance, compared to an estimated 8.7% in medical (Curran, 2016). There are several
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possible reasons for this, which are the following:
1. There is no federal program that serves as a reliable vehicle for dental benefits (such
as Medicare and Medicaid1). Instead, the majority of dental insurance enrollment
comes from employer-sponsored dental plans.
2. Services that are most generously covered in dental insurance are routine and preven-
tive procedures, instead of services that take place upon emergence of unpredictable
and severe health ailments. These preventive and routine procedures are services
that individuals may feel can be delayed until symptoms of an oral condition appear.
Hence, demand for routine dental services may not be very high and as a result,
demand for dental insurance may not be very high, especially if there is no employer-
provided subsidy for dental premiums. Instead, demand for dental services is typically
driven by increases in disposable income.
As a result, take-up of dental insurance is primarily located among employed individuals,
and prior to 2011 did not necessarily cover their dependents, leaving a large segment of
the population without dental insurance. An industry-wide expansion in dental insurance
coverage among employers may then lead to a high take-up rate.
Second, increases in dental insurance rates are likely to translate into access to dental
care, because dental practices tend to operate under-capacity. Declining demand for dental
care services has been explained previously by improvements in public health interventions
for oral care (such as fluoridation and di↵usion of good dental hygiene habits among the
population) leading to decreased rates of oral conditions in the population . Using data
from the American Dental Association Health Policy Institute’s Survey of Dental Practice,
Vujicic et al. (2013) found that 42% of solo practitioners reported being “not busy enough”
in 2012, and that wait times for a general practitioner dental appointment have declined
1Some state Medicaid programs do o↵er dental benefits, but these tend to be easily cut when there is
a state budget deficit. Hence, there are fluctuations in the generosity and availability of Medicaid dental
benefits (a fact that was leveraged in Buchmueller, Miller, and Vujicic (2014)), though there are no changes
in Medicaid dental benefits in the main states of analysis in this paper during the timeframe of interest.
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steadily over time from an average of 11.3 days to 5.4 days. These suggest that there is
substantial room for absorbing new demand for dental care among dental practices.
Similarly, Buchmueller et al. (2016) suggest that dental o ces are even willing to accept new
Medicaid patients, which has been a group for which reimbursement rates to the provider
are historically low. They examine the e↵ect of expansion of Medicaid dental coverage, and
find that dentists are able to increase their take-up of newly insured Medicaid patients.
This did not impact the number of visits or the number of privately insured patients in the
practice, indicating that the dentists had su cient capacity to accommodate the increased
numbers of patients. This implies that dentists are able to and to some extent are willing to
take on new patients when there is a market expansion, which separates the dental industry
to some extent from the medical industry where an increase in coverage does not directly
lead to an increase in access (McCormick et al., 2012). This ability to take on even new
patients with the lowest reimbursement rates for providers suggests that there is excess
capacity in practices to take on new patients suggests that dental providers has the scope
and financial incentive to induce demand.
The ability of dental practices to take on new patients may not only be because of operating
under-capacity, but also may be directly related to their ability to use dental hygienists,
especially for providing routine preventive procedures for new patients with minimal cost
to the o ce. Dental hygienists are paid a median of $34.77 per hour (BLS, May 2015)
and tend to work part-time. In comparison, topical fluoride applications are paid more
than $30 per person, and prophylaxis (cleaning) costs between $60-$80 per person (ADA),
and each of these procedures generally take less than an hour and can be carried out by
dental hygienists. Buchmueller et al. (2016) suggest that o ces located in states with less
restrictive scope of practice laws for dental hygienists, which regulate the types of treatments
that dental hygienists can undertake without the presence of the dentist in the o ce, are
more able to take on new (Medicaid) patients without substantially increasing wait times
in the practice. As a result, the use of dental hygienists further augments the ability of
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dental practices to accommodate new patients.
However, as suggested by Section 2.1 discussing the model of provider behavior, there is
still a shadow cost to providing care to new patients, which is that given a fixed o ce
capacity, the o ce may have less capacity to provide treatments. Though dentists may
be able to expand the hours worked by a dental hygienist in the practice to accommodate
more patients, the practice may still become constrained in capacity in the short run, either
because of insu cient physical space in the practice (i.e. not enough chairs) or because of
an inability to expand dental hygienist labor supply su ciently to meet demand (i.e. when
it becomes necessary to hire an additional dental hygienist in the practice).
Finally, dental providers have room to induce demand without detection by both insurers
and patients. An example of this arises from one of the most common procedures - cavity
fillings. Though a common and relatively simple procedure, reimbursements vary with the
size of the filling, going from $88 to $350 per filling (King, 2011), and X-rays typically do not
capture the full extent of the tooth damage. Rather, the extent of the damage is known only
when the dentist drills into the tooth, and due to the di↵erences in reimbursement for simple
versus more complex cavities, the dentist has an incentive to carry out the procedure for a
larger filling than necessary. This can be done without penalty from the insurer or patient
because there is no way to detect at a claim-by-claim level whether the dentist induced
demand for a higher intensity procedure than would have otherwise been demanded by the
consumer with perfect information. Inducement at an individual claim level is therefore
neither observable nor verifiable.
The treatment of dental caries (also known as cavities) is an area with a non-trivial amount
of potential waste - preventive treatment, such as fluoride and sealant application, exists
and is low cost to administer and highly e↵ective, yet 18% of the dental industry’s revenues
comes directly from caries treatment and 20% from radiographs (which may be involved in
caries treatment)2. Other treatment areas are similar - though consumers may have had
2In comparison, fluoride and sealant applications, which have been shown to substantially decrease the
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repeated encounters with a dentist for cleanings and similar preventive procedures, quality
is di cult for consumers to ascertain, especially because many dental conditions tend to be
asymptomatic. When treatment alternatives presented to the patient are similar in out-of-
pocket cost, time cost, and cosmetic appearance, the dentist will have the ability to sway
the consumer to procedures with higher probability of downstream procedures and/or with
higher total reimbursement rates.
These characteristics of dental practices (operating under capacity, use of dental hygienists
to provide low-cost care, and fixed capacity constraints in the short run) suggest that an
insurance expansion resulting in an increase in market demand for dental services may lead
to a more dramatic change in treatment behavior, which is as a result more likely to be
detected in the data. The Buchmueller et al. (2016) paper is suggestive of this. First, though
there was a statistically significant increase in wait times, the e↵ect was quantitatively small.
Furthermore, they found that a ten percentage point increase in dental coverage only led
to an increase in dentists’ own labor supply by 0.6 hours per week. In contrast, there was
an additional three visits per week from an increase in coverage of ten percentage points.
This suggests that the content or the length of visits diminished, and indeed they find
that average visit length falls by one tenth of a minute to one minute. Though the e↵ect
seems small and is statistically insignificant, one should keep in mind that Buchmueller
et al. (2016) worked with 1) survey data on practice behavior, and did not directly observe
changes in visit length; and 2) worked with expansions that may have been relatively small
in scope. As a result, they were likely underpowered to find a statistically significant e↵ect
on visit length.
Though the dental care industry seems to be a promising area of study to detect changes in
treatment behavior in response to shocks a↵ecting o ce size, the literature was previously
limited by the di culty of obtaining detailed data on dental utilization, especially at the
risk of caries especially among young adults, account for only 8% of dental industry revenue in 2011. Only
very recently has there been a move among dental insurers to use and reimburse CPT procedure codes for
dental prevention.
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practice-, provider-, and patient-levels for a variety of insurance statuses (over multiple
private insurers, public insurance, and the uninsured). Some e↵orts via survey data, such
as the American Dental Association’s Survey of Dental Practices, have been carried out to
examine nationwide practice decisions, but so far the data required to carry out a dental
version of the Dartmouth Atlas (which documents variation in medical expenditure and use
for the Medicare population) does not yet exist.
On the private dental insurance front, there have been some piecemeal e↵orts at consolidat-
ing dental claims across private insurers, however, such as FAIR Health data or some state
APCD databases (such as Massachusetts). However, these tend to be costly, even at the
institutional levels, and limited in research applications, due to data use agreements that
restrict the use of provider- and plan-level masked identifiers. In terms of public insurance,
Medicaid dental data can be obtained through arrangements with each state government,
but the degree of di culty varies, due to significant administrative burden.
Finally, the lack of data on the uninsured is especially significant in dental care, even
compared to the magnitude of the problem in medical care, because of the prevalence of
patients receiving dental care without any form of insurance (estimated to be between 30-
40%). For medical care, the utilization patterns among uninsured patients can be observed
in data either because 1) without insurance, medical care is una↵ordable and thus is not
utilized, and 2) when the lack of medical care becomes untenable for the uninsured, they may
utilize a part of the medical safety-net (such as emergency rooms), at which point researchers
may observe their utilization via hospital electronic medical records. Electronic dental
records can also be obtained from practices, but 1) there is variation in what record-keeping
software is used across o ces; 2) dental o ces tend to be small business endeavors, and thus
the administrative costs of making data accessible to researchers may be quite large; and
3) the cost involved in making claims data from disparate dental practices comparable and
obtaining enough data to create a comprehensive view of the market or make meaningful
comparisons between practices may be insurmountable for individual researchers. As a
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result, the di culty of obtaining data on the privately insured, publicly insured, and the
uninsured has curtailed the ability of researchers to fully characterize the nature of the
dental care market, as has been done in the medical care market.
3.2. Relevance of Dental Practices to Primary Care Practices
Studying the impact of demand fluctuations on dental practices may provide some insight
into the impact of demand fluctuations on primary care practices. Though there has been
literature on how providers and clinical facilities respond to sudden fluctuations in demand,
there has been little attention to how primary care facilities respond to sudden demand
shocks due to the increased ability of primary care providers to schedule care for later, or
push emergencies outside of the primary care clinic.
Instead, the majority of the literature focuses on cases where care cannot be delayed and
scheduled for later, due to the acuity of cases seen and the risk of severe consequences to
the patient without care. This is in contrast to the literature on demand shocks in settings
where facilities are at capacity but cannot turn away patients when they come through
the doors, such as for emergency admissions or inpatient settings with acute admissions.
This is because the demand fluctuations that take place in a short period of time (due
to the severity of cases seen and the inability to turn away patients or reschedule them
for later care) di↵er conceptually from demand fluctuations that can be accommodated
and spread out via scheduling. For instance, Evans and Kim (2006) find that when there
are weekend surges in hospital admissions on patient outcomes when hospital sta↵ levels
are pre-determined, length of stay declines and the probability of subsequent readmission
increases, but this focuses specifically on weekend surges where cases are more likely to be
acute and less likely to be delayed for treatment later in the week due to risk of severe
health consequences to the patient without care. In contrast, Cook et al. (2012) examines
the causal impact of changes in regulation governing the patient/nurse ratio in hospitals on
failure to rescue, which reflects a focus on how temporal changes in demand that must be
immediately accommodated impacts short-term patient outcomes. It is not likely that the
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possibly negative impact of demand on patient outcomes that results from these settings
occurs because of changes in treatment decision-making - the focus of these studies primarily
are to evaluate or project potential e↵ects of legislation regulating minimum nurse to patient
ratios in hospital units, and nurses are limited by their scope of practice in what treatments
or tests they can perform.
Examining the dental setting allows a look at exogenous shifts in demand that can be
accommodated by scheduling that will likely have a general equilibrium impact on how
patients are treated in o ces, which is likely to be more similar to the types of demand
shocks faced by primary care clinics with an insurance expansion. Dental o ces generally
do not face dental emergencies, which are more often directed towards hospital emergency
rooms and covered by medical insurance. Hence, temporal changes in demand generally
do not need to be accommodated in a short period of time, which limits any immediate
short-run e↵ects on patient outcomes due to lack of attention or mistakes due to short-run
sta ng issues. Instead, any increases in market demand faced by dental o ces can usually
be scheduled over a longer period of time so that the provider is not facing immediate shocks
to demand, but can choose how to reallocate their resources given an increase in demand
spread out over some period of time. Furthermore, there exists a non-trivial amount of
excess capacity in dental o ces (Vujicic et al., 2013) - hence, dental o ces are less likely
to face the sudden stress on resources and manpower such as that would stem from a surge
in hospital admissions due to low risk of severe health consequences to patients (due to
the nature of most dental conditions and due to extreme dental emergencies being covered
by medical insurance and being directed to emergency rooms) and ability to schedule and
distribute increases in demand over time.
3.3. Data and Sample Restrictions
Though I remain restricted on my ability to characterize parts of the dental market due
to data limitations, I resolve several of the issues mentioned previously, especially those
a↵ecting measurement of provider behavior, using a novel source of data to the economics
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literature. I use 2008-2014 dental claims from Delta Dental of Michigan, Indiana, and Ohio
(DDMI) that traces providers across claims, patients, and years, spanning the majority of
its privately insured beneficiaries under employer-sponsored dental plans. A version of this
claims database has been used previously in studies of oral health (Heller et al. 2004), of
treatment trends (Eklund 1997), and to compare treatment options (Bogacki et al. 2002).
However, this is the first time to my knowledge that a comprehensive dental claims database
from a large insurer has been used to evaluate the e↵ects of a policy change on treatment
behavior.
Delta Dental is one of the top three dental insurance carriers across the United States (the
other two are Aetna and MetLife). On a whole, Delta Dental is a nonprofit organization with
39 dental service organizations, which operate in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and
Puerto Rico. Each of its subsidiaries are independent, but overall were expected to account
for 28.5% of total industry revenue in 2014 (IBISWorld - Delta financial info.pdf). DDMI,
whose claims data I use in this project, primarily operates in Michigan, Indiana, and Ohio,
but DDMI also actively operates in Arkansas, Kentucky, New Mexico, North Carolina, and
Tennessee. Within DDMI’s main states of business, DDMI and its a liates held 64.8%
market share in the dental insurance industry in 2014, with 4.16 million subscribers. Most
of its business is in providing dental coverage through employers. Because premiums are
highly proprietary data, I was not able to obtain premium levels for plans, but SNL Peer
Analytics reports that DDMI had premiums of $28 per member-month in 2015, while other
dental insurers operating in Michigan had an average premium of $316 per member-month, a
minimum of $3 per member-month, and a maximum of $1,432 per member month. Though
employers with non-disclosure agreements with Delta Dental were excluded from the data,
the DDMI data contains more than 4000 employers across 2008-2014 with employees residing
in Michigan.
Though the data contains providers and patients across all fifty states, I restrict the analysis
to patients and providers in Michigan, the main state of business for Delta Dental of Michi-
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gan. This is because I am able to capture a higher percentage of an o ce’s patients in the
data relative to other states, where Delta Dental may have lower penetration among o ces.
Furthermore, the penetration of this branch of Delta Dental in Michigan is greater than
65% according to SNL Financial (the market share among other states in the data could
not be calculated using the SNL Financial Peer Analytics tool), and the probability that a
dentist is included in DDMI’s network is much higher in these three states. Together, this
decreases the likelihood that new patients who are newly enrolled in Delta Dental plans in
practices are switching between insurers (which would imply that the increase in enrollment
in DDMI is not reflective of industry trends, but is merely business-stealing) or switching
between providers (which would imply that the increase in Delta Dental new enrollment
took place among individuals who were previously seeing the dentist while uninsured or
while insured under a di↵erent insurer). I discuss both of these points further in Sections
3.5 and 4.2. Restricting the analysis to Michigan results in more than 8 million unique
enrollees over 81 unique counties.
The data is comprised of an enrollment file containing all beneficiaries enrolled in the
employer-sponsored dental plans and claims files for every year between 2008 and 2014.
Both types of files contain masked identifiers for providers, beneficiaries, employers, and
plans, allowing providers and beneficiaries to be traced over time, and for plan benefit
designs to be known across a large set of consumers. This data includes procedure codes,
negotiated prices, charges, insurer payments, and out-of-pocket prices paid by patients. The
enrollment file also contains beneficiary information, such as age, county of residence, and
whether the enrollee is a dependent and of which family, and dental provider information,
such as the county of operation. This allows me to 1) identify which subsets of the pop-
ulation are eligible for the dental coverage expansions and 2) define dental markets at the
county level.
Tables 2 through 4 contains summary statistics for the Michigan-specific data across en-
rollees with any dental utilization and across the continuously insured patients (continuously
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insured from at least 2008 to 2013), who are the focus of the main o ce-level analyses. In
the full Michigan sample, individuals enrolled in Delta Dental plans are an average of 44.79
years old, which is in line with the average age of the working-age population. To examine
how enrollment is distributed across age brackets, I construct age groups to reflect those
who are young enough for dependent coverage prior to the dependent coverage expansion
and are not directly a↵ected by the expansion (0 to 17 year olds), those who are directly
eligible (18 to 26 year olds), those who are not eligible for dependent coverage and likely
not young enough to have dependents who are eligible (27 to 33 year olds, generally used
in prior literature as a control group for the 18 to 26 year olds), those who are not as com-
parable to the directly eligible group but younger than retirement age (35 to 64 year olds),
and those who are retirement age and above (65 to 84 year olds and above age 85). The
majority of individuals are between 35 to 64 years of age (48.29% of the entire population
enrolled in Delta Dental in Michigan). Tables 2 reveals that just over half of all unique
individuals enrolled in Delta Dental plans are continuously insured in the same plan from
at least 2008 to 2013, with a similar age distribution and county demographics as for the
entire population of individuals enrolled in Delta Dental plans.3
Across the entire population of Michigan enrollees, each individual averages just over two
routine visits per year4, which is the usual recommended minimum frequency of routine
dental visits. Though routine procedures are generally covered at 100%, the median yearly
out-of-pocket cost across all enrollees is $44.8 and $42 for continuously insured enrollees.
Reflecting the average of approximately two routine visits per year, the average expenditure
per visit is approximately $24 across all enrollees, as well as across the continuously insured
3In 2012, Delta Dental was selected by the UAW Retiree Medical Benefits Trust to administer a pre-
ventive dental plan among retirees of Chrysler and General Motors (Delta Dental of Michigan, Ohio, and
Indiana, 2011). Retirees were automatically enrolled, but were provided full coverage only for preventive and
diagnostic services, emergency palliative treatment, radiographs, and minor restorative procedures (Delta
Dental of Michigan, Ohio, and Indiana, 2011). As a result, this was an increase in enrollment that was
unrelated to the dependent coverage expansion and specific to Delta Dental, not common across the dental
industry. Furthermore, this was a plan that did not mirror typical dental benefit designs in the market
and the automatic enrollment of retirees in 2012 was announced to dental professionals prior to the start of
enrollment and thus did not constitute a sudden shock to dental o ces. To avoid the noise that this change
in coverage for retirees lends to the data, I drop individuals of retirement age (over age 65) in the data.
4Routine visits are defined as visits where only routine procedures take place.
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enrollees. The dental expenditure distribution, much like medical expenditure distributions,
have a long right tail, resulting in mean out-of-pocket costs that are more than $100 above
the median out-of-pocket costs. This reflects that though dental expenditures with dental
coverage generally are low, the lack of catastrophic coverage in dental plans can result in high
levels of out-of-pocket spending for some patients. Even among those who are continuously
insured over the length of the sample time period with coverage, and have had access
to routine and preventive dental care consistently over time, 25% of continuously insured
patients incur expenses of more than $143.50 and 5% of continuously insured patients incur
expenses of more than $739.60.
Mean approved amounts per year and per visit in the data align closely to the estimated cost
of a routine visit based on the fees for the East North Central Division of the United States
from the 2013 American Dental Association Survey of Dental Fees discussed in Section
2.3. Using the ADA survey, a single routine visit encapsulating an oral evaluation, a set
of bitewing X-rays, fluoride application, and cleaning averaged around $216.23 in total
reimbursement and had a high end of $286. In comparison, average yearly approved amounts
were $547.69 across all Michigan patients, which divided by the average number of routine
visits among patients yields approximately $273.85 per visit. The mean approved amount
per visit falls a little under this estimate of the cost of a routine visit with $230.93, but both
mean approved amounts fall within the bounds of the cost estimate across the industry for a
routine visit. The mean approved amounts for continuously insured patients are comparable
as well.
The distribution of plan payment amounts exhibits less variation relative to the out-of-
pocket expenditure and total provider reimbursement distributions. Yearly amounts paid
to dental providers per patient have a median of $226.7. As expected from the structure
of dental insurance plans, the majority of the average reimbursement per visit is borne
by the insurer. However, as the expenditure per patient per year increases, increasingly
more of the cost is borne by the patient, with the top 1% of patients responsible for more
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than 50% of total provider reimbursement per year. This reflects that dental insurance
plans o↵ered by Delta Dental, like the majority of dental benefits, primarily cover routine
services and catastrophic costs are borne by the patient, presumably until the point to
which the costs of care are charged to health insurers or to the public safety net. Despite
the ability to charge higher levels of dental expenditure to health insurers for some types
of care, this demonstrates that patients may bear significant financial risk from incurring
dental expenditures even when covered by dental insurance and health insurance5.
I initially define markets to be at the county level because the finest geographic level avail-
able in the data is the county level for both providers and enrollees and distance to the
provider is only available for providers that the enrollee has visited. 91% of observations
are to providers within 20 miles of the enrollee’s residence, while the median land area of
a U.S. county is 622 square miles, and 76-80% of enrollees in each claim year are seen by
providers operating in the same county that the enrollee resides in. As a result, the major-
ity of enrollees are choosing providers that are in the same county. Hence, the county-level
shocks approximate the market-level shocks. In the o ce-level analysis, I refine the market
definition using a variation of the Elzinga-Hogarty approach, which allows for a variable
o ce-specific radius to define the market, which leverages the limited data on the travel
distance between patients and dental o ces available. This is further discussed in Section
4.2.1 for the description of the o ce-level analyses.
For o ce-level regressions later on, I impose further sample restrictions at the o ce-level.
First, I restrict to o ces that are present for all years used in the analysis (2008-2013) to
ensure that treatment behavior is observed in every year for each o ce. I restrict further
to o ces comprised of only general dental practitioners and exclude specialists or o ces
with a mix of generalists and specialists6. This is because o ces that tend to have more
than three providers per practice are extreme outliers, and are also more likely to have
5Because the data covers employer-sponsored dental plans administered by Delta Dental, individuals
enrolled in these plans are likely also to have had an o↵er of health insurance from their employer.
6The data does not include dental hygienists or dental assistants, as billing is typically done through the
dentist(s) in the o ce.
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much larger o ces, which skews the results for some of the o ce-level regressions later on.
Furthermore, this removes o ces that are likely to be training facilities and dental schools
from the data, which are likely to be facing meaningful di↵erences in severity and as a result
have significantly di↵erent treatment behaviors relative to regular dental clinics. Lastly, to
ensure that there are enough patients each year to measure changes in treatment behavior
for each o ce, I exclude o ces with fewer than ten continuously insured patients in any
year of the analysis. The e↵ect of the sample restrictions are displayed in Table 5. The
o ce-level sample restrictions do not change the composition of the counties included in
the analysis very much, though two rural counties fall out of the analysis.
3.4. Delta Dental Relative Reimbursement Rates
To establish that the reimbursement structure of Delta Dental plans aligns with the general
payment structure of dental plans discussed in Section 2.3, I do the following: 1) examine
the estimated profit of routine visits to the estimated profit of a one-surface cavity filling to
establish that there is a general incentive to take on new patients and 2) examine how reim-
bursement rates for cleanings compare to reimbursements for preventive treatments with a
strong base of supporting clinical evidence. This is in lieu of displaying the reimbursement
rates for a given set of procedures, which are confidential.
As before, I calculate the total reimbursement of a routine visit from the reimbursement
rates of an oral evaluation, a prophylaxis (cleaning), a topical fluoride varnish, and a set
of bitewing X-rays (comprised of four radiographic images). Using Michigan Medicaid
rates from 2016 for procedures to approximate the underlying cost to dental providers for
providing each treatment (conditional on 100% coverage of the procedure, which is the case
for routine procedures), I find that the profit from a routine visit averages $102.55, with
an upper limit 7 of $138.55, which is generally greater than the estimated profit from a
one-surface anterior resin-based composite filling. As a result, providers taking patients
from Delta Dental plans have an incentive broadly to take on new patients when possible
7Calculated from the 95th percentile of the reimbursement rate distribution for each procedure.
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rather than initiating restorative treatment for an existing patient.
Using the median approved amounts per procedure across claims for enrollees under age
65 in Michigan, Indiana, and Ohio in 2013 seeing in-network providers, I find that fluoride
varnish for adults is reimbursed at 44% of the reimbursement for prophylaxis treatment for
adults (cleanings), sealants at 58.5%, and silver diamine fluoride at 55%. Using Michigan
Medicaid reimbursement rates from 2016 as a proxy for the underlying cost of treatments
(other than for silver diamine fluoride, because Michigan Medicaid does not reimburse
for silver diamine fluoride treatments) and subtracting costs from the median approved
amounts to estimate profit, fluoride varnish brings in 36.5% of the profit for adult prophy-
laxis treatments and sealants 53.8%. As a result, there is a broad incentive for providers
to provide cleanings (the e cacy of which have never been tested systematically in clinical
trials or evaluated robustly) over preventive treatments that do have high levels of clinical
e↵ectiveness.
As a result, providers taking patients from Delta Dental plans have an incentive broadly
to take on new patients when possible, and are broadly disincentivized against providing
preventive treatments (such as sealants and silver diamine fluoride and fluoride varnish)
with high e cacy in clinical trials and incentivized towards providing treatments with lit-
tle clinical basis of support (such as cleanings and most restorative treatment). This is
consistent with the provider reimbursement structure of dental insurance plans generally
discussed in Section 2.3.
3.5. Dependent Coverage Expansion
As part of the A↵ordable Care Act, the dependent child coverage mandate required that
plans and issuers extend coverage to adult children up to age 26. Though this requirement
targeted only health plans, and not dental-only plans, many large employers extended dental
coverage to children between ages 18 and 26 in 2011 and 2012. This was largely unexpected
by providers - this was because in 2010, dental insurers were sure to inform dental providers
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that the dependent coverage expansion in health plans did not apply to dental. For instance,
in October 2010, Delta Dental reported to its network of dentists that the new rules for
health plans did not apply to them, but that it would be implemented for clients that
requested additional dependent coverage for their employees . Similarly, though Aetna was
reported to extend dependent coverage in their medical plans early, the dependent coverage
expansion was noted to not apply to dental benefits. Other than briefs or news articles
in the general press or in newsletters to dentists, underlining that dependent coverage for
dental benefits was not required, there was little to no discussion of how the dependent
expansion impacted dental plans until 2014 (Vujicic et al. 2014). This is echoed in Figure
2, which displays the year fixed e↵ects from a specification where the log of the number
of o ces in each county is regressed upon a series of year and county fixed e↵ects. If
providers were able to predict an increase in demand in 2011, one way this may appear in
the data is more dental o ce openings during or before the implementation time period
(2011-2012). However, Figure 2 shows that between 2008-2012, there was no statistically
significant change in the percentage increase in the number of o ces or providers per market
relative to 2006 levels8.
Insurers suggest that the dependent coverage expansion in dentistry was primarily imple-
mented by large employers, due to a desire to mirror the changes in health coverage in dental
coverage. Representatives at Delta Dental of Michigan suggest many large employers ex-
tended benefits voluntarily to those under age 26 because of union action - unions saw that
health coverage was being extended to dependents under age 26, and wanted these changes
to be applied also to dental coverage. Claim administrators for the University of Pennsyl-
vania’s (UPenn) dental plans also concur with this interpretation of events, and all dental
plans o↵ered to UPenn faculty, sta↵, and students were also required to extend benefits to
those under age 26. Results from the Delta Dental claims data concur with this interpreta-
8The increase in 2013-2014 may have come as a belated reaction to the increase in dental coverage and the
resulting increase in market demand for dental services from 2011 and 2012, and can be interpreted as either
more providers graduating in 2013 and 2014 and opening their o ces, or providers who were previously
partners or practicing in an o ce with a group of dentists breaking o↵ and opening their own practices.
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tion of events - I detect that the dependent coverage expansion was primarily implemented
by large employers (more than 100 employees at least). Using the Delta Dental enrollment
file, I regressed the log of the number of 18-26 year old dependents (the target group of the
2011 dependent expansion) in each plan on a series of year, plan, and employer fixed e↵ects
with robust standard errors. I carry out this regression for each employer size size (under
100 employees, 101-500 employees, 501-1000 employees, 1001-5000 employees, and 5000+
employees) and map the year coe cients. Table XXX restricts attention to plans that are
present in the data starting at least from 2007 and continuing for every year up until 2014,
though results including all plans in the data are similar (not included here). The size of
the e↵ect ranges between a 10-20% increase in 2011 after a period of little to no growth
in enrollment among 18-26 year old dependents between 2007-2010. There appears to be
delayed implementation of the dependent expansion among some firms and plans, which
Delta Dental representatives agreed with in informal interviews, leading to further gains in
enrollment among the target group of dependents in later years (2012-2014), leading to a
total increase of 30-40% in the number of 18-26 year old dependent enrollees among plans
in 2014 relative to 2007 baseline levels.
3.6. Replicating Earlier Industry-Level Analyses
The dependent coverage expansion was not isolated to Delta Dental, but occurred across
multiple insurers. The first papers reporting on a possible dependent coverage expansion in
dental insurance were Vujicic et al. (2014) and Shane and Ayyagari (2015). These estimated
the size of the dependent coverage expansion using two di↵erent sources of survey data,
and find that the increase in enrollment among young adults between ages 19-26 years
old has been between 5.6 and 6.9 percentage points relative to adults above the 26-year-
old dependent coverage age limit. This was followed later by the IBISWorld 2016 Dental
Industry report (Curran, 2016), which writes that “[an] uptick in the number of children
with dental benefits, coupled with more young adults (i.e. individuals aged 19 to 25) having
private dental benefits, has provided a boon to the industry”. As a result, the dependent
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coverage expansion was not isolated to a single insurer, but was an industry-wide trend.
Upon carrying out a similar analysis to Vujicic et al. (2014) and Shane and Ayyagari (2015),
I find a percentage increase in enrollment among 20 to 24 year olds relative to a control
group that is very close to their estimates of 5.6 to 6.9 percentage points. I do this by
looking at the percentage change in enrollment over time relative to a base year of 2008,
and compare changes in enrollment for 20 to 24 year olds relative to 30 to 34 year olds.
Formally, this is done by implementing the following regression:
log(# Enrolledact) =  0 +  t1(18-26 year oldsa) + ↵log(Popact) +  a + ⌘c +  t + ✏act
where a denotes the age group, c the county, and t the year. The coe cients of interest are
the  t, which maps the percentage increase in enrollment among 20-24 year olds relative to
2007 and in comparison to 30 to 34 year olds. I use 20 to 24 year olds and 30 to 34 year
olds instead of 18 to 26 and 27 to 33 year olds as in Vujicic et al. (2014) and Shane and
Ayyagari (2015) to control for time-variant changes in the size of the population of each
age group per county, which is only possible using the county characteristics available for
five year age bands. I exclude 25 to 29 year olds in the analysis because this age group
has a mix of individuals who are and are not eligible for the expansion (includes both
those who are below and above age 26). Because the 30 to 34 year olds are too old to
be eligible for the dependent expansion, but are closest in age without being eligible to
the directly eligible group (20 to 24 year olds), the 30 to 34 year olds serve as a control
group to net out changes in enrollment that may be shared across age groups over time.
The  t coe cients along with 95% confidence intervals are mapped in Figure 3. In years
prior to the expansion (2008 to 2010), there is no statistically significant di↵erence in the
percentage increase in enrollment each year between the treatment (20 to 24 year olds) and
control (30 to 34 year olds) groups. However, there is a small, statistically insignificant
percentage increase in enrollment among 20 to 24 year olds relative to 30 to 34 year olds
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in 2011, which then becomes statistically significant and sizable in 2012 and 2013. This is
primarily because, according to discussions with insurers, it took time for the dependent
expansion in dental insurance to be implemented. By collapsing  t into a post-expansion
dummy equal to one for 2011 and the years after, and zero otherwise, I find that there is a
7.3% increase in enrollment among 20 to 24 year olds relative to 30 to 34 year olds in the
post-implementation period relative to the pre-implementation period. The 95% confidence
interval for this coe cient estimate contains the values estimated in Vujicic et al. (2014) and
Shane and Ayyagari (2015); hence, the increase in Delta Dental enrollment among those
eligible for the expansion relative to those ineligible is similar to estimates of the increase
in dependent enrollment for the entire industry, based on survey data.
3.7. Conclusion
To conclude, the dental market is a useful setting in which to study the impact of insurance
expansions on provider behavior because private insurance expansions are likely to have
a direct impact on access and utilization of dental care, leading to substantial o ce-level
demand shocks, and because dental providers, like medical providers, have incentive and
ability to induce demand without detection by both patients and insurers. Furthermore,
much of the literature examining how demand fluctuations impact care delivery focuses
upon care that cannot be delayed and provides little insight on how non-emergency care
delivery responds to temporal changes in demand. Hence, examining the impact of insurance
expansions on dental practices may provide some insight into whether there are general
equilibrium changes in how patients are treated across o ces that do not provide emergency
care (i.e. primary care clinics).
Using 2008-2013 Delta Dental of Michigan data, I find that the structure of reimbursements
in Delta Dental plans mirror the structure of reimbursements in the general dental industry,
discussed in Chapter 2, and that there is an incentive to take on new patients over inducing
demand.
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Furthermore, the size of the dependent expansion in the dental market estimated in the
Delta Dental data closely matches the estimated size found in prior papers for the entire
dental industry.
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3.8. Tables and Figures
Table 2: Baseline Summary Statistics
All Continuously Insured
# Unique Individuals 8882347 4384512
Avg # Routine Visits Per Individual 2.03492 2.049801
# Unique Plans 4023 1681
Age 44.79 43.83
(22.06) (21.93)
2014 Median Household Income of Area of Residence 51855.6 52065.5
(10091.0) (10233.2)
Unemployment Rate 10.22 10.15
(2.808) (2.831)
Age Distribution in 2011
0-17 18.26 18.64
18-26 10.09 12.90
27-33 6.30 8.45
35-64 48.29 47.61
65-84 15.46 11.16
85+ 1.59 1.25
Total 100.00 100.00
Note: Summary statistics are from the full dataset between the years 2008-2013 obtained from Delta Dental
of Michigan. This incorporates Michigan only. Due to legal restrictions, some employers were removed from
the data due to non-disclosure agreements. The continuously enrolled are defined to be enrollees who have
been enrolled in the same Delta Dental plan from at least 2008 to 2013. The sample is limited to those over
age 0 and under age 100.
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Table 5: O ce-Level Sample Restrictions
Michigan Only General Only
Balance 3 Providers Sample
# O ces 3508 2506 2375
# Counties 80 79 78
Avg # Providers Per O ce 1.56 1.21 1.21
Avg Rural-Urban Classification 2.17 2.19 2.21
Avg Median HH Income (2014) $52,652.63 $52,673.51 $52,666.77
Avg Unemployment Rate 9.88% 11.29% 11.28%
Figure 2: Percentage Change in # O ces Per County Over Time Relative to 2008
-.0
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Year
Notes: This figure displays the year fixed e↵ects from a regression of the log of the number
of o ces in each county on a series of year and county fixed e↵ects. 90% confidence
intervals are given by the bars. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.
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Table 7: Dependent Dental Enrollment: Increases Among Employers by Size of
Employer(Plan-Level Regressions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log(# 18-26 yo Enrollees) <100 101-500 501-1000 1001-5000 5000+
1(2008) -0.00798 0.0219** 0.0411* 0.00993 -0.103
(0.0140) (0.0108) (0.0231) (0.0499) (0.141)
1(2009) -0.0176 0.0145 0.0506 0.0173 -0.118
(0.0188) (0.0150) (0.0368) (0.0491) (0.146)
1(2010) -0.0559** 0.0106 0.0341 0.0200 -0.0910
(0.0227) (0.0179) (0.0457) (0.0524) (0.152)
1(2011) -0.0304 0.0946*** 0.177*** 0.176*** 0.0769
(0.0253) (0.0204) (0.0580) (0.0555) (0.157)
1(2012) -0.0265 0.123*** 0.245*** 0.260*** 0.184
(0.0280) (0.0235) (0.0684) (0.0585) (0.159)
1(2013) -0.0275 0.158*** 0.273*** 0.333*** 0.243
(0.0298) (0.0234) (0.0676) (0.0635) (0.161)
1(2014) -0.0842*** 0.147*** 0.263*** 0.368*** 0.263
(0.0308) (0.0257) (0.0719) (0.0668) (0.174)
Constant 2.261*** 3.894*** 4.823*** 5.823*** 7.419***
(0.0184) (0.0153) (0.0426) (0.0472) (0.134)
Observations 6,388 4,538 1,005 1,149 460
R-squared 0.004 0.054 0.094 0.199 0.108
Number of Plans 841 571 126 145 59
Plan FE X X X X X
Employer FE X X X X X
Level Mean 15.43 68.31 177.8 572.3 3135
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: This table presents the increase in dependent coverage (measured by the log of the number of
18 to 26-year-old individuals in each plan) in each plan by employer size, for plans that are in the data
for all years of the analysis (2007-2014). Results are comparable for the full, unbalanced sample.
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Figure 3: Percentage Change in Enrollment Among 20-24 Year Olds vs. 30-34 Year Olds
from 2009-2013, Relative to 2008
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Notes: This figure maps the coe cients on the interaction between the treatment dummy
(equal to one for the 20 to 24 year old age group, and zero for the 30 to 34 year old age
group) to examine the percentage increase in enrollment among 20-24 year olds relative to
2007 and in comparison to 30 to 34 year olds. County and year fixed e↵ects are included,
as well as controls for the population size for each age group in each county. 95%
confidence intervals are given by the bars. Standard errors are clustered at the county
level.
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CHAPTER 4 : Analysis
4.1. Variation in the Size of the Dependent Expansion and Market-Level E↵ects
Though it is possible to examine how enrollment changes before and after the implemen-
tation of the dependent coverage expansion, leveraging variation in the size of the depen-
dent expansion across markets allows one to control for changes over time across counties
and markets that may be unrelated to the dependent expansion. Furthermore, measuring
changes in Delta Dental enrollment before and after the timing of the expansion may only
speak to what is happening within Delta Dental plans, instead of industry-wide trends.
For instance, the increases in enrollment may only be experienced within Delta Dental, and
these increases would not impose a large shock to dental o ces, because patients are merely
switching insurers.
To avoid capturing Delta Dental-specific changes in enrollment, I look at how a key industry-
wide predictor of the size of the dependent expansion in a county a↵ects Delta Dental
enrollment. This industry-wide predictor of the size of the dependent expansion in a county
is the number of newly eligible individuals in the county in 2011. Controlling for di↵erences
in population sizes, a county with a larger proportion of individuals in the population
that are newly eligible for dependent coverage will be subject to larger increases in dental
coverage rates from the expansion. The ideal measure of the proportion of individuals who
are newly eligible for the dependent expansion in the county would be the proportion of
18 to 26 year olds without dental insurance in the overall population, but this data is not
collected by any agencies. In lieu of this, using the proportion of 18 to 26 year old individuals
in the market (with or without dental insurance) would be a fair approximate, because this
population is less likely to have had an o↵er from an employer for dental insurance, and
also faces significant cost barriers to purchasing individual dental plans and to seeing the
dentist out-of-pocket without insurance (Nasseh et al. 2015). However, there is no dataset
that the author knows of that records the number of 18 to 26 year olds in each county -
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county population datasets typically separate population by five-year age bands. Instead,
I use the ratio of 20 to 24 year olds in each county in 2011 to predict the initial size of the
expansion in each market, which captures the majority of the age group of interest without
capturing individuals in other age groups that are not directly eligible for the dependent
coverage expansion. For brevity, I call this the ”eligible ratio”.
I use a di↵erence-in-di↵erences specification, allowing the treatment dosage to vary, where
the treatment dose is the size of the eligible ratio, which controls for time-invariant dif-
ferences between counties that have a higher and lower eligible ratio. Figure 4 is the
distribution of the eligible ratio across counties, and shows that there is a large amount
of variation across Michigan counties in the ratio of eligibles in county populations. The
standardized normal distribution in Panel (b) of Figure 4 shows that some counties may
be up to as much as four standard deviations from the mean eligible ratio, where some
counties have more than 20% of their population under age 65 between ages 20 and 24 1.
To evaluate the parallel trends assumption inherent to di↵erence-in-di↵erences analysis, I
regress the log of DDMI coverage rates by age group (calculated by taking the number of
individuals enrolled in DDMI, divided by the size of the county subpopulation for each age
group) on the interaction of the main treatment variable, the log of the eligible ratio in the
county, with year dummies. The resulting regression specification is the following:
log(Covg Rateact) = 0 + ↵tlog(Eligible Ratioc) +  1Xct + ⌘c +  t + ✏act
where a is the age group, c the county, and t the year. I use the log of the eligible ratio
(which is time-invariant) to take into account that the distribution of the eligible ratios is
1The county with 24.88% of its under 65 population between ages 20 and 24 in 2011 is Isabella County,
which the 2013 American Community Survey reports has a median age of 26 and has 29.7% of its total native
born population between ages 18 and 24. The county with the second highest eligible ratio is Houghton
County with 17.4% between ages 20 and 24, which the 2013 American Community Survey reports has 19.2%
of its native born population between ages 18 and 24. Washtenaw County, where the University of Michigan
- Ann Arbor resides, ranks 6th highest among Michigan counties in the eligible ratio with 13.7% of the
population under age 65 between ages 20 and 24.
63
skewed, and the log of the coverage rates to allow for a percentage interpretation. County
and year fixed e↵ects (⌘c and  t) are included to account for time-invariant di↵erences
between counties and changes in coverage rates over time that are shared across counties.
To account for variation over time in market conditions, I include variables in Xct such as
the log of the size of the population without any form of insurance (between ages 18-64, and
under age 19), the unemployment rate, and the number of dental o ces per county. This is
important because, for instance, changes in health insurance coverage in a county could also
impact take-up of dental insurance, and this is variation that is not directly related to the
dental dependent coverage expansion. Likewise, changes in unemployment over time would
a↵ect the proportion of the population that has access to employer-sponsored insurance
plans. I report also the results using the log of the number of people enrolled in each age
group in Delta Dental as the dependent variable with the log of the size of the population
of the age group in the county as an additional independent variable for robustness and
additional interpretation. The goal of this analysis is to test for 1) no statistically significant
di↵erences in coverage rates between counties with varying levels of the eligible ratio prior
to the implementation of the expansion; 2) a statistically significant increase in coverage
rates among age groups that we expect to be a↵ected by the expansion after the dependent
expansion in 2011-2013; and 3) no statistically significant change in coverage rates among
age groups not expected to be a↵ected by the expansion in 2011-2013.
The age groups examined are the following: 1) ages 65 and younger, 2) 0-14 year olds, 3)
15-19 year olds, 4) 20-24 year olds, 5) 25-29 year olds, 6) 30-34 year olds, and 7) 35-64
year olds. Though 25 to 29 year olds include 25 year olds that may be eligible for the
dependent coverage expansion, I examine five-year age bands because the denominator of
the coverage rate dependent variable is the size of the county population in the age group,
and the county population variables are available only in five-year age bands. Though I also
run the regressions using log of the enrollment in Delta Dental for each age group as the
dependent variable, this version of the regressions still include county population in the age
group as an independent variable to account for changes in county population over time,
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and to make the results comparable to those from the coverage rate regressions.
A priori, the primary e↵ects should be concentrated among age groups directly impacted
by the dependent coverage expansion, the 15-19 and 20-24 year olds, with limited e↵ects on
the 25-29 year olds and no e↵ect on the 30-34 year olds. There may be e↵ects among 0-14
year olds and 35-64 year olds if the implementation of the dependent coverage expansion
caused families overall to be aware of the availability of both dental coverage for those who
were too young to have been eligible for the expansion before and after implementation and
of dental coverage in general for their families.
Figure 5 shows that prior to 2011, there is no statistically significant relationship between
coverage rates and the size of the eligible ratio relative to 2007, for the overall dental
insurance coverage rate among those under age 65 and by age subgroup. Starting from
2011, there is a statistically significant percentage increase in coverage rates for the overall
population under age 65, which is primarily from percentage increases in coverage from
those that are most likely to be impacted by the dependent expansion (15-19, and 20-24
year olds) and those that may be impacted via an increase in awareness of availability of
dependent dental coverage (0-14 year olds and 35-64 year olds). There is no statistically
significant percentage increase in coverage among those ages 25 to 34, which are the age
group that we expected no to little e↵ect from.
Table 8 collapses the year coe cients on the eligible ratio into a post-implementation coef-
ficient, where the eligible ratio has an impact on coverage rates only in 2011 and the years
following. Over individuals under age 65, a 100% increase in the eligible ratio for a county
is associated with a 9% increase in the coverage rate, all else fixed (Column 1). Breaking
down by age group, the largest e↵ects in the percentage increase in coverage rate come from
the primary age groups of interest,15-19 and 20-24 year olds, where a 100% increase in the
eligible ratio for a county is associated with a 11.2% and a 10.5% increase in coverage rate
respectively. There is also a somewhat smaller e↵ect on the percentage change in coverage
rates for 35-64 year olds after the expansion is implemented, of 8.51% in response to a 100%
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increase in the eligible ratio.
To translate the coe cients in Table 8 to more easily interpretable numbers, I calculate
the standardized coe cients in Table 10, which are then used to estimate the increase
in enrollees per market on average and the potential size of the increase in number of
patients per o ce. A one standard deviation increase in the eligible ratio from the mean
implies a 2.82% increase in the coverage rate among those under age 65 on average across
counties in the sample. On average, this implies a 0.7 percentage point increase in DDMI
coverage. Because the average size of the population under 65 years of age is 106,596 in the
sample, this represents roughly an increase of 746 Delta Dental enrollees. Because there are
approximately 2000 general o ces in Michigan and 83 counties, this is approximately 31
new Delta Dental enrollees per practice, which predicts up to a 9.2% increase in the number
of patients under age 65 for the average o ce. Hence, not only is the market-level shock
from the dependent expansion substantive, but the o ce-level shock (conditional on o ces
being responsive to market-level shocks) is substantive as well.
Table 9 gives some insight into why 35-64 year olds are increasing substantially in coverage
by examining the e↵ect on the percentage increases in enrollment from an increase in the
eligible ratio. Though Table 8 found no statistically significant impact on coverage rates
among 0 to 14 year olds, there was still a statistically significant increase when examining the
percentage change in enrollment, where a 100% increase in the eligible ratio is associated
with a statistically significant 13% average increase in the number of 0 to 14 year olds
enrolled in Delta Dental plans. In fact, the largest percentage increases in enrollment
numbers are found among 0-14 year olds, with smaller percentage increases among 15-19,
20-24, and 35-64 year olds. However, this is still consistent with Table 8, primarily because
though the percentage gain in number of 0 to 14 year olds was statistically significant, this
was a small change in coverage rates among the 0 to 14 year old population across counties.
Likewise, the gain in coverage among 20 to 24 year olds, though a smaller percentage
increase in enrollment, implied a larger impact on the overall coverage rate in a county
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for this population. Because both 0-14 and 35-64 year olds are increasing in enrollment in
response to the dependent expansion, this suggests that there may have been spillovers onto
families with dependents that were too young to be directly impacted by the expansion,
simply because of an increase in information about dental dependent coverage.
To rule out the possibility that there was not a concurrent change in the market a↵ecting
enrollment of 35 to 64 year olds at the same time, which would have increased enrollment
among both parents and non-parents, I split up the population in Column (7) of Table
9 to separate parents of dependents under age 26 from those who are enrolled without
dependents. Enrollees are deemed to be parents if they have dependents who are enrolled
in Delta Dental, and non-parents otherwise. I further split the parents by the age of
their dependents - those with dependents under age 17, who are too young to be directly
impacted by the expansion, and those with dependents between ages 18 and 26. Results
are reported in Table 12. Overall, increases in enrollment among 35 to 64 year olds stem
only from parents of dependents, where a 100% increase in the eligible ratio will yield
a 9.05% increase in enrollment among parents of dependents between ages 0 to 26, who
are themselves between ages 35 and 64 (Column 1). In contrast, there is no statistically
significant change in non-parental enrollment for those between ages 35 to 64 in response
to the dependent expansion implementation (Column 4). Furthermore, the increases in
parental enrollment are concentrated among parents with dependents between ages 0 to
17, with no change in parental enrollment for those with dependents between ages 18 to
26. The results from Table 12 along with the percentage increase in enrollment among
those between ages 0 to 14 from Table 9 suggest that there were indeed unintended and
unanticipated increases in enrollment from the dependent expansion from families with
dependents that were too young to be directly impacted by the expansion.
The spillovers in enrollment among families with dependents that are too young to be
directly eligible for the dependent expansion are non-trivial. I use the standardized coe -
cients for Table 9, contained in Table 11 to calculate the increase in enrollment from each
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age group due to a one standard deviation increase in the county eligible ratio. Though
the percentage increase in coverage for 35 to 64 year olds is smaller than the percentage
increases among 15-19 and 20-24 year olds, the 35 to 64 year olds represent a large share of
enrollment in Delta Dental, with 51.2% of total enrollment under age 65 coming from this
group. In comparison, 15 to 19 year olds and 20 to 24 year olds represent only 6.95% and
6.28% of total enrollment under age 65. As a result, 50.3% of the increase in enrollment
from the expansion comes from the 35 to 64 year old group on average2.
The spillovers are an important factor in how heavily o ces are impacted by the dependent
expansion. This is because in general, o ces have di culty capturing individuals between
ages 21 to 34, who face the most significant cost barriers to care (Nasseh et al. 2015).
Furthermore, individuals in the target age group between ages 18 to 26 year olds tend to
travel further to dental o ces, presumably because they are living away from home or away
at school. Figure 6 displays this, showing that 18 to 26 year olds tend to travel further to
the dentist on average, with much wider variation in distance than other age groups. As
a result, whether the shock at the o ce-level from the dependent expansion is sizable will
heavily depend on whether the increase in enrollment among 35 to 64 year olds translates
to an increase in the number of patients among 35 to 64 year olds. Without an increase
among 35 to 64 year olds, and only an increase among the younger age groups, we can
expect only up to a 4.5% increase in the number of patients per o ce.
By using an industry-wide predictor for the dependent expansion, the county-level anal-
yses suggest that the increases in coverage and enrollment were not merely increases in
Delta Dental enrollment or market share, but an increase in overall industry enrollment.
Furthermore, the increases in coverage stemmed primarily from increases in the target age
groups (15 to 19 and 20 to 24 year olds), with spillover e↵ects on coverage for individuals
between ages 35 to 64 who are parents of those too young for the expansion (ages 0 to 17).
2The calculation is conducted via the standardized coe cients for Table 9, where a one standard deviation
increase in the eligible ratio yields a 2.59% increase in enrollment for those under age 65. This then yields
an increase of 3,593 (=0.0259*138,729) enrollees under age 65, with (=0.0251*72,038) enrollees coming from
the 35 to 64 year old age group.
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In contrast, there was no increase in enrollment in age groups that should not have been
a↵ected, primarily the 25 to 29 year olds, the 30 to 34 year olds, and 35 to 64 year old
adults that were not parents. The market-level analysis suggest that the increase in the
number of patients in each o ce could be as much as 9.2% with a one standard deviation
increase in the eligible ratio.
4.1.1. Falsification Test
I also implement a falsification test to show that the eligible ratio is a valid proxy for the
size of the dependent expansion in each county by using the ratio of the population that is
between ages 30 to 34 in each county. The falsification test carries out the same analyses as
in Tables 8 and 9, but simply replacing the main regressor of interest with the false proxy,
the ratio of the population in the 30 to 34 age bracket, comprised of individuals who are not
eligible for the dependent expansion, nor likely to have any dependents directly impacted
by the dependent expansion.
Figure 7 displays the distribution of the ratio of 30 to 34 year olds in the population across
counties. As previously, there is a substantial amount of variation across counties, but the
distribution is more evenly spread across counties and approximates a normal distribution
more than the ratio of the 20 to 24 year olds. Relative to the distribution of the ratio of 20
to 24 year olds in the population under age 65 across counties, there are more counties to
the left of the mean, whereas the distribution of the eligible ratio had a long right tail.
Figure 8 implements the parallel trends test carried out previously using the eligible ratio in
Figure 5. Unlike Figure 5, the parallel trends assumption is not fulfilled, with statistically
significant di↵erences between counties with high and low ratios of 30 to 34 year olds in
the years preceding the dependent expansion (2009 and 2010) relative to the base year
of 2008. This is because the proportion of 30 to 34 year olds in a county is likely to
reflect di↵erences in employment between counties (such as unemployment rate, or di↵erent
industries) and these di↵erences will a↵ect both the likelihood that dental insurance is
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o↵ered to individuals living (and/or working) in a county and the likelihood of take-up of
an o↵er of dental insurance. Hence, there are unobserved di↵erences between counties with
high and low ratios of 30 to 34 year olds in the population driving di↵erential pre-trends in
dental insurance enrollment.
In the context of non-parallel trends, the dosage di↵erence-in-di↵erences analysis is not
valid, but the regression coe cients for the falsification test are given in Tables 13 and 14
for the sake of comparison. There is no statistically significant percentage change found
for coverage rates and enrollment among all age groups from being in a county with a
higher ”non-eligible ratio” (the ratio of 30 to 34 year olds in the population) in the post-
implementation period of the dependent expansion.
As a result, this supports the argument that the eligible ratio (the ratio of 20 to 24 year
olds in the county population under age 65) is a valid proxy for the size of the dependent
expansion.
4.2. The E↵ect of a Market Expansion on O ce Load and Behavior
4.2.1. Impact on O ce Load
To examine how o ces respond to the dependent expansion, I take into account the size of
the expansion in their relevant market. However, o ces may draw patients from outside of
their county of operation, indicating that they may be located on the boundary of a county
or that because of less dense population areas, they compete with o ces that are further
away in other counties. As a result, the relevant market boundaries for o ces should not be
determined by the geopolitical boundaries set by county definitions, and o ces will instead
respond to changes from the dependent expansion across the counties encapsulated by its
market boundaries. I describe then in the following subsection how I define markets for
each o ce and measure the o ce-specific shock from the dependent expansion implied by
the market definition.
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O ce-Specific Market Definition and Measuring the O ce-Specific Shock from
the Dependent Expansion
A challenge in the data is that there is extremely limited information on the geographic loca-
tion of o ces and consumers, with counties being the finest level of geographic information
available. For o ces that are located on the boundaries of counties and thus e↵ectively op-
erate in multiple counties, this introduces measurement error into the size of the dependent
expansion shock. Using the size of the shock (the eligible ratio) for the county of operation
for the o ce is not su cient - the o ce may be responsive also to the dependent expansion
shock in neighboring counties. To capture this, I use a variation of the Elzinga-Hogarty
approach to define the market specifically for each o ce using data I have on the Euclidean
straight-line distance between each patient and the o ce seen by the patient, which was
calculated by programmers at Delta Dental of Michigan prior to masking the locations of
patients and providers3.
The Elzinga-Hogarty approach allows for a variable radius specific to each facility and
based on patient flow, where the convention is to base the radius for each facility (generally
hospitals) on the 75th and 90th percentile distances for patients to the facility. Because
results for using the 75th percentile radius are virtually identical to those using the 90th
percentile radius, I use the 90th percentile radius for each o ce for the Elzinga-Hogarty
approach. This indicates that 90 percent of patients seen in the o ce travel less than or
equal to the radial distance. I also use an alternate approach, where the radius is fixed
by the county of operation to take into account the distances generally traveled to o ces
within the county of operation, which di↵erentiates between rural and urban areas. This
does not capture variation in how far patients will choose to travel dependent on the quality
of dental o ces, whereas the traditional Elzinga-Hogarty approach will allow o ces that are
perceived by patients to be higher quality to have a larger radius. In general, the alternate
approach is more conservative than Elzinga-Hogarty, which will allow markets to be larger.
3Jones et al. (2010) demonstrates that the di↵erence between Euclidean straight-line distances and
driving distances is unlikely to influence the outcome of analyses.
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To calculate the o ce-specific measure of the dependent expansion, I use the o ce-specific
radius obtained either through Elzinga-Hogarty or the alternate approach with the data
prior to the implementation of the dependent expansion to calculate the ratio of patients
travelling within the market from each county. I then use the ratio of patients in each
county surrounding the o ce as a weight to proxy the relative exposure to the dependent
expansion in each county. The ratio of patients in each county is thus multiplied by the
size of the dependent expansion (the eligible ratio) in the county, and then summed for
a o ce-specific measure of the dependent expansion. The o ce-specific measure is thus
calculated as follows:
\Elig Ratiop =
X
c
(Elig Ratio)c ⇤
#Patients Pre-Expansion Traveling rp from county c
# Patients Pre-Expansion Traveling rp
where p indicates the o ce, c indicates the county, and rp indicates the radius associated
with the o ce p. This assumes that 1) residents of each county are equally dispersed within
the county, and 2) the newly enrolled individuals from the dependent expansion will have
similar travel patterns as those who were enrolled prior to the expansion. The o ce-specific
eligible ratio then is a measure that smooths the size of the dependent expansion across all
the counties the o ce receives patients from prior to the expansion. The theoretical result
is that this allows o ces to be relatively more exposed to shocks in counties where they
draw a larger proportion of patients prior to the expansion.
A potential weakness of Elzinga-Hogarty methods of defining markets is that it can ”lead to
large catchment areas that do not accurately reflect the level of a [facility’s] market power”.
In this case, there is no definitive direction of the bias from larger catchment areas - the
o ce-specific eligible ratio may be higher or lower than the eligible ratio for the eligible
ratio faced by the o ce given a smaller market definition. Other than defining the radius of
the Elzinga-Hogarty approaches to be smaller, the finest market definition available given
the data is defining markets to be counties. Hence, I compare the o ce-specific eligible
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ratio to the eligible ratio for the o ce’s county of operation in Figure 9. In Panel (a), I
find that consistent with how the o ce-specific (market) eligible ratio was defined, there is
a clear linear relationship between the market eligible ratio and the county eligible ratio.
Furthermore, in Panel (b), the distribution of the error terms from the regression of the
market eligible ratio on the county of operation eligible ratio is normally distributed around
zero, indicating that there is not a clear direction to the bias.
I also use this modified Elzinga-Hogarty approach to generate the weighted market char-
acteristics that vary over time that each o ce responds to. I take the weighted average
across counties that the o ce receives patients from for the following variables: the size
of the population without any form of insurance (between ages 18-644, the unemployment
rate, the number of individuals per o ce in an age group (taken as the population size in
a county for an age group, divided by the number of general o ces in the county), and the
total population size. These weighted market characteristics will be used in the o ce-level
analyses to control for changes over time that impact the market.
A noted shortfall of this approach is that though I can approximate the size of the market
in terms of the number of people that may choose to go to a given o ce over other o ces, I
cannot know whether an o ce is within the bounds of another o ce’s markets. As a result,
market fixed e↵ects and the number of o ces per market cannot be used as controls in the
regression analyses, though the number of o ces per county can be used as a control.
4.3. First Stage Regressions
Using the o ce-specific market shock from the dependent expansion, measured by the
weighted average of the ratio of young adults in the population across the counties the
o ce draws patients from, I implement a diference-in-di↵erences regression with variable
treatment intensity to describe the impact of a market expansion on the number of patients
among o ces. Because an increase in the ratio of young adults in the population will lead
4The uninsurance rate among those under age 19 is also available, but because of collinearity with the
uninsurance rate among those between ages 18 to 64, this was omitted from the regressions
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to a larger o ce-level shock for counties with larger overall populations relative to smaller
populations, I restrict to o ces located in markets with more than 250,000 people in the
population, which captures 66.4% of the o ce sample.
There are multiple advantages to restricting the sample to o ces located in larger markets.
First, conditional on the eligible ratio, o ces in larger markets are more likely to have larger
responses to the eligible ratio. Second, this makes it more likely that o ces within the
sample that face larger eligible ratios operate more similarly to those facing smaller eligible
ratios. This is especially important given that the set of observable o ce characteristics and
market characteristics is limited in the data. In particular, o ces that operate in smaller
markets may face a di↵erent market structure (i.e. less competitive) than those that operate
in larger markets, and this may impact how they respond to sudden increases in market
demand and in o ce load. As a result, restricting to the set of o ces that operate in larger
markets may help to control for any time-varying changes that disproportionately a↵ect
o ces in larger markets over those in smaller markets.
Along similar lines, I construct a second o ce-level sample to contain only general o ces
that provide root canal treatment. Based on anecdotes given by an endodontist, general
dental practitioners who feel that they are able to provide root canal treatment may choose
to provide more root canal treatments in-o ce rather than referring to an endodontist
in periods of low demand. As a result, o ces who are able to generate income through
root canal treatments would be operating more similarly to other o ces that also provide
root canal treatment. Furthermore, anecdotes from dentists suggest that these may be
o ces that are more likely to engage in demand inducement, because in-house root canal
treatments at a general dentist’s o ce result in measurably worse clinical outcomes relative
to at an endodontist’s o ce. As a result, o ces that are more likely to engage in demand
inducement are more likely to respond to shocks that influence the financial incentives to
induce demand.
To show that the sample restrictions may control for unobserved di↵erences between o ces
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facing larger and smaller expansions, I look at various dimensions of the quantity and
intensity provided among o ces in high expansion markets relative to low expansion markets
in 2010, the year preceding the implementation of the dependent expansion. An o ce is
defined to be in a high expansion market if the o ce-specific eligible ratio exceeds the mean
o ce-specific eligible ratio in the particular sample of interest. The variables examined in
this table are the total number of patients under age 65 in each o ce, the total number
of visits, the total number of tooth fillings (total and by intensity), the total number of
root canals, and the total number of extractions in 2010. Many of the mean di↵erences
between o ces in high and low expansion markets are statistically di↵erent in the full
o ce sample, which is influenced by the large amount of heterogeneity in the size of the
market of operation. Restricting to o ces that operate in larger markets (above 250,000
in population) leads to o ces that are very similar to each other on the all measures other
than the number of extractions in a year among patients under age 65. Further restricting
to o ces that are likely to be higher-intensity o ces (because they are general dental o ces
that carry out root canals instead of referring high severity cases out to dental specialists)
does not lead to substantial changes between the o ces in high and low expansion markets.
This also serves to address concerns that the underlying treatment intensity or demand
for procedures is di↵erent for o ces that are facing larger versus smaller expansions, such
that the instrument would be correlated with the underlying factors influencing treatment
intensity.
To measure changes in how busy an o ce is over time (which I call o ce load), I use
the number of patients under age 65 and the number of visits among these patients. The
main proxy for o ce load of interest in this analysis is the number of patients, because the
number of visits per patient is a choice variable for the dental provider (the dentist and
the patient together determine how many visits to have in a year; hence, the number of
visits per patient is not exogenously assigned). However, the shock to o ce load may be
underestimated by examining only the number of patients under age 65 if, for instance, new
patients enter dental o ces with high levels of severity and require more visits.
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I test for parallel trends for the di↵erence-in-di↵erences analysis by implementing the fol-
lowing regression specification:
log(# Patients in Age Group)pct =  0 +  1t1(High O ce-Specific Eligible Ratio)p
+  2Xpt +  p + ⌘c +  t + ✏pct
where p indicates the dental o ce, c denotes the county of operation, and t indicates the
year. I use the log of the o ce-specific eligible ratio (which is time-invariant) to take into
account that the distribution of the eligible ratios is skewed. I take the log of the num-
ber of patients per o ce-year to address the concern that though some o ces may have
a relatively large level increase in the number of patients, this may not be a substantive
shock to the o ce depending on the baseline level of patients in the o ce. However, the
standardized coe cients using a regression specification with levels for both the dependent
and independent variables of interest results in quantitatively identical results to the log-log
specification described here. I do not include the level-level regression results here to avoid
duplication. Hence, percentage increases in the number of patients within the o ce are
more directly of interest. The  1t are the coe cients of interest. The  1t coe cients map
the average impact of the expansion across all o ces relative to 2008 as the base year and
is interpreted as the average percentage increase in the number of patients for an o ce
from having a ”high” o ce-specific eligible ratio, where ”high” in this context is taken to
be in the topmost quartile of the distribution of o ce-specific eligible ratios. The choice to
use a binary variable in lieu of the continuous o ce-specific eligible ratio is stylistic - the
results from the parallel trends test are robust to using the continuous variable or other
cuto↵s for the ”high” definition - and mostly allows for a more elegant graphical presenta-
tion. Similarly to the county-level regression specification, I account for variation over time
in market conditions by including variables in Xpt (the index p reflects that the markets
are defined for each o ce) to avoid omitting time-variant factors that may be correlated
with the change from the dependent expansion. These variables include the size of the
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population without any form of insurance (between ages 18-64, and under age 19) and the
unemployment rate, all taken as weighted averages across counties encapsulated in the mar-
ket boundaries with weights specified in the modified Elzinga-Hogarty approach described
earlier. In practice, using the modified Elzinga-Hogarty weighted means do not influence
the results substantially relative to using the characteristics of the county of operation for
each o ce. Additionally, the number of individuals per o ce in an age group is included
as an additional county-level, time-varying regressor to account for changes in population
sizes among specific age groups that may impact o ce take-up of patients of these ages.
This variable also serves as a control for di↵erences in utilization over time that is associ-
ated with dentist supply that may be correlated with the size and timing of the dependent
expansion shock. I include also o ce fixed e↵ects (which is possible because balance was
imposed upon the o ce-level sample), county fixed e↵ects, and year fixed e↵ects.
In implementing these o ce-level regressions, I collapse the 15 to 19 and 20 to 24 year old
age groups into a single 15 to 24 year old age group, primarily because individuals of these
age groups comprise a relatively small proportion of dental o ces. Likewise, I collapse the
25 to 29 and 30 to 34 year olds age groups into a single 25 to 34 year old age groups for
the same reason. Historically, dental o ces have had di culty capturing individuals of
these ages primarily because this group faces the highest cost barriers to care and dental
insurance, and were not likely to have had an o↵er of employer-sponsored dental insurance,
whether as an employee or as a dependent.
Figure 11 graphs the  1t coe cients for the parallel trends test specified above, for o ces
operating in high population markets (greater than 250,000 people under age 65 in the
market population). The figure for the entire sample of o ces is excluded here, due to strong
similarities. As in the county-level analysis, there is no statistically significant percentage
increase in the number of patients per o ce relative to 2008 baseline levels in 2009 and 2010
across all age groups, but there is a statistically significant percentage increase in the number
of patients under age 65, between ages 15 and 24, and between ages 35 and 64 beginning in
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2011, the first e↵ective year of the dependent expansion. The youngest age group, made up
of individuals between ages 0 and 14, see steady but statistically insignificant percentage
increases in the number of patients per o ce for all years except for 2013. This may be
attributable to the somewhat delayed implementation of the dependent expansion, which, as
mentioned previously, was due to delays in employee awareness of the dependent expansion
in employer-sponsored dental insurance plans.
To summarize the overall e↵ect of the dependent expansion, I implement the following
regression:
log(ypct) =  0 +
2013X
t=2011
 tLog(O ce-Specific Eligible Ratiop)1(Post)
+  2Xpt +  p + ⌘c +  t + ✏pct (4.1)
where ypct is the measure of o ce load for an o ce p in county c and year t, which is mea-
sured using the number of patients per o ce and the number of visits per o ce. The main
coe cients of interest are the  t which are the average e↵ect of the dependent expansion
across o ces in each year following implementation of the expansion (2011 through 2013).
Time-varying market characteristics, given by Xpt, and include the size of the population
without any form of insurance (between ages 18 to 64, and under age 19), the unemployment
rate, the number of individuals per o ce in an age group, and the total population size of
the market in each year5. I implement this for all three o ce samples - all o ces, o ces in
high population (more than 250,000 individuals under age 65 residing in the market) (called
the ”250K” sample), and o ces that are in high population markets that are able to carry
out root canals (called ”Self-Referral” sample, because these o ces have a choice to refer
high-intensity specialist treatments to specialists or to themselves).
5Recall that markets are defined for each o ce, so that market characteristics are a weighted average of
the characteristics of counties that an o ce draws patients from.
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To adjust for changes in the distribution of the o ce-specific eligible ratio across samples,
which a↵ects the scale of the estimated coe cients, I calculate the mean and standard
deviation for the log of the o ce-specific eligible ratio in each sample and generate the
standardized version of this variable by subtracting the sample mean from the original
value and divide by the standard error in the sample. This yields a more straightforward
coe cient interpretation.
The standardized coe cient estimates of interest in Table 16 describe the average percentage
increase in o ce load from one standard deviation increase in the log of the o ce-specific
eligible ratio. An increase in one standard deviation in the o ce-specific eligible ratio leads
to an average 3.6% increase in the number of patients under age 65 for the 250K sample,
and an average 3.3% for the self-referral sub-sample. Both coe cient estimates for each
o ce-level sample are highly statistically significant at the 1% level. Though the scales are
di↵erent, these coe cients are in range of the e↵ects estimated at the county level in Table
11, where a one standard deviation in the county-level eligible ratio led to a 2.59% increase
in the number of people enrolled in the county under age 65.
Table 17 uses the number of visits among patients under age 65 per practice as an alternate
measure to detect increases in o ce load from the dependent expansion. Overall, an increase
in one standard deviation in the o ce-specific eligible ratio leads to an average 3.92%
increase in the number of visits under age 65 in the 250K sample, with a slightly more
muted e↵ect in the self-referral sample (consistent with the preceding analysis using the
number of patients as the measure of o ce load) of 3.49%. As a result, using number
of visits as the alternate measure of o ce load increases the estimated impact from the
dependent expansion, though the coe cient estimates are in reasonably bounds of the
coe cient estimates from Table 16 using the number of patients as the measure of o ce
load.
Given that the top 5% of o ces in the 250K sample are more than 2.64 standard deviations
above the mean, column (1) of Table 16 suggests that o ces at the 95th percentile on
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average experience a 9.5% increase in the number of patients under age 65. This is well
within the upper bounds of the estimates calculated with the county-level analyses, which
suggested up to a 9.2% increase in the number of patients with one standard deviation
increase in the county eligible ratio. Similarly, the 95th percentile of the distribution of
o ces in the Self-Referral sample is 2.72 standard deviations away from the mean, implying
a 8.9% increase in the o ce load from the dependent expansion. As a result, the increase
in o ce load from the dependent expansion is non-trivial and may be a large enough shock
to alter provider incentives for demand inducement.
To show that the e↵ect comes primarily from the age groups of interest, I carry out the same
regression specification, but using as the dependent variables the number of patients in each
age group per o ce-year. Table 18 contains the standardized coe cient estimates for the
regression specification described in Equation 4.1, using the log of the number of patients in
each age group as the dependent variables. I find primarily that there are highly statistically
significant increases among patients who are directly targeted by the expansion (15 to 24
year olds), those who are young enough to be eligible (0 to 14 year olds) and patients who
are old enough to be parents of dependents (ages 35 to 64). The estimated e↵ect of a one
standard deviation increase in the o ce-specific eligible ratio on the percentage increase
in the number of patients is greatest among the 0 to 14 year olds with a 3.64% increase,
followed by the 15 to 24 year olds with a 3.57% increase, and then the 35 to 64 year olds
with a 3.51% increase. This is consistent with the prior county-level regressions combined
with the average travel distances by age group, because though the greatest increases in
coverage were among those directly targeted by the dependent expansion (15 to 24 year
olds), this was also the age group with the furthest travel distances to dental providers
primarily because of college or not living in the same residence with their parents (which
cannot be directly measured or detected with this data). As a result, the increases in
patients among ages 15 to 24 in o ces would be muted relative to the increases in coverage
in response to the dependent expansion, because those ages 15 to 24 would not be as likely
as those in other age groups to visit providers within the same market. In contrast, there is
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no statistically significant increase in the number of patients between ages 25 to 34, which
is comprised of patients who are too old to be eligible for the dependent expansion, but
primarily not old enough to have children that are directly eligible for the expansion. This
is consistent with the earlier county-level results that found that the increases in enrollment
from the dependent expansion among 35 to 64 year olds was driven by 35 to 64 year olds
enrolled as parents, not by those who were not enrolled as parents.
Though the use of an industry-level predictor of the size of the dependent expansion (the
eligible ratio) may ameliorate concerns about whether the increase in enrollment is shared
across the dental insurance industry and not exclusive to Delta Dental, one may still be
concerned that the influx of patients into o ces as measured by the Delta Dental data does
not actually represent a shock to the o ce, but represents instead existing patients in the
o ce switching dental insurers or insurance statuses and newly appearing in the DDMI
data, but are not new to the practice. This would be the case if Delta Dental carried out
business-stealing, which would imply that the measured increases in enrollment described
earlier were not true increases in dental market demand.
To fully neutralize the business-stealing argument, I introduce the use of a combination
of procedures codes in dental claims data that helps to distinguish whether increases in
enrollment in any year were due to business-stealing actions on the part of Delta Dental
or represented real increases in dental market demand. Because Delta Dental has ¿93% of
all dental providers in its main states of operation contained in its networks, the likelihood
that an individual who is switching insurers is also switching providers is not very high.
In addition, there are several specific procedure codes common across all dental claims
datasets that are utilized only for patients who are new to the practice and/or have not
been seen at the dentist in the past three years. These are the codes D0150 and D0180,
which are respectively Comprehensive Oral Evaluation New or Established Patient and
Comprehensive Periodontal Evaluation New or Established Patient. Discussions with both
claims administrators at the University of Pennsylvania School of Dental Medicine and
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with dentists suggest that there is little incentive to code established patients that have
been seen continually in the practice using these dental procedure codes, because these
codes require more services to establish a new dental history for the patient and if these
services are found to be lacking, the dental provider opens himself up for litigation. As a
result, if business-stealing is occurring within the data, and the majority of new enrollees in
Delta Dental in a given year are switching coverage from other insurers or were uninsured
and seeing the dentist previously, then an increase in enrollment should not lead to an
increase in the number of new patients within practices or within counties. Conversely,
if an increase in enrollment leads to an increase in the number of new patients, then the
increase in enrollment can be interpreted as a true increase in market demand.
Because there is little financial incentive to use the new patient coding, the new patient
codes are likely to be underused, making it more di cult to detect changes in the number of
new patients in each year per o ce. To mitigate this issue, I calculate the minimum number
of new patients coded in each o ce over the entire time period and remove from the sample
o ces in the bottom and top 5% of the o ce-level distribution of the minimum number of
new patients. This serves to remove o ces that rarely or never use the new patient coding
(bottom 5%) and o ces that often use the new patient coding. Either scenario suggests
that these o ces in the bottom and top 5% of the distribution either do not use the new
patient coding as other o ces or are operating di↵erently from other patients (for instance,
o ces that tend to see many new patients in each year may have higher levels of turnover
relative to other o ces). Because o ces are likely to underuse the new patient coding, even
after removing o ces that seldom or never use the new patient coding, I expect that the
estimates of the e↵ect of the dependent expansion on new patients will be biased towards
zero.
The resulting increase in the number of new patients is examined in Table 19 by implement-
ing equation 4.1 and replacing the dependent variable with the log of the number of new
patients in each age group. The results are given in Table 19, which finds that the most
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substantive increases in new patients comes from the target age group (ages 15 to 24) and
the individuals between ages 35 and 64 who are parents of 18 to 26 year olds. In contrast,
there are no statistically significant increases in the number of new patients among other
age groups, among parents of 0 to 17 year olds, and among non-parents. This increases
confidence that the proxy for the dependent expansion is capturing true increases in o ce
load, and among the groups of interest. The lack of a statistically significant increase in the
number of new patients between ages 0 to 14 is in contrast to the statistically significant
increase in the number of patients found earlier in Table 18. However, because there is
little financial incentive to use the new patient coding, it is likely that using this measure of
increases in patient load captures only the most dramatic increases in patient load. Hence,
the most detectable changes in the number of new patients per o ce in response to the
dependent expansion are among the age group targeted by the expansion and their parents.
As a result, the increase in o ce load is substantive with o ces at the 95th percentile of
the distribution (among the 250K sample) experiencing an average predicted increase of
9.5% in o ce load from the dependent expansion. Furthermore, the increases come from
the age groups of interest - those young enough to be eligible for the expansion and those
old enough to be parents of eligible dependents - with the most dramatic increases coming
from the 15-24 year olds and the parents of the directly eligible (ages 18 to 26). These
results align with the prior county-level analyses and verify that the increase in patient load
is from the dependent expansion and not any other concurrent change in the market during
the post-implementation period of the dependent expansion.
4.4. Impact on Treatment Decisions from An Increase in O ce Load
4.4.1. Measurement of Treatment Intensity/Quantity
Providers can primarily alter the intensity of care for patients through two pathways -
frequency of visits and treatments and intensity of treatment. To measure changes in
frequency of care, I examine the number of visits and the number of routine visits per
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continuously insured patient on average within an o ce, where I define routine visits to be
visits that are comprised entirely of routine procedures typically covered at 100% (within
the yearly frequencies determined by the insurer.
To measure changes in overall treatment intensity by providers over continuously insured
patients, I measure the average number of procedures by procedure categories, where the dif-
ferent procedure categories indicate lower and higher intensities of treatment. For instance,
I separate cavities into cavities with one-, two-, three-, and four or more surfaces, where
one-surface cavities are the least intrusive and least intensive cavity filling procedure and
four-surface cavities and up are the highest intensity (without moving towards root canals
and other more involved procedures typically requiring dental specialists). I also broadly
separate routine from non-routine procedures, where routine procedures are those typically
covered generously by dental insurance plans, such as routine examinations, cleanings, and
X-rays. The average quantity within each procedure category indicate the quantity of each
type of procedure across the relevant group of patients. I construct average quantities for
continuously insured patients and continuously insured and continuously seen (at least once
a year) patients. Increases in the average number of high-severity procedures (such as fill-
ings with three or more surfaces, or root canals) per continuously insured patient indicate
increases in treatment intensity by providers, since the continuously insured patient cohort
is constant throughout the time period for each o ce and is not changing in its underlying
severity nor facing changes in dental coverage that would alter patient demand for services.
Restricting to analyzing changes in average treatment intensity and frequency among the
continuously insured and continuously seen patient cohort controls even more strictly for
the underlying severity and composition of the patient group, because this group receives
continuous management of their underlying oral health condition which likely is closely cor-
related to better oral hygiene habits and decreased likelihood of sudden onset of caries or
other adverse oral health conditions.
I also construct average patient and insurer payment amounts per year, averaged across all
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patients within each subgroup in each practice to analyse how changes in quantities and
intensities alter payment amounts by both patients and insurers.
4.5. Endogeneity Concerns and OLS Results
The ultimate goal of this research is to analyze how substantial changes in o ce load
(measured primarily in the number of patients per o ce) impact treatment behavior, by
using a change in o ce load that is plausibly exogenous. As a result, this research is
most concerned with whether providers’ treatment decisions respond to the size of a shock
from the number of new patients added into each o ce. The plausible exogeneity has
been established in the prior sections, but is key particularly to analyzing the impact on
treatment decisions, primarily because there is an endogeneity problem here.
There are two sources of concern here. The first is an endogeneity concern - there may be
omitted variables or unobserved variables that mediate the relationship between the number
of patients an o ce attracts and its average intensity or quantity of dental treatments. For
instance, if one were to regress directly the average treatment quantity of an o ce across its
patients on the number of patients attracted by an o ce, there may very well be a positive
correlation that could not be construed as causation. This is because omitted variables,
such as quality, may be influencing this relationship. A plausible story is that patients may
perceive o ces that implement more treatments or higher intensity treatments to be higher
quality, and thus flock to these o ces, leading o ces that are higher intensity/quantity
to have more patients. Hence, a priori, there should be a positive correlation between
number of patients in o ces and treatment quantity if the following naive OLS regression
is estimated:
log(ypct) = 0 + 1log(# Patients <65)pct + 2Xct +  p + ⌘c +  t + ✏pct
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where p indicates the o ce, c the county, and t the year. ypct captures the average treat-
ment quantity of an o ce across its patients over time. I take the log of the dependent
variables (the average quantity of treatment per patient) because both baseline levels and
level changes in the average treatment quantity per patient may also be small. As a re-
sult, percentages make it easier to determine how impactful the change in the treatment
is relative to baseline levels. However, using levels for the dependent variables and the
independent variables of interest result in standardized coe cients that are quantittatively
identical to the results using the log-log specification described here.
Tables 20 through 22 contain the results of the naive OLS regression for the 250K o ce-level
sample and a variety of measures of treatment intensity, where I directly regress the log of
the average treatment intensity of treatments among all patients on the log of the number
of patients under age 65. The estimated coe cients support the underlying story about
quality driving a positive relationship between quantity of treatment and the number of
patients seen within an o ce. Regardless of intensity of treatment, whether one-surface or
three-surface cavities, the OLS regressions find that there is a positive correlation between
the number of patients at an o ce and the quantity of treatments. For instance in Table 20,
a 100% increase in the number of patients under age 65 is correlated with a 2.79% increase
in the average number of cavities per patient and a 1.64% increase in the average number
of 1-surface fillings per patient. Furthermore in Table 21, a 100% increase in the number of
patients under age 65 is correlated with a 3.98% increase in the average number of routine
visits per patient and a 8.74% increase in the average number of visits per patient.
An interesting pattern to note is that the positive correlation between o ce load and the
number of cavity procedures of each type diminishes in magnitude as the severity of the
procedure increases. A 100% increase in the number of patients under age 65 is correlated
with a 1.64% increase in the average number of surface 1 fillings per patient, a 0.87% increase
in the average number of surface 2 fillings per patient, a statistically insignificant but still
positive 0.59% in the average number of surface 3 fillings per patient, and a statistically
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insignificant but still positive 0.28% in the average number of surface 4 fillings per patient.
Moving up in intensity for cavity procedures leads to the coe cient of interest becoming
a degree of magnitude smaller, but remaining still positive. There is also a statistically
insignificant and positive 0.009% increase in the average number of root canals per patient
in response to a 100% increase in the number of patients, where the coe cient is smaller
than the coe cient on four-surface cavities. This may suggest that though perceived quality
may be positively correlated with the number of procedures provided, perceived quality also
diminishes as the severity of procedures increases. The positive coe cient for root canals
provides some suggestive evidence that demand inducement may be carried out by general
dental practitioners, simply for the fact that the clinical outcomes of root canals done by
general dental practitioners are far worse than those done by endodontists, who are specially
trained to carry out endodontic procedures6.
The increases in treatment among larger practices relative to smaller practices primarily
manifest in higher payments for the insurer, where a 100% increase in the number of patients
is correlated with a 31.7% increase in the average yearly insurer payment amount to the
provider. This, along with the statistically insignificant e↵ect on yearly patient out-of-pocket
amounts (Column 4 of Table 21), suggest that larger o ces primarily can increase provision
of treatments for patients primarily by increasing quantity and intensity among treatments
that are covered generously by the insurer, which would yield little in out-of-pocket cost
increases for patients.
The positive correlation between the number of patients in the practice and the number of
routine procedures is most prominently seen for oral evaluations, cleanings, and diagnostic
imaging, which were previously discussed to be among the most profitable services for
general dental practitioners to o↵er. For instance, a 100% increase in the number of patients
under age 65 is correlated with a 6.18% increase in the average number of yearly cleanings
per patient and a 7% increase in the average number of diagnostic imaging procedures
6Discussed previously in Chapter 2
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per patient, both with a high level of statistical significance in Table 22. There is also a
statistically significance positive correlation between the o ce load and the average number
of fluoride treatments and sealant treatments provided per patient, but the magnitudes are
smaller than for the correlations for the most profitable treatments.
Additional notable exceptions to the statistically significant positive correlations between
frequency of treatment and o ce load are extractions. Extraction are typically the last
choice of procedure (unless followed up by dentures or implants) for dentists for both clinical
and financial reasons. Extractions remove the original tooth structure, which is undesirable
from a clinical standpoint, and are reimbursed very little. Anecdotally, dentists say that
extractions are typically used only when the patient cannot a↵ord other treatments or is
otherwise income-constrained. As a result, there is a negative, statistically insignificant cor-
relation between the average number of extractions per patient and the number of patients
per dental practice.
Hence, using the OLS regressions in Tables 20 through 22 would lead one to conclude that
an insurance expansion that increases the number of patients in practices would lead to
increases in the frequency of all services for all patients. This is clearly erroneous, given
that additional increases in routine procedures alone would lead to increases in out-of-
pocket cost for patients due to limitations on the frequency of routine procedures under
dental insurance plans. Furthermore, this would imply that o ces could increase frequency
of all procedures without facing adverse consequences from patients and insurers.
A secondary concern is that even if we were to control for omitted variables across o ces,
o ces may strategically increase the number of patients they have over time, by increasing
outreach to patients or advertising. As a result, o ces that are observed to have increases
over time may very well be expecting the increases by adjusting their o ce capacity (for
instance, by hiring more dental hygienists or increasing the physical size of the o ce and
the number of chairs in the o ce) in anticipation of the increased patient numbers. Hence,
the increase in the number of patients in the practice is not a shock to the o ce, and
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as a result, would bias the relationship between patient numbers and treatment intensity
towards zero. However, the use of the dependent expansion ameliorates concerns about this
issue, primarily because the dependent expansion within dental insurance was unexpected
and led to sizable increases in o ce load as discussed in the previous section.
4.6. Instrumental Variables Results for All O ces
To analyze the impact of the increase in the number of patients per o ce from the dependent
expansion on treatment decisions, I implement an instrumental variables strategy, using the
earlier di↵erence-in-di↵erences specification as a first stage, estimated via two-stage-least-
squares (2SLS) with o ce and county fixed e↵ects. The instruments are the interactions
between the post-implementation dummy for the expansion (equal to one for 2011 and the
years following) and the size of the o ce-level shock from the expansion (measured via the
log of the o ce-specific eligible ratio). The first stages for each sample are contained in
Table 16. These instruments isolate the increases in o ce load, measured in the number
of patients under age 65, that come solely from each o ce being exposed to the market-
level shock from the dependent expansion. As a result, this removes any variation in o ce
load that comes from unobserved quality across o ces, which was the endogeneity concern
described earlier.
To control for changes in underlying severity of the patient cohort and to ameliorate concerns
about changes in patient preferences for treatment, due to changes in insurance coverage,
I examine the impact of the exogenous increase in o ce load on the average quantity of
services across continuously insured patients in an o ce for each procedure and visit type,
zpct 7. This implements directly the hypothesis test described in the Theory section. The
7I choose to examine average treatment intensity across a fixed cohort of patients instead of implementing
a patient-o ce-year level regression primarily because I am limited in the amount of patient characteristics
that can be introduced into the regressions and fixed e↵ects for each continuously insured patient threatens
to di↵erence away much of the variation, especially because continuously insured patients would not be likely
to have significant changes over time in their underlying severity or demand for procedures.
89
second stage is then the following:
log(zpct) = 0 + 1log( \# Patients <65)pct + 2Xct +  p + ⌘c +  t + ✏pct
where p indicates the o ce, c the county, and t the year. O ce, county, and year fixed e↵ects
are included, as well as time-varying market characteristics. Standard errors are clustered
at the county level to adjust for correlations among o ces within the same county, and
observations are weighted by the estimated size of the market population in 2011 constructed
using the modified Elzinga-Hogarty method. 8
The IV results for patients who are continuously insured between at least 2008 to 2013 for
the ¿250K sample of o ces are contained in Tables 24 through 25, which explicitly test
Hypotheses 1 and 2. Notably the F-statistic for the first stage, which takes on a value of
18.77, is above the Stock-Yogo weak identification test critical value for a 10% maximal IV
size, 16.38 - hence, weak instruments are not likely to be a problem here. There are on
average 131.7 continuously insured patients per o ce contained in the sample, which allows
one to be reasonably satisfied that any changes in treatment behavior over time across the
o ce on average for continuously insured patients are being measured with some degree of
accuracy and is not driven by outliers. In Table 23, Panel B, I find that there there are no
increases in the average frequency of routine visits for continuously insured patients from
a percentage increase in the number of patients from the dependent expansion. This is an
intuitive result, because among insurance plans, two routine visits per year per patient is
the recommended norm (and implicitly enforced through coverage rules on the frequency
of routine procedures), and there is an average of 1.974 routine visits among continuously
insured patients, giving dental providers little room to increase the average number of
routine visits. There are also no statistically significant increases in the number of visits,
yearly plan costs, and yearly patient out-of-pocket costs in response to the increase in the
8Ideally, market-level fixed e↵ects and clustering would be preferred over county fixed e↵ects and county-
level clustering, but this is a limitation of the data.
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number of patients from the dependent expansion.
However, the statistically insignificant e↵ect on the number of routine visits does not imply
that there are no increases in routine procedures that are fully covered by the insurer at
100% within the routine visits that occur, nor that there are no increases in routine pro-
cedures in visits that are a mix of routine and non-routine procedures. Rather, there is
a statistically significant increase in the average number of hygiene instructions given to
continuously insured patients from the increase in the number of patients from the depen-
dent expansion. Taken together with the statistically significant decrease in the average
number of surface 3 and surface 4 cavities per continuously insured patient and increases
in the average number of low-severity surface 1 cavities (statistically significant for surface
1 cavities and statistically insignificant for surface 2 cavities) in Table 25, this suggests
that there is mild substitution away from higher intensity cavity procedures towards less
intensive cavity procedures and more routine services that can be carried out by dental
hygienists and are usually reimbursed for at 100%. This lends support for the hypotheses
outlined in the theory section, primarily that o ces that experience a larger increase in
the number of newly insured patients in their practices will lead to a decrease in treatment
intensity for the continuously insured. 9
I carry out the same analysis for the Self-Referral sample to test whether the results hold
for a subsample of o ces that are plausibly more similar and more likely to carry out
demand inducement in Tables 26 through 28. The direction and statistical significance of
coe cients largely align with those from the 250K sample. The most significant di↵erence is
9The reader may be concerned that I am testing multiple outcomes per hypothesis here, which increases
the likelihood of finding an e↵ect from any one outcome variable. An easy way to adjust for this is to use
the the Bonferroni correction, which adjusts the critical value with which to judge the statistical significance
of a result. Given that the cuto↵ for statistical significance is 10%, and there are less than ten treatments
per grouping (among high intensity treatment vs. routine treatments), coe cients that are significant at the
1% level pass the Bonferroni correction for multiple hypothesis testing, which uses the critical value of ↵/n.
Because the Bonferroni adjustment assumes that outcomes are uncorrelated, it tends to be too conservative
when outcomes are correlated. All results that are statistically significant in Table 24 through Table 25
remain statistically significant under the Bonferroni adjusted critical value except for the increase in the
average number of surface 1 cavities per continuously insured patient. As a result, the interpretation of the
results hold up even under the conservative Bonferroni adjustment.
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that the impact of the increase in patient load from the dependent expansion on the number
of diagnostic imaging procedures has increased in magnitude relative to the 250K sample
(the coe cient has gone from a 15.8% increase in response to a 100% increase in o ce
size from the expansion in the 250K sample to a statistically significant 21% increase in
the Self-Referral sample) and become statistically significant at the 5% level. Additionally,
the magnitudes for the decrease in the average number of high intensity cavity procedures
(surface 3 and 4 fillings) per continuous patient are larger, and with larger numbers of
procedures in each category at baseline (an average 0.119 surface 3 fillings per continuously
insured patient across o ces, and an average 0.0678 surface 4 fillings per continuously
insured patient across o ces in the High Referral sample). Hence, the group of o ces that
are most likely to carry out demand inducement were more responsive to the decreased
incentive to induce demand, though as in the 250K sample, this led to no statistically
significant changes in the average number of visits, routine visits, and yearly costs (insurer
and out-of-pocket costs). 10
To be more stringent about controlling for changes in underlying severity in the composi-
tion of patients included for each o ce, I restrict the patient population to those who are
continuously insured and have at least one visit for every year in the analysis (2008-2013).
Because these are individuals who are seeing the dentist continually, this may imply that
their underlying oral health condition is stable or an increased concern or awareness for
their oral health. Results are contained in Tables 29 through 31. As expected, because the
group of continuously seen and insured patients are less likely to face sudden changes in
their oral health, there is no statistically significant e↵ect in the average number of surface
4 cavities per continuously insured and continuously seen patients. However, there is a
statistically significant decline in the average total number of cavities per patient which
seems to come primarily from a decline in the average number of surface 2 and surface
10Using the Bonferroni correction, the increase in diagnostic imaging is not statistically significant. As
a result, the interpretation of the results for the Self-Referral sample are on a whole identical to those for
the 250K sample, though the estimated coe cients have increased in the Self-Referral sample, indicating a
stronger response to the increase in the number of patients from the dependent expansion.
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3 cavities per continuously insured and continuously seen patient, which may be because
there is still potential room for dentists to overdiagnose small cavities even among highly
adherent patients. However, there is a statistically significant increase in the average num-
ber of diagnostic imaging procedures and in the average number of hygiene instructions per
patient in this group across o ces, with magnitudes that are comparable to those from the
preceding analyses using the continuously insured. This implies that the changes in treat-
ment behavior faced by the continuously insured were not isolated only to the continuously
insured, but were shared across the majority of patients.
To evaluate whether these changes in treatment behavior are reflected over entire o ces, I
examine the average treatment intensity and frequency for all patients seen within o ces
in the high population sample. Though there are compositional changes within o ces, the
direction of coe cients are in line with the preceding analyses with statistically significant
decreases in the average number of surface 4 fillings per patient in response to the increase
in patient load from the dependent expansion. There is also a statistically significant in-
crease in the average number of diagnostic imaging procedures per patient with a magnitude
comparable to all the prior analyses. As a result, this suggests that the shift away from
intensive restorative procedures towards routine procedures was not isolated to continu-
ously insured patients and to continuous patients, but took place across the entire practice.
This is consistent with how providers are postulated to make practice pattern decisions -
optimization takes place at the practice level, not at the individual level.
4.7. Welfare Implications
Overall, I find that the average number of non-routine procedures declines among the con-
tinuously insured patients, with the number of higher intensity cavity fillings carried out per
person experiencing the largest declines. I also find that new patients experience a decline
in the average number of intensive treatments in response to the expansion, suggesting that
the overall changes in treatment behavior took e↵ect across both continuously insured and
new patients. Restricting the analysis to o ces that were highly exposed to market-level
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shocks suggests that not only did non-routine, high-intensity procedures decline, but that
there was substitution towards routine procedures. Overall, the pattern of results consis-
tently point towards a decrease in intensive cavity procedures and substitution towards less
intensive, routine procedures, which is consistent with the earlier model of provider behavior
with demand inducement.
However, is a decline in intensive cavity procedures unambiguously welfare-improving for
patients? Given the clinical background discussed in Chapter 2, the decline in intensive
cavity procedures is almost certainly welfare-improving provided that cavities were not left
to increase in severity to be filled in later. However, if this were true, this would likely have
been coupled with a persistent decline in the average total number of cavity fillings, and only
Table 26 found a statistically insignificant negative coe cient - all other samples reported a
statistically insignificant positive coe cient. Furthermore, this would imply large implicit
costs from demand inducement, if this was a common form of demand inducement - actively
delaying a cavity procedure for much later in order to reap higher costs may lead to 1) the
patient becoming symptomatic and perceiving the quality of dental care provided to be
low as a result, 2) higher risk of being detected by the insurer if cavities are persistently 3
surface fillings or greater, and 3) ethical costs to the provider from not providing care when
necessitated. The decline in intensive cavity procedures, however, is not likely to have had
a large impact on patient welfare, given the magnitude of the estimated coe cients.
What is more concerning is the increase in routine procedures that stemmed most from
the increase in diagnostic imaging, and less from increases in cleanings. While the shift
from restorative procedures to routine procedures suggested a decrease in inducement for
higher intensity cavity procedures, this also suggests that the shift was towards low-intensity
procedures reimbursed generously by insurers with little positive benefit to the patient in
terms of prevention of cavities. I discuss this issue in further depth in Chapter 5.
Why would dentists not provide the low-intensity procedures prior to a shock to o ce load?
There are several possibilities. First, there may be diminishing or negative returns from
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providing too many treatments per patient. This is an argument based on Dranove (1988),
where patients are able to infer that providers exceeding a treatment quantity or intensity
threshold are engaging in inducement behavior and punish them as a result. There may
also be increasing probabilities of being detected by the insurer by providing too many
treatments per patient. Second, if patients do indeed perceive quality of a dentist’s o ce
to be correlated with the number of procedures in lieu of providing more capacity-intensive
and higher intensity treatments, providers may use an increase in diagnostic procedures
in order to justify the decrease in the number of restorative procedures. Future work
developing quality measures for dental practices may be useful in testing these mechanisms
empirically.
4.8. Conclusion
To summarize, I use a novel dental claims dataset from Delta Dental of Michigan to examine
the e↵ect of an exogenous increase in market demand, coming from a dental insurance
expansion e↵ective starting in 2011, on provider treatment behavior in dentistry. Because
dental o ces tend to practice under-capacity and readily take on new patients, the dental
market is an area where aggregate market shocks will more directly impact o ce loads and
o ce-level outcomes. I detect that a one standard deviation increase in the potential size
of the insurance expansion, proxied by the fraction of the population in each county that
is directly eligible for the dependent coverage expansion, leads to a 2.82% increase in the
coverage rate among those under age 65 on average across Michigan counties. This translates
to a potential 9.2% increase in the number of patient under age 65 for the average o ce in
Michigan. Furthermore, though the increase in coverage rates is most dramatic for the age
groups directly eligible for the dependent expansion, there is also a substantial increase in
coverage rates among the parents of those eligible for dependent coverage. The increase in
enrollment from adults with dependents accounts for 50.3% of the increase in enrollment on
average across counties. The spillovers in enrollment, as a result, are an important factor in
how heavily o ces are impacted potentially by the dependent expansion, especially given
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the general di culty of dental o ces in capturing individuals between ages 21 to 34, an age
group that faces the most significant cost barriers to care relative to all other age groups
(Nasseh and Vujicic, 2015).
I then move to the o ce-year-level analysis and examine how o ces respond to the de-
pendent expansion in their market by using dosage di↵erence-in-di↵erence analysis. By
constructing markets using a variation of the Elzinga-Hogarty approach and the data avail-
able on the Euclidean straight-line distances between each patient and the o ce seen by the
patient, I construct the potential size of the dependent expansion at the o ce-level, which
is a weighted average of the county-level shocks across all counties (within an o ce-specific
radius). As in the county-level analyses, I find that increases in the number of patients per
o ce from the dependent coverage expansion are concentrated first among the age groups
directly impacted by the expansion, and then among the age group of individuals old enough
to have eligible dependents. Furthermore, there is no detectable percentage change in the
number of patients in the control group, made up of individuals too old to be eligible directly
for the expansion and too young to have dependents impacted directly by the dependent
coverage expansion. As a result, a one standard deviation increase in the potential size of
the dependent expansion, as measured using the o ce-specific eligible ratio, yields a 3.6%
increase in the number of patients under age 65 in the post-implementation period, relative
to baseline levels in 2008. This implies that some o ces could experience as large as an
9.5% increase in the number of patients in the dental o ce from the dependent expansion
relative to 2008 levels, which is well within the bounds of the estimates of the increase in
the number of patients per o ce from the county-level analysis. Furthermore, the increase
in o ce load from the dependent expansion is non-trivial and may be a large enough shock
to alter provider incentives for demand inducement.
The dosage di↵erence-in-di↵erence regression is then used as the first stage in an instru-
mental variables analysis, which seeks to remove the influence of any omitted or unobserved
variables impacting both the number of patients attracted by an o ce and its average inten-
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sity or frequency of dental treatments. Using the increase in o ce load from the dependent
expansion, I find that the sudden shock in o ce load leads to a statistically significant
decrease in the average number of intensive cavity procedures across continuously insured
patients and a statistically significant and sizable increase in the average number of diag-
nostic imaging procedures per continuously insured patient, and modest increases in the
average number of hygiene instruction per continuously insured patients. Because I in-
clude only patients who have been continuously insured throughout the time period, the
increase in intensive cavity procedures is not from a sudden change in insurance coverage,
thus removing any moral hazard e↵ect or changes in underlying demand. The result taken
together suggest that a sudden increase in an o ce’s workload leads to substitution away
from intensive cavity procedures towards routine procedures. This is consistent with the
predictions of models of demand inducement and provider behavior.
4.9. Tables and Figures
97
Figure 4: County-Level Distribution of Eligible Ratio in 2011
(a) County-Level Distribution of Eligible Ratio in 2011
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Figure 5: Testing for a Break in Trend in Coverage Rates
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Notes: In this figure, I implement the parallel trends test to examine whether there are
common trends between counties with larger and smaller eligible ratios in the
pre-implementation period (2009 and 2010) relative to 2008. Each dot represents the
coe cient estimate for the given year, where the mapped coe cients are the interactions
between the county-specific eligible ratio and the year fixed e↵ects. 2008 is used as the
excluded base year. The coe cients used in these graphs are the standardized coe cients
for ease of interpretation. Additional control variables included in these regressions are
such as the log of the size of the population without any form of insurance (between ages
18-64, and under age 19), the unemployment rate, and the number of dental o ces per
county. The 90% confidence intervals are given by the bars around each coe cient point
estimate. Standard errors are clustered at the county-level, and observations are weighted
by the size of the under 65 population in each county.
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Figure 6: Distribution of Distance to the Provider by Age Group
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Notes: These figures maps the distribution of travel distances from the individual’s
residence to the dental provider across individuals residing in Michigan and enrolled in
Delta Dental of Michigan plans between 2007 and 2013 for each age group. Outliers with
travel distances exceeding 50 miles are dropped.
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Figure 7: Falsification Test: County-Level Standardized Distribution of Ratio of 30 to 34
Year Olds in 2011
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Figure 8: Falsification Test: Testing for a Break in Trend in Coverage Rates
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Notes: As part of the falsification, I implement the parallel trends test to examine whether
there are common trends between counties with larger and smaller non-eligible ratios in
the pre-implementation period (2009 and 2010) relative to 2008, where the non-eligible
ratios are given by the ratio of 30 to 34 year olds in the county population under age 65.
Each dot represents the coe cient estimate for the given year, where the mapped
coe cients are the interactions between the county-specific eligible ratio and the year
fixed e↵ects. 2008 is used as the excluded base year. The coe cients used in these graphs
are the standardized coe cients for ease of interpretation. Additional control variables
included in these regressions are such as the log of the size of the population without any
form of insurance (between ages 18-64, and under age 19), the unemployment rate, and the
number of dental o ces per county. The 90% confidence intervals are given by the bars
around each coe cient point estimate. Standard errors are clustered at the county-level,
and observations are weighted by the size of the under 65 population in each county.
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Figure 9: Comparison Between O ce-Specific and County Eligible Ratios
(a) Distribution of the O ce-Level Eligible Ratio
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(b) Error Distribution from the Linear Prediction of O ce-Specific on County-Specific Eligible Ratio
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Notes: Panel (a) maps the o ce-specific eligible ratio (also called market eligible ratio),
constructed using the modified Elzinga-Hogarty approach to defining the market at the
o ce level, to the original county-level eligible ratio. Panel (b) maps the error terms from
the regression of the market eligible ratio on the county of operation eligible ratio to show
that there is no clear direction to the bias from using the market definition provided by
the Elzinga-Hogarty approach.
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Figure 10: O ce-Level Z-Score Distribution for the O ce-Specific Eligible Ratio
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Notes: This figure maps the standardized normal distribution, primarily to show where the
data lies in number of standard deviations from the mean in the sample, using the High
Population sample (greater than 250,000 individuals under age 65 in the market in 2011).
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Figure 11: E↵ect of Dependent Expansion Size on O ce Load by Year, High Population
O ces
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Notes: The coe cients mapped in this figure represent the average impact of the
expansion across all o ces for each age group over the years 2009 to 2013 relative to 2008
as the base year, and are interpreted as the average percentage increase in the number of
patients for an o ce from having a ”high” o ce-specific eligible ratio in each year, where
”high” in this context is taken to be inthe topmost quartile of the distribution of
o ce-specific eligible ratios. The coe cients are given by the dots, whereas the bars give
the 90% confidence intervals around each point estimate and use standard errors that are
clustered at the county-level. The sample used to generate this is the high population
sample of o ces, comprised of o ces operating in markets with at least 250,000
individuals under age 65.
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Table 16: Standardized Coe cients: Increase in O ce Load Among Patients Under Age
65, O ce-Level Regressions
(1) (2)
Log of Dependent Variable # Patients # Patients
1(O ce-Specific Eligible Ratio)*1(Post) 0.0360*** 0.0330***
(0.00831) (0.00786)
Observations 8,892 7,710
R-squared 0.030 0.039
Number of O ces 1,482 1,285
Sample 250K Self-Refer
County FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Pre-Policy Control Level Mean 289.1 294.1
First Stage F-Stat 18.77 17.62
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: This table contains the standardized coe cient estimates for o ce-year
level regressions with log of proxies for o ce load (given by number of patients
among those under age 65) as the dependent variables and the interaction of
the log of the size of the dependent expansion faced by each o ce (proxied
by the o ce-specific eligible ratio) with year fixed e↵ects as the key indepen-
dent variables of interest. Year and county fixed e↵ects are incorporated into
all regressions, as well as time-varying controls for the size of the population
without any form of insurance (between ages 18-64, and under age 19) and the
unemployment rate in the market. Including time-varying county character-
istics do not substantially impact the regression results, and so are excluded
here. Observations are weighted by the Elzinga-Hogarty weighted mean popu-
lation for each market to take into account that holding fixed the o ce-specific
eligible ratio, o ces in markets that are larger in population will face a larger
shock to the number of patients seen within practices.
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Table 17: Standardized Coe cients: Increase in Number of Visits Among Patients Under
Age 65, O ce-Level Regressions
(1) (2)
Log of Dependent Variable # Visits # Visits
1(O ce-Specific Eligible Ratio)*1(Post) 0.0392*** 0.0349***
(0.00787) (0.00776)
Observations 8,892 7,710
R-squared 0.028 0.033
Number of O ces 1,482 1,285
Sample 250K Self-Refer
County FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Pre-Policy Control Level Mean 641 656.1
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: This table contains the standardized coe cient estimates for o ce-
year level regressions with log of proxies for o ce load (given by number
of visits among patients under age 65) as the dependent variables and the
interaction of the log of the size of the dependent expansion faced by each
o ce (proxied by the o ce-specific eligible ratio) with year fixed e↵ects as
the key independent variables of interest. Year and county fixed e↵ects are
incorporated into all regressions, as well as time-varying controls for the size
of the population without any form of insurance (between ages 18-64, and
under age 19) and the unemployment rate in the market. Including time-
varying county characteristics do not substantially impact the regression
results, and so are excluded here. Observations are weighted by the Elzinga-
Hogarty weighted mean population for each market to take into account
that holding fixed the o ce-specific eligible ratio, o ces in markets that are
larger in population will face a larger shock to the number of patients seen
within practices.
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Table 18: Age Group Breakdown of Increase in O ce Load Among Patients Under Age 65,
O ce-Level Regressions, High Population O ces
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log of Num Patients in Age Group 0-14 15-24 25-34 35-64
1(O ce-Specific Eligible Ratio)*1(Post) 0.0364*** 0.0357*** 0.0222 0.0351***
(0.00710) (0.00804) (0.0202) (0.00690)
Constant 4.184 3.361 6.678 5.236
(2.936) (4.193) (3.857) (3.611)
Observations 8,892 8,892 8,892 8,892
R-squared 0.040 0.014 0.027 0.031
Number of O ces 1,482 1,482 1,482 1,482
County FE X X X X
Year FE X X X X
Pre-Policy Control Level Mean 40.16 36.25 23.82 169.5
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: This table contains the standardized coe cient estimates for o ce-year level regressions with log
of proxies for o ce load (given by number of patients and number of visits among those under age 65)
as the dependent variables and the interaction of the log of the size of the dependent expansion faced
by each o ce (proxied by the o ce-specific eligible ratio) with year fixed e↵ects as the key independent
variables of interest. Year and county fixed e↵ects are incorporated into all regressions, as well as time-
varying controls for the size of the population without any form of insurance (between ages 18-64, and
under age 19) and the unemployment rate in the market. Including time-varying county characteristics
do not substantially impact the regression results, and so are excluded here. Observations are weighted
by the Elzinga-Hogarty weighted mean population for each market to take into account that holding
fixed the o ce-specific eligible ratio, o ces in markets that are larger in population will face a larger
shock to the number of patients seen within practices.
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Table 21: OLS Regression: Relationship Between O ce Load and Average Number of Visits
Per Patient and Average Yearly Payment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Visits Routine Visits Plan Pay Patient Pay
Log(Num Patients Under Age 65) 0.0874*** 0.0398*** 0.317*** -0.0177
(0.00912) (0.00895) (0.0585) (0.0210)
Constant 0.724** -0.206 5.927*** 3.594***
(0.289) (0.801) (1.907) (0.707)
Observations 8,892 8,892 8,892 8,892
R-squared 0.132 0.032 0.210 0.008
Number of groupo ce 1,482 1,482 1,482 1,482
County FE YES YES YES YES
O ce FE YES YES YES YES
Level Mean 2.278 1.985 389.1 194.3
Avg # Patients in Group 296.6 296.6 296.6 296.6
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: This table contains the coe cient estimates for o ce-year level regressions with log of the number
of visits (by type) and yearly payment amounts (for insurers and patients) averaged among all patients
under age 65 in the practice as the dependent variables and the log of the number of patients under
age 65 as the key independent variable of interest as a proxy for o ce load. Year and county fixed
e↵ects are incorporated into all regressions, as well as time-varying controls for the size of the population
without any form of insurance (between ages 18-64, and under age 19) and the unemployment rate in the
market. Including time-varying county characteristics do not substantially impact the regression results,
and so are excluded here. The sample used for these regressions is the 250K sample, comprised of o ces
operating in markets with at least 250,000 individuals under age 65 in the market population. Standard
errors are clustered at the county level.
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Table 23: E↵ect of Increase in Number of Patients from Dependent Expansion on Average
Yearly Frequency and Average Yearly Cost of Care for Continuously Insured Patients, High
Population Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: OLS Regression Visits Routine Visits Plan Pay Patient Pay
Log(Num Patients Under Age 65) 0.123*** 0.0868*** 0.481*** 0.332**
(0.0140) (0.0217) (0.0811) (0.115)
Observations 8,892 8,892 8,892 8,892
R-squared 0.180 0.066 0.239 0.066
Number of O ces 1,482 1,482 1,482 1,482
County FE YES YES YES YES
O ce FE YES YES YES YES
Level Mean 2.278 1.985 389.1 194.3
Avg # Patients in Group 131.7 131.7 131.7 131.7
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel B: IV Regression Visits Routine Visits Plan Pay Patient Pay
Log(Num Patients Under Age 65) 0.0607 0.0240 0.0966 0.0678
(0.0496) (0.0220) (0.143) (0.191)
Observations 8,892 8,892 8,892 8,892
R-squared 0.113 0.032 0.087 0.026
Number of O ces 1,482 1,482 1,482 1,482
County FE YES YES YES YES
O ce FE YES YES YES YES
Level Mean 2.278 1.985 389.1 194.3
Avg # Patients in Group 131.7 131.7 131.7 131.7
First Stage F-stat 18.77 18.77 18.77 18.77
Standard errors clustered at the county level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: This table contains the coe cient estimates for o ce-year level regressions with log of the
average number of visits (by type), average yearly insurer reimbursement, and average yearly out-of-
pocket patient cost among all patients under age 65 in the practice as the dependent variables and the
log of the number of patients under age 65 as the key independent variable of interest as a proxy for
o ce load. Year and county fixed e↵ects are incorporated into all regressions, as well as time-varying
controls for the size of the population without any form of insurance (between ages 18-64, and under
age 19) and the unemployment rate in the market. Including time-varying county characteristics do not
substantially impact the regression results, and so are excluded here. The sample used here is the high
population sample, comprised of o ces with at least 250,000 individuals under age 65 in the market in
2011. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.
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Table 26: The E↵ect of Change in O ce Size on Average Yearly Frequency and Average
Yearly Cost of Care Per Continuously Insured (2008-2013) Patient Among Self Referral
O ces
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: OLS Regression Visits Routine Visits Plan Pay Patient Pay
Log(Num Patients Under Age 65) 0.119*** 0.0824*** 0.463*** 0.285
(0.0205) (0.0233) (0.116) (0.169)
Observations 7,710 7,710 7,710 7,710
R-squared 0.161 0.056 0.221 0.052
Number of O ces 1,285 1,285 1,285 1,285
County FE YES YES YES YES
O ce FE YES YES YES YES
Level Mean 2.297 1.972 400.3 199.7
Avg # Patients in Group 134.1 134.1 134.1 134.1
Standard errors clustered at the county level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel B: IV Regression Visits Routine Visits Plan Pay Patient Pay
Log(Num Patients Under Age 65) 0.0251 0.0526 0.0213 -0.0928
(0.0523) (0.0422) (0.179) (0.193)
Observations 7,710 7,710 7,710 7,710
R-squared 0.052 0.048 0.025 -0.030
Number of O ces 1,285 1,285 1,285 1,285
County FE YES YES YES YES
O ce FE YES YES YES YES
Level Mean 2.297 1.972 400.3 199.7
Avg # Patients in Group 134.1 134.1 134.1 134.1
First Stage F-stat 17.62 17.62 17.62 17.62
Standard errors clustered at the county level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: This table contains the coe cient estimates for o ce-year level regressions with log of the
average number of visits (by type), average yearly insurer reimbursement, and average yearly out-of-
pocket patient cost among continuously insured patients under age 65 in the practice as the dependent
variables and the log of the number of patients under age 65 as the key independent variable of interest
as a proxy for o ce load. Year and county fixed e↵ects are incorporated into all regressions, as well
as time-varying controls for the size of the population without any form of insurance (between ages
18-64, and under age 19) and the unemployment rate in the market. Including time-varying county
characteristics do not substantially impact the regression results, and so are excluded here. The sample
used here is the self-referral sample, comprised of o ces with at least 250,000 individuals under age
65 in the market in 2011 with at least one root canal procedure during the time period (2008-2013).
Standard errors are clustered at the county level.
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Table 29: The E↵ect of Change in O ce Size on Average Yearly Frequency and Average
Yearly Cost of Care Per Continuously Insured and Continuously Seen (2008-2013) Patient
Among High Population O ces
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: OLS Regression Visits Routine Visits Plan Pay Patient Pay
Log(Num Patients Under Age 65) 0.0781*** 0.0264* 0.145* -0.0410
(0.0110) (0.0146) (0.0706) (0.0499)
Observations 8,826 8,826 8,826 8,826
R-squared 0.108 0.008 0.037 0.020
Number of O ces 1,471 1,471 1,471 1,471
County FE YES YES YES YES
O ce FE YES YES YES YES
Level Mean 2.278 1.985 389.1 194.3
Avg # Patients in Group 76 76 76 76
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel B: IV Regression Visits Routine Visits Plan Pay Patient Pay
Log(Num Patients Under Age 65) 0.0599*** 0.0762*** 0.148 0.0492
(0.0222) (0.0266) (0.0913) (0.124)
Observations 8,826 8,826 8,826 8,826
R-squared 0.026 -0.006 0.017 -0.001
Number of O ces 1,471 1,471 1,471 1,471
County FE YES YES YES YES
O ce FE YES YES YES YES
Level Mean 2.278 1.985 389.1 194.3
Avg # Patients in Group 76 76 76 76
First Stage F-stat 20.88 20.88 20.88 20.88
Standard errors clustered at the county level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: This table contains the coe cient estimates for o ce-year level regressions
with log of the average number of visits (by type), average yearly insurer reimburse-
ment, and average yearly out-of-pocket patient cost among continuously insured and
continuously seen (at least one visit per year in the dental o ce) patients under age
65 in the practice as the dependent variables and the log of the number of patients un-
der age 65 as the key independent variable of interest as a proxy for o ce load. Year
and county fixed e↵ects are incorporated into all regressions, as well as time-varying
controls for the size of the population without any form of insurance (between ages
18-64, and under age 19) and the unemployment rate in the market. Including time-
varying county characteristics do not substantially impact the regression results, and
so are excluded here. The sample used here is the self-referral sample, comprised of
o ces with at least 250,000 individuals under age 65 in the market in 2011. Standard
errors are clustered at the county level.
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CHAPTER 5 : Optimal Insurance and Policy Levers for the Dental Market
In the 1970s, a time when enrollment in employer-sponsored dental benefits were beginning
to increase, and economists began to be concerned about the cost of dental benefits with
the observed increase in medical expenditures, Bailit et al. (1979) writes:
...it must be remembered that a major objective of dental insurance should
be to improve oral health... From an economic point of view, the problem can
be states in terms of the marginal return in dental health that can be achieved
with greater investment in dental services, i.e., there comes a point where further
investment in dental services produces very little increase in oral health. The
problem, then, is identifying that level of investment where the marginal costs
equal the marginal benefits in health. Furthermore, it is not only how much
money is spent for dental services that matters but also the specific services
which are purchased. In terms of improving health, some services may have
greater benefit than others.
However, the predicted increase in dental expenditures has not played out as dramatically
as would have been predicted in the 70s (which perhaps was a reason why economists
turned away from studying the dental market) [CITE]. Furthermore, Section 2.3 is in direct
opposition to this perception of dental insurance, suggesting that not only is there incentive
for dental providers to induce demand, but that the incentives for demand inducement
are exaggerated due to the failure to align payment for dental procedures with clinical
outcomes for care. This section then discusses why such a payment system has arisen
in dental insurance, and how to redesign dental insurance in the context of the optimal
insurance literature.
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5.1. Current Dental Insurance
Dental insurance is not insurance in the traditional sense - rather than providing coverage
for low-risk, high-expenditure oral health events, the structure of dental insurance is instead
that of a pre-payment plan for a set of common routine dental procedures that are generally
seen to be preventive. However, Section 2.3 stressed that the common dental procedures
covered by dental insurance have not been demonstrated to be e cacious nor cost-e↵ective.
In contrast, there are several preventive dental procedures with strong evidence bases for
e cacy that are typically not covered as generously as routine procedures. If the goal of
dental insurance is to increase oral health, why would these procedures go uncovered?
The simple answer is that dental insurers are not incentivized to improve oral health, and
thus do not have a significant incentive to generously cover the e↵ective preventive dental
procedures especially if consumers do not demand them (either because their providers
do not suggest these procedures to them, or because consumers are not aware of these
procedures).
Dental insurers are not incentivized to improve oral health because they do not face the
costs from catastrophic oral health events. As a result, dental insurance plans have costs
that can be predicted accurately and planned for (Guay, 2006), and do not vary with the
underlying dental risk or oral health status of the consumer. Because there is no tie between
the costs of running a dental insurance plan and the risk and health of enrolled individuals,
dental insurers have no incentive to cover procedures that will decrease the probability of
adverse events or improve patient health. Instead, the catastrophic dental costs are turned
over in extreme cases to health insurers, emergency rooms, or absorbed by the patient in
out-of-pocket costs (Mertz, 2016).
Dental insurance became an attractive product for insurers to sell because of the predictable
costs and after realizing that many who enroll would not seek care (Mertz, 2016). The
predictability of costs in a dental insurance plan may then have been a barrier to adopting
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capitation payment structures in dentistry, which were strongly recommended as early as
1980 in an IOM report (Mertz, 2016) but has yet to appear more than marginally outside of
Medicaid. Furthermore, employer-sponsored dental insurance allows individuals to redirect
their income via pretax payment towards routine dental care. In addition, dental insurers
may be able to leverage the higher numbers of individuals enrolled in the plan to bargain
prices with individual dentists to be lower than if patients directly bargained with dentists
themselves on average. As a result, dental insurance would allow consumers to pre-purchase
a routine set of dental services using pre-tax income and at possibly a lower price due to
the increased bargaining power of the insurer.
Hence, dental insurers would only be incentivized to change the bundle of dental services
to favor the clinically supported preventive dental procedures o↵ered in dental plans if
consumers valued the preventive procedures enough. Via Summers (1989), benefits will be
provided up to the point where an extra dollar spent on including the service is valued by
the enrollee at one dollar. However, oral health promotion studies have stressed that the use
of preventive dental procedures depends whether patients receive advice from their dentist
or dental sta↵ to use these procedures (Mejia et al., 2011). There has been some preliminary
work to show that there is no significant correlation between oral health literacy and use of
preventive dental care (Burgette et al., 2015), though this is still an understudied area. As a
result, due to the overall financial disincentive for providers to encourage or educate patients
about e↵ective preventive procedures, patients likely do not value or demand coverage for
preventive services. 1
However, there may be substantive medical savings generated by providing e↵ective pre-
ventive dental care. For instance, diabetes is associated with increased occurrence and
progression of oral complications and though the correlation seems to stem from a bidi-
rectional relationship between diabetes and periodontal infection, there are a number of
1Despite this, there are some dental insurers that have moved towards piloting several pay-for-performance
initiatives to incentivize dentists to increase provision of preventive procedures proven to be clinically e↵ec-
tive. For instance, Delta Dental of Massachusetts introduced a program to incentivize dental providers to
place sealants soon after tooth eruption among children (Hunt and Aravamudhan, 2014)/
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studies indicating that management and treatment of periodontal disease in patients may
improve diabetic patients’ glycemic levels and insulin requirements2. Using linked medical
and dental claims from 2001-2002, Albert et al. (2006) finds that individuals with more
severe dental conditions had significantly higher medical costs, though endogeneity and
self-selection into the sample and into treatment for the di↵erent dental conditions (which
were proxies for having a dental condition) were undoubtedly a limitation of the study de-
sign. Avalere Health (2016) used the 2010 Chronic Condition Public Use Files from CMS
to simulate the e↵ects of covering the intial and follow-up treatment of periodontal disease
for beneficiaries with diabetes or heart disease and those who had su↵ered a stroke, assum-
ing that those receiving periodontal treatment would have decreased medical costs, finding
overall cost-savings to Medicare of $63.5 billion from 2016 to 2025 primarily through re-
duced hospitalizations and emergency room visits. It is notable that periodontal treatment
alone, which works to treat an existing infection, could be estimated to decrease medical
costs to this extent, suggesting that there may be additional cost savings from providing
preventive dental care earlier. In the Avelere analysis, the average allowed rate for initial
periodontal treatment and ongoing maintenance every six months from private insurers
were used to estimate the cost to Medicare of providing periodontal benefits. These were
very high compared to the cost of providing treatment for preventive dental care - $825
for initial treatment procedures per person and $250 for ongoing maintenance every six
months. Though these are suggestive results, I stress also that the literature in this area
has room for growth - the vast majority of this literature uncovers correlations that cannot
be interpreted causally.
There are other sources of low-hanging fruit in terms of how and why improving provision
and/or coverage of preventive dental care may decrease medical costs. This is especially
clear for emergency room and hospital admissions due to dental problems. Meyer and
Tolleson-Rinehart (2016) writes that
2Albert et al. (2006) contains a brief literature review on this topic.
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In 2012 [ED dental visits financed by Medicaid or self-paying patients] ac-
counted for nearly 2 percent of all ED visits, consumed $1.6 billion - roughly
3 percent of all ED expenditures - and averaged $749 per visit. Similarly, den-
tal visits to the ED cost $23 million in Georgia in 2007 and nearly $88 million
in Florida in 2010. It is estimated that 79 percent of ED dental visits could
be avoided if preventive care were more routine, translating to as much as $4
million savings to a single state Medicaid program.
The amount of savings is not likely to be overexaggerated - in Iowa, 78% of costs for
restorative dental care for Medicaid children were attributable to hospital and anesthesiol-
ogist charges alone (Mouradian et al., 2000), with an average overall cost to Medicaid of
$2009 per case. Similarly, in Louisiana, children receiving dental care in a hospital operating
room incurred estimated costs of $1508, in contrast to $104 for children receiving outpatient
dental care (Mouradian et al., 2000).
A recent study paints an even starker picture. Bruen et al. (2016) found that 98% of surgical
care for Medicaid children under age 20 was due to treatment of dental caries, accounting
for 26,373 cases across six states in 2011 and accounting for $68 million in total Medicaid
payments in those six states. The six states included in the analysis had complete Medicaid
data for both fee-for-service and capitated managed care in 2011. Extrapolating to the
rest of the United States, Bruen et al. (2016) suggest that approximately $450 million in
additional expenditures took place in 2011 due to surgical care for preventable pediatric
dental conditions. Though this was a study focused on Medicaid, this suggests that failing
to treat and prevent dental caries may lead to large medical expenses for insurers, patients,
and the public health safety net.
Failure to treat and prevent dental caries may lead to large medical expenses for insurers,
patients, and the public health safety net. The analysis of the NHAMCS by Wall and
Nasseh (2013) supports this, finding that dental emergency room visits in the United States
increased from 1.1 million in 2000 to 2.1 million in 2010, with a statistically significant
136
increase as a percent of total emergency room visits from 1.06% of total emergency room
visits in 2000 to 1.65% in 2010 (Wall and Nasseh, 2013). The increase in dental emergency
department visits was primarily accounted for by young adults between ages 21 to 34, who
generally face the highest cost barriers to dental care out of any age group, but who may have
health insurance (up to age 26) as a dependent on a parent’s insurance plan or may have an
o↵er of employer-sponsored health insurance. Using the 2009 HCUP Nationwide Emergency
Department Sample (NEDS), which is the largest all-payer emergency department database
in the United States, Seu et al. (2012) finds that the major payers for hospitalized patients
among those using the ED for dental conditions in 2009 were Medicaid, followed by private
(health) insurance (Seu et al., 2012).
The use of emergency departments for dental conditions may be especially important with
the recent private and public health insurance expansions through the A↵ordable Care
Act. Chalmers et al. (2016) found that the rollout of the 2014 Medicaid expansion in
Kentucky occurred simultaneously with a dramatic increase in the number of ED discharges
for conditions related to dental or oral health - though ED discharges for all diagnoses among
Medicaid adults doubled with the increase in Medicaid coverage, the number of discharges
related to dental conditions nearly tripled. While the overall incrase in overall ED visits was
not unexpected based on the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment that found an increase
in ED use, the dramatic increase among dental-related ED visits is novel. This may imply
that when insurance expansions reach populations with higher risk of poor oral health, the
pent-up demand for dental care may manifest in emergency room and outpatient visits that
are ine↵ective at treating the underlying oral health condition - patients typically receive
prescriptions to treat symptoms (such as pain, toothache, and infection), antibiotics, or
analgesics (Chalmers et al., 2016).
Given the possible e↵ect of dental care on decreasing medical expenditures, spillovers to the
public health safety net (especially hospitals and state Medicaid programs) and to overall
health expenditures, the stakeholders that may benefit most from increases in utilization of
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e↵ective dental prevention are states and health insurers. Given the research currently being
generated on the linkage between dental and systemic (overall) health and the underlying
costs, there have been some e↵ort to internalize these externalities by some private insurers
and some Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) providers by integrating both medical
and dental benefits (Avalere Health, 2016). This is because states and health insurers
are best positioned to internalize the spillover e↵ects of increasing preventive dental care
on medical expenses. This suggests then a two-pronged strategy to redesign the payment
and delivery of dental care through the incorporation of dental benefits into health plans for
higher income cohorts and the public provision of some types of preventive dental procedures
to the most vulnerable populations. I discuss private plan provision of preventive dental
care in the following section.
5.2. Optimal Insurance
Optimal insurance theory may provide some insight into whether dental benefits should
be included into health plans or not. Pauly and Held (1990) discuss the conditions under
which full coverage of preventive services would take place given profit-maximizing insurers
or payers, which are as follows: 1) at minimum, the preventive service should be cost-
e↵ective; 2) there should not already be a large proportion of people who would purchase the
preventive service without insurance; 3) consumers should be responsive to price changes for
the treatment (high elasticity of demand); and 4) coverage should a↵ect treatment decisions.
Hence, I discuss each of these components.
1. Are dental services cost-e↵ective? Though there exists a robust evidence base for
the clinical e cacy of preventive dental services such as fluoride, silver diamine fluoride,
and sealants, comprehensive economic evaluations of caries prevention methods are modest
in number and quality (Niederman et al., 2015), primarily indicating that prevention is
cost-e↵ective for specific populations and countries. The cost-e↵ectiveness studies in dental
prevention primarily su↵er from inability to compare between multiple methods of preven-
tion, lack of detail on cost, and the absence of economic outcomes (such as education, school
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attendence, income, days missed at work, and overall quality of life) that may have an im-
pact on the overall cost-e↵ectiveness ratio (Tonmukayakul et al., 2015) and other related
outcomes (such as number of emergency room admissions averted or primary care visits for
dental-related conditions). Hence, the cost-e↵ectiveness research in dental care is an open
and developing area of research with room for improvement (Gri n and Jones, 2013).
The cost-e↵ectiveness studies and clinical trials examining e↵ectiveness of preventive dental
services (or dental services in general) typically fail to relate how dental treatments a↵ect
overall systemic health. Though there has been much discussion of the linkage between
oral health and systemic health (Li et al., 2000), whether the associations are causal is
not yet clear. For instance, there is a correlation between periodontal disease and adverse
pregnancy outcomes, heart disease, stroke, and diabetes, but causation has not been es-
tablished (Pihlstrom et al., 2005). However, randomized controlled trials for periodontal
therapy have shown intensive periodontal treatment to improve lipid profiles that influence
cardiovascular risk, relative to standard periodontal therapy(D’Aiuto et al., 2006). Perhaps
as a result of the lack of evidence demonstrating that systemic diseases are caused by oral
infection, clinical trials and cost-e↵ectiveness studies in dentistry do not typically model or
test for changes in health status. This may have an important e↵ect on the estimated cost-
e↵ectiveness of dental treatments - if there are indeed salient and measurable changes in
health status due to improvements in oral health that come from increased use of preventive
dental treatment, then dental treatments may be more likely to be cost-e↵ective.
Additionally, routine dental examinations may be a way to detect whether a patient is at
high risk for diseases such as oral cancer, diabetes, and heart disease even before their pri-
mary care visits (Koneru and Tanikonda, 2015; Wright et al., 2014; Strauss et al., 2015),
but current structures of reimbursement in dental insurance do not reward dental providers
for checking for propensity for non-oral disease. Studies examining the e cacy of early de-
tection of diabetes in dental settings also noted that the lack of coordination between dental
and medical providers can mean that early detection in dental clinics may not translate to
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follow-up care with patients’ primary care physicians (Wright et al., 2014). However, given
that an estimated 8.1 million people in the United States with diabetes are undiagnosed,
and an additional 86 million with prediabetes are also undiagnosed, routine dental exam-
inations may be a valuable tool to identify and treat prediabetics in order to halt disease
progression and diagnose and manage existing diabetic patients (Strauss et al., 2015).
Hence, there are pathways through which preventive dental care and routine dental exam-
inations may have a measurable and large impact on health, but they have not been fully
examined. As a result, more work is needed to determine whether these dental interven-
tions would be worth the benefit received by the patient in terms of patient health and
other relevant economic outcomes. This is especially true for dental interventions targeted
at adults - much of the work in establishing cost-e↵ectiveness of treatments have been aimed
at children.
However, some studies have demonstrated that programs (primarily targeted towards chil-
dren) implementing preventive dental care may be cost-saving to payers such as Medicare
and Medicaid. Gri n et al. (2016) systematically reviewed the literature and found that
from a societal perspective, school sealant programs at schools attended by a large number
of high-risk children were cost-saving (the comparison was to having no sealant programs)
and also improved the quality of life for children through decreasing the probability of need-
ing future fillings and su↵ering toothaches. Given that the material cost of silver diamine
fluoride is a small fraction of that for sealants ($0.10 per dose and $3.00 per application
on multiple teeth) and can be applied by dental assistants instead of the dentist with an
estimated clinical e cacy equal to sealants, upcoming economic evaluations of randomized
clinical trials examining silver diamine fluoride relative to other preventive methods may
indeed find that silver diamine fluoride is cost-saving as well. Quality of life measures may
be especially important in evaluating preventive interventions such as silver diamine fluo-
ride among non-pediatric populations, because silver diamine fluoride may stain the tooth
partially black in areas where there are active infections. Hence, providing sealants may be
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not only cost-e↵ective but cost-saving from the perspective of public payers, but additional
work examining the cost-e↵ectiveness of other procedures (such as silver diamine fluoride)
incorporating non-oral health outcomes of interest (such as quality of life and medical ex-
penditures) are needed. Furthermore, it remains unclear whether preventive treatments
that are cost-saving from a societal perspective would be cost-saving or cost-e↵ective for
insurers, given that the decreased costs from restorative procedures and decreased medical
costs may need to accrue over a longer period of time (over one year) for provision of a
preventive treatment to be cost-e↵ective. If insurers retain enrollees over a relatively long
period of time (perhaps due to inertia), then it is more likely that providing some preventive
dental services may be cost-e↵ective.
2. Do people already purchase dental services without coverage? Suppose then
that preventive dental treatments and routine examinations are cost-e↵ective - do individ-
uals choose to purchase them even without dental coverage? Individuals without dental
coverage have the option to see a dentist by paying out-of-pocket and/or purchasing a pre-
payment plan directly from the o ce. Because data on uninsured dental patients is di cult
to obtain other than from practice-level data from individual dental o ces or dental schools,
the best source of data is then survey data asking about dental utilization over a large pop-
ulation. Based on the 2000-2012 data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, Nasseh
and Vujicic (2014) found that in 2012, only 35.4 percent of working-age adults visited the
dentist, and that there was a steady decline in utilization among this group over the time
period analyzed. Wall et al. (2012) used data from the National Health Interview Survey
(NHIS) and found similarly that among non-elderly adults, ”utilization has been falling
steadily since 1997 [to 2010] among all but the wealthiest income group”, which appeared
to be related to decreases in private insurance coverage and increases in public coverage,
where the majority of adult Medicaid programs do not provide adult dental benefits. This
is in line with Chalmers et al. (2016) mentioned in the previous section, which found that
an increase in Medicaid adult coverage in Kentucky led to an increase in emergency de-
partment discharges due to dental-related conditions. Hence, this suggests that utilization
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of dental services is tied to dental coverage and that loss of dental coverage leads to an
increase in pent-up demand for dental services, ultimately culminating in increases in the
emergency department (and possibly other medical facilities, such as primary care clinics)
for dental-related emergencies.
3. Are consumers responsive to price changes for dental care? Though the
literature is again lacking in empirical tests, the price elasticity of demand for dental care
has been suggested to be high, because dental issues are seldom emergencies and dental
care can be delayed for some period of time without significant consequences of overall
systemic health Sintonen and Linnosmaa (2000). The best evidence to date estimating
the price elasticity of demand for dental services comes from the RAND Health Insurance
Experiment, where individuals were randomized to plans with varying levels of cost-sharing
that covered medical and dental services under the same plan. They find that there is some
evidence that dental services are ”significantly more responsive... to cost sharing during
the first year of dental coverage than are other outpatient health services” but are not
responsive in the long run to cost-sharing. However, this result has limited applicability in
the current dental insurance setting - the insurance coverage provided through the RAND
experiment included both medical and dental services, and took the traditional insurance
structure instead of being structured like current dental benefits which are similar to pre-
payment plans for routine services. Meyerhoefer et al. (2014) found that use of preventive
and restorative dental services was insensitive to out-of-pocket price, but this was based on
MEPS survey data with potentially endogenous variation in dental coverage status and with
no information on dental coverage levels across individuals. Further research is necessitated
to examine this question, which will support whether or not preventive dental care should
be incorporated into health insurance plans.
4. Would adding coverage for dental services increase utilization of (preventive
and/or cost-e↵ective) dental care and/or decrease use of restorative services?
There is evidence that having dental coverage in its current structure is associated with a
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higher probability of visiting the dentist and having any dental utilization, but how much
of this e↵ect is from self-selection into dental insurance or an underlying demand for dental
services is unclear. However, Nasseh and Vujicic (2015) states that ”[individuals] with
private dental benefits [are] twice as likely to visit a dentist compared to [people] without
any benefits” and that the decline in private dental coverage in the population has occurred
simultaneously with a drop in dental care utilization especially among working-age adults.
Potential areas to test for a causal linkage between inclusion of dental coverage in medical
plans and increased dental utilization are the embedded pediatric dental benefits in medical
plans on the health insurance exchanges through the recent A↵ordable Care Act, and dental
benefits in Medicare Advantage plans that are available as part of plans by default or as an
optional supplemental benefit.
However, it is not clear that the current structure of dental benefits should be used in
medical plans primarily because of the incentive to use restorative over preventive care gen-
erally from the current fee-for-service system. Excluding restorative treatment from benefits
may be only a partial solution that ignores the demand for restorative treatments among
individuals with pent-up demand for dental services and whose underlying severity neces-
sitates some restorative treatments. Even if preventive treatments were to be reimbursed
highly over restorative treatments, this may not be su cient to account for the loss of fu-
ture income from using preventive treatment, dental providers may refuse to participate,
or public provision of preventive care through alternate methods of delivery may be more
cost-e↵ective.
Restructuring dental provider payments to be based on a bundled payment mechanism
rather than on fee-for-service may be a solution to the problem of how to provide dental
providers with the proper incentives for treatment. There are multiple barriers to this,
mostly due to the outstanding questions of 1) how to define a cycle of care and measure
changes in dental health, 2) how to define which preventive dental procedures are cost-
e↵ective and under what conditions to allow for treatment variability, and 3) how to measure
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quality of care to encourage appropriate care. Because dentistry does not have ”a tradition
of formally reporting specific diagnoses or associating such diagnoses with specific services,
especially through the claims process” (Dental Quality Alliance, 2016), there is currently
no diagnoses in dental claims used to track patient outcomes within diagnosis groups nor
to trace quality and appropriateness of the dental care provided to the patient. Instead,
measures that are typically used in dentistry are process measures rather than outcome
focused measurements (Dental Quality Alliance, 2016). To begin to bridge this gap, a set of
dental diagnostic codes (SNO-DDS) was recently approved as a national standard and has
been implemented in electronic dental record systems at several universities including New
York University College of Dentistry, with more expected to adopt in the next few years
(Manchir, 2016).
Should Health Insurers Incorporate Dental Benefits? Though there is a move
towards establishing the linkages between medical and dental costs generally, there is yet
more work to be done to establish whether most preventive dental procedures are cost-
e↵ective, and whether coverage of preventive dental procedures would influence patients’
and providers’ treatment choices. Additionally, the current structure of dental payment may
not su ce for e cient delivery of preventive dental services, and changing the system of
reimbursements to dentists to align with current clinical evidence would require an upheaval
of current claim processing requirements for dental o ces to implement dental diagnostic
coding and the development and standardization of oral health outcome measures instead of
process measures. Dentists would also need to be willing to participate in insurance plans
implementing these changes, which is only likely to take place given either inclusion of
dental benefits into essential health benefits, or if dental insurers are able to ensure patient
volume in dental o ces. More concerning, however, is that a shift towards preventive dental
care and away from restorative care may necessarily decrease the future demand for dental
services and would require a major shift in the practice decisions of dentists.
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5.3. Conclusion
There is a general concern that while there may be societal welfare gains from increased
provision of clinically e↵ective preventive dental procedures, the current structure of dental
insurance and reimbursements to dental providers and the practice patterns of dentists tends
to incentivize restorative over preventive care. As a result, though public programs such as
Medicaid and private health insurers may benefit from the decreases in medical expenditure
and utilization from improved dental utilization among their relevant populations, there is
still work to be done to establish the cost-e↵ectiveness of many preventive dental treatments
and the linkage between dental and medical costs to incentivize payers to overhaul the
current structure of dental insurance. Additionally, an overhaul of current dental insurance
structure would imply a major shift in how dentists practice and are trained to practice,
which would need to involve reform of scope of practice acts and dental school training.
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CHAPTER 6 : Conclusion
In this dissertation, I examine the supply-side e↵ects of insurance expansions through the
lens of models of provider behavior with demand inducement. Because the problems with
provider agency that exist in medicine also exist in dental, and there exists substantial
excess capacity within dental practices, a private insurance expansion provides an opportu-
nity to test for whether demand inducement exists among dentists and whether insurance
expansions are an available policy lever to decrease the amount of provider-initiated over-
utilization. Furthermore, Chapter 6 introduces the idea that the incentive to induce demand
for dentists is exaggerated through the misalignment of provider reimbursement with the
clinical benefit of dental treatments. Given that mispricing of procedures is an issue also
in general health care markets, evaluating whether insurance expansions will exacerbate or
limit the problems with provider incentives given suboptimal plan design is a salient topic
that applies to the health care market more generally, and can be evaluated in the dental
market.
In particular, the dental market is a setting in which the incentive to induce demand is
exacerbated by the misalignment and opposition between provider financial incentives and
the clinical e cacy of dental treatments. Though the majority of dental caries are seen
to be preventable through improvement of dental hygiene habits, due to the nature of
caries progression which is non-linear and fluctuates over time between remineralization and
demineralization, providers generally are not reimbursed well or at all by insurance plans to
assess risk for caries or improving dental hygiene habits of patients. Similarly, there exist a
number of low-cost preventive dental procedures that can arrest or prevent the progression
of cavities, such as silver diamine fluoride, sealants, and fluoride (Niederman et al., 2015,
forthcoming), which are simple and quick to provide, that are either not reimbursed by
dental plans or at very low levels. Because of the low reimbursement rates, coupled with
the potential e↵ect that providing e↵ective preventive dental care would have on decreasing
future profits due to decreased caries prevalence in the patient population, these procedures
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(which are generally quick and cost very little to the dentist) tend to go underused.
A priori, the simple extension of the McGuire and Pauly (1991) model of provider behavior
with demand inducement suggests that even when there is an incentive to induce demand
for more intensive, restorative procedures, an increase in private dental insurance coverage
may decrease the incentive to induce demand and lead to shifts away from restorative
procedures towards preventive and/or routine procedures. Hence, rather than exacerbating
the problem of provider-initiated overutilization of restorative care and under-utilization
of preventive care, a private dental insurance expansion could provide at least a short run
solution to improve provision of preventive dental care. Given the monetary and political
costs of overhauling the entire dental system (dental insurance, provider payment, and
provider practice patterns), increasing dental insurance coverage may be a more e cient
way to decrease concerns about demand inducement in dentistry.
To support this, I discuss in depth the general structure of dental insurance reimbursement
to providers and where there is potential to induce demand, as well as the negative wel-
fare e↵ects on patients from demand inducement. To underline that the issue with dental
reimbursement structures is not easily resolved and leads to a general incentive to reduce
use of clinically e↵ective preventive care and increase use of restorative dental procedures, a
discussion of why the current divide between dental and medical insurance leads to the mis-
pricing of dental procedures, and why dental insurers have little to no incentive to improve
provision of clinically e↵ective preventive care among their enrollees. Given that cavities
are preventable bacterial infections, but are prevalent to epidemic proportions and are cur-
rently the fifth most expensive disease to treat, the underuse of preventive dental care and
subsequent overuse of restorative care can lead to negative externalities for the public health
safety net (especially for hospitals and emergency rooms, which are ill-equipped to deal with
dental emergencies and are not cost-e↵ective sources of dental care relative to receiving care
at dental o ces), health insurers (through increased likelihood of associated diseases), and
the workforce. I then consider whether there are alternate ways of structuring the payment
147
and delivery of dental care, specifically through inclusion of dental benefits as part of a
health plan. Though there are yet-unanswered questions about the cost-e↵ectiveness of dif-
ferent dental procedures across various populations, the linkages between oral and systemic
health, and the resulting linkages between oral health expenditures and medical expendi-
tures, none of the answers thus far suggest that dental procedures should not be included
as part of preventive benefits in health plans.
However, given the mispricing of procedures within current dental benefit structures, I then
seek to evaluate whether increases in enrollment in dental benefits as currently structured,
such as through an insurance mandate or insurance expansion, would disincentivize high
intensity, restorative procedures in favor of preventive and routine procedures. The answer
to this question may then inform health insurers as to what would occur if they incorporated
dental benefits into health plans with the current structure of reimbursement for dental
providers. If the decreases in demand inducement are substantive given a ”large enough”
exogenous increase in demand for dental services, then increasing dental coverage regardless
of its suboptimal payment structure (from a societal perspective and perhaps from a health
insurer’s perspective) may be a feasible short run solution to shift dental practices away from
restorative procedures towards more ro utine, preventive procedures. This is in contrast
to overhauling and innovating new dental payment structures, or directly altering the way
dentists practice or are trained.
Though the analysis finds that a unexpected increase in market demand for dental care
from an insurance expansion leads to increases in o ce workloads, which then yield mild
substitution away from high intensity cavity procedures, the substitution is towards routine
procedures that are reimbursed by dental plans generally at 100% and with little to no
preventive benefit to patients (in the case of diagnostic imaging procedures. This does not
necessarily apply to cleanings, though there is currently no robust evidence on whether
cleanings do or do not decrease the likelihood of cavities). As a result, though the decreases
in the high intensity cavity procedures found in the analysis are almost unambiguously
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welfare improving for patients, given the clinical background discussed in Chapter 2, the
decreases may not be substantive enough to justify the increase in low-value treatments
that are quick for dental providers to administer through dental hygienists. Hence, the
results are mixed - though the analysis yields evidence pointing towards the existence of
demand inducement among dental providers, it is unlikely that a dental insurance expansion
or a dental coverage mandate would lead to increases in clinically-e↵ective preventive care.
Instead, an increase in coverage for dental benefits as currently structured would likely
yield a decrease in capacity-intensive, high intensity low value treatment to low intensity,
low value treatments that are not capacity intensive. As a result, more work is yet to be
done on how to increase provision and utilization of preventive dental care, especially for
adults and for those with insurance coverage.
Because catastrophic dental costs or catastrophic medical costs resulting from insu cient
utilization of clinically e↵ective preventive care do not fall upon the dental insurer, dental
insurers are not incentivized to decrease the incentives for demand inducement nor to pro-
vide incentives for dental providers to increase utilization of clinically e↵ective preventive
care. I then discuss the policy levers available for addressing the misalignment of clinical
e cacy and provider reimbursement, using the theory of optimal insurance and optimal
coverage of preventive care. However, given the substantial costs to reforming delivery and
payment of dental care, many of the suggested solutions are not implementable in the short
run.
Though the theoretical literature on provider behavior and inducement suggests that an
insurance expansion may provide a short run solution to decrease the overall incentive
to induce demand in dental practices, I find that the substitution away from intensive
procedures towards routine procedures in the context of reimbursement systems that are
heavily flawed and that give ample incentive to induce demand for intensive services suggest
that insurance expansions may decrease (at least in the short-run) the incentive to induce
demand and to increase utilization of lower intensity procedures. However, the increase in
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utilization among lower intensity, routine, and/or preventive services is limited to treatments
that are reimbursed well by the insurer. For instance, treatments that have been clinically
shown to be e↵ective in preventing cavities and that have been shown to be cost-e↵ective or
cost-saving under certain scenarios, such as sealants, do not see an increase in utilization.
This may be because of the decrease in future income that results from using highly e↵ective
preventive care.
As a result, the analyses suggest that though insurance expansions do not exacerbate in-
centives to induce demand via imperfect reimbursement mechanisms to providers, they do
not solve the issues of low utilization of clinically e↵ective preventive care. However, in-
surance expansions may bridge the gap between the status quo - not reforming and not
decreasing the amount of demand inducement by providers - and completely reforming the
payment and delivery system in dental markets. This is because a su ciently large enough
dental insurance expansion may shift practice patterns towards lower intensity treatments,
and reconcile the di↵erences between the current system of dental care delivery focused
primarily upon restorative care and a system focused upon delivery of preventive care that
may be preferred by patients, medical insurers, and policymakers. A gradual shift away
from restorative care-based dental practice patterns could lead to a shift to how dentists
are trained to practice, thus clearing the way for reform of scope of practice acts and dental
school training.
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APPENDIX
Appendix
A.1. Full Theoretical Model
I extend the McGuire and Pauly (1991) model to incorporate capacity constraints, moral
hazard among the newly insured, and distinguish between newly insured and continuously
insured patients. To do this, I follow the general framework of McGuire and Pauly (1991),
where providers have utility over total income Y and disutility from total inducement I. We
assume that utility is separable in income and inducement. The objective function is then
given by the following:
U(Y, I) = U(Y ) + U(I)
Total inducement I is made up of the inducement levels per person for each service j,
called ij . The inducement level with the out-of-pocket price of treatment pj a↵ects the
quantity response xj , which is a function that gives the amount or intensity of each service
type supplied to the patient. The higher the inducement level, the higher the quantity or
intensity of the service. However, xj is also a↵ected by the out-of-pocket price of treatment
pj . The higher the out-of-pocket price of treatment pj , the more inducement e↵ort required
to achieve a given level of quantity or intensity. This results in xj = xj(ij , pj), where
dxj
dij
> 0, dxjdpj < 0,
d2xj
dijdpj
< 0. This captures the idea that when patients do not face the full
price of treatment (especially for routine procedures, such as cleanings and X-rays) when
they become insured, patients will demand more services so that less inducement e↵ort is
needed to achieve each level of quantity or intensity. Each service receives a margin per
unit that encapsulates both the total reimbursement received by the provider for providing
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the service, net of material, labor (for example, the labor supplied by the dental hygienist
in the practice), and time costs. The more intense or the more quantity that is supplied of
each service per patient, the higher the profit from that service.
I separate patients into two di↵erent groups in the practice, the continuously insured and
the newly insured. There are four potential groups of patients in the practice: 1) those who
were previously and continue to be insured and seeing the dentist, 2) those who are newly
insured and were not seeing the dentist previously, 3) those who are newly insured and
were seeing the dentist out-of-pocket previously, and 4) those who are seeing the dentist
out-of-pocket. Of these groups, the two that can be identified in the data are groups (1)
and (2), the continuously insured and the newly insured. Because the e↵ect of the insurance
expansion used in this paper primarily increases insurance rates among those previously not
seeing the dentist out-of-pocket (discussed later in Section V on data and measurement),
I abstract away from groups (3) and (4), those who were seeing the dentist out-of-pocket
without insurance at some point in time. The number of continuously insured patients is
given by N1 and the number of newly insured patients who were not previously seeing the
dentist is given by N2. Hence, the total inducement e↵ort in the practice is given by
I = N1
X
j
i1j +N2
X
j
i2j
Similarly, the income in the practice is given by
Y = N1
X
j
mjx1j(i1j , p1j) +N2
X
j
mjx2j(i2j , p2j)
where p1j and p2j capture the di↵erence in out-of-pocket price for continuously insured and
newly insured patients. Here, p1j and p2j are equal given enrollment in insurance, but when
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group 2 newly receives insurance, they also experience a shock to their out-of-pocket price
for treatment, which previously was prohibitively high (so that they were previously not
seeing the dentist without insurance) and declines after insurance receipt. The change in
p2j captures the idea that patients may increase their consumption of dental services and
be less resistant to inducement when the out-of-pocket price of services declines, especially
for cleanings and X-rays, upon becoming insured in a dental plan.
To incorporate the capacity level of the practice K, which can represent the combination of
the provider’s labor supply along with the physical capacity of the practice (i.e. the number
of chairs available), I require that the total intensity and quantity of services required does
not exceed K. Each service takes up tj units of the o ce’s capacity, and the higher the
intensity or quantity provided of the service, the more capacity is used (tjxj). The shadow
cost of expanding the practice capacity K is given by  . The capacity constraint as a result
is
K  N1
X
j
t1jx1j(i1j , p1j) N2
X
j
t2jx2j(i2j , p2j)   0
The resulting optimization problem is then the following:
maxi1j ,i2j U(Y, I) = U(Y ) + U(I)
s.t. K  N1
X
j
t1jx1j(i1j , p1j) N2
X
j
t2jx2j(i2j , p2j)   0
with Y = N1
X
j
mjx1j(i1j , p1j) +N2
X
j
mjx2j(i2j , p2j)
I = N1
X
j
i1j +N2
X
j
i2j
Using the Lagrangian method and placing   as the Lagrangian multiplier on the capacity
constraint, I obtain the following optimality condition for each group and service combina-
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tion (suppressing the group and service identifiers for simplified notation):
mxi =
 UI +  txi
UY
where UY and UI are respectively the marginal utility from total income and marginal
disutility from total inducement, and xi is the marginal increase in the quantity response
from the inducement level per service per patient. The predictions generated from this
optimality condition are the following:
Prediction 1: An increase in o ce size leads to downward pressure on induce-
ment levels per service per patient.
As in the McGuire and Pauly (1991) model, an increase in N leads to an increase in
marginal disutility from total inducement and a decrease in marginal utility from total
income, holding fixed levels of inducement. To bring the optimality condition back to
equality, there must be a decrease in the amount of inducement per service. In addition,
an increase in N may also cause the capacity constraint may become binding so that the
shadow cost of expanding capacity becomes nonzero (  > 0). A nonzero shadow cost
puts additional downward pressure on inducement levels per service per patient, and this
downward pressure is stronger for services that take up more capacity in the practice (t is
higher). This leads to:
Prediction 2: An increase in o ce size that makes the capacity constraint bind,
holding fixed levels of inducement per service per patient, leads to decreased
inducement per service per patient, with stronger results for services that take
up more capacity in the practice.
We also have
Prediction 3: A decrease in (due to the gain in insurance coverage upon the
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newly insured group) leads to an increase in the quantity of services for the
newly insured.
Because Predictions 1 and 2 imply a decline in the level of inducement per service per pa-
tient, leading to a decline in quantity for more intensive services, while Prediction 3 implies
an increase in quantity for all services among the newly insured, there is an ambiguous
prediction for the quantity of services provided per newly insured patient. To avoid am-
biguous predictions, I focus attention on the continually insured in the practices who are
not experiencing abrupt changes in plan design. However, if the capacity constraint be-
comes binding and the e↵ect of capacity especially for more time- and capacity-intensive
procedures (that generally tend to be more intensive services in dentistry) dominates the
moral hazard e↵ect for the newly insured, it may be possible to detect a stronger decline
in the quantity of services provided per newly insured patient for more intensive services
relative to less intensive services (such as cleanings and X-rays).
Hypothesis 1: An increase in N2 will lead to a decrease in inducement for the
continuously insured.
Hypothesis 2: When capacity constraints become binding, an increase in N2
will lead to stronger decreases in inducement for more capacity-intensive services
among the continuously insured.
Corollary: Hypothesis 2 may hold for the newly insured if the capacity e↵ect
dominates the moral hazard e↵ect for the newly insured.
Overall, the model implies that there may be a change in the general equilibrium of the
quantity and quality of services provided across all patients, and thus implies spillovers onto
continuously insured patients.
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